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Abstract
Modern mobile devices are fast, programmable and feature localization and wireless capabil-
ities. These technological advances notably facilitate mobile access to Internet, development
of mobile applications and sharing of personal information, such as location information. Cell
phone users can for example share their whereabouts with friends on online social networks.
Following this trend, the field of ubiquitous computing foresees communication networks com-
posed of increasingly inter-connected wireless devices offering new ways to collect and share
information in the future.
It also becomes harder to control the spread of personal information. Privacy is a critical
challenge of ubiquitous computing as sharing personal information exposes users’ private lives.
Traditional techniques to protect privacy in wired networks may be inadequate in mobile
networks because users are mobile, have short-lived encounters and their communications can
be easily eavesdropped upon. These characteristics introduce new privacy threats related to
location information: a malicious entity can track users’ whereabouts and learn aspects of
users’ private lives that may not be apparent at first. In this dissertation, we focus on three
important aspects of location privacy: location privacy threats, location-privacy preserving
mechanisms, and privacy-preservation in pervasive social networks.
Considering the recent surge of mobile applications, we begin by investigating location
privacy threats of location-based services. We push further the understanding of the privacy
risk by identifying the type and quantity of location information that statistically reveals
users’ identities and points of interest to third parties. Our results indicate that users are at
risk even if they access location-based services episodically. This highlights the need to design
privacy into location-based services.
In the second part of this thesis, we delve into the subject of privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms for mobile ad hoc networks. First, we evaluate a privacy architecture that relies on the
concept of mix zones to engineer anonymity sets. Second, we identify the need for protocols to
coordinate the establishment of mix zones and design centralized and distributed approaches.
Because individuals may have different privacy requirements, we craft a game-theoretic model
of location privacy to analyze distributed protocols. This model predicts strategic behavior
of rational devices that protects their privacy at a minimum cost. This prediction leads to
the design of efficient privacy-preserving protocols. Finally, we develop a dynamic model of
interactions between mobile devices in order to analytically evaluate the level of privacy pro-
vided by mix zones. Our results indicate the feasibility and limitations of privacy protection
based on mix zones.
In the third part, we extend the communication model of mobile ad hoc networks to ex-
plore social aspects: users form groups called “communities” based on interests, proximity, or
social relations and rely on these communities to communicate and discover their context. We
analyze using challenge-response methodology the privacy implications of this new communi-
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cation primitive. Our results indicate that, although repeated interactions between members
of the same community leak community memberships, it is possible to design efficient schemes
to preserve privacy in this setting.
This work is part of the recent trend of designing privacy protocols to protect individuals.
In this context, the author hopes that the results obtained, with both their limitations and
their promises, will inspire future work on the preservation of privacy.
Keywords: location privacy, wireless networks, location-based services, ad hoc networks,
rationality, game theory, communities
Re´sume´
Les outils de communication sont de plus en plus rapides, programmables et mobiles. Ces
avance´es technologiques facilitent notamment l’acce`s mobile a` Internet, le de´veloppement
d’applications mobiles et le partage d’informations personnelles. Les utilisateurs de te´le´phones
portables peuvent par exemple partager leurs positions ge´ographiques avec des amis sur les
re´seaux sociaux en ligne. Les futurs re´seaux de communication seront sans doute encore
plus omnipre´sents dans les activite´s quotidiennes. Ainsi, leur ubiquite´ permettra d’autant
plus le partage d’informations personnelles. Ce type de re´seaux utilisera entre autres des
communications sans fil ad hoc et distribue´es. De ce fait, les re´seaux de communication
transporterons de plus en plus de donne´es personnelles.
Ne´anmoins, il devient aussi plus difficile de controˆler le partage des informations person-
nelles. La confidentialite´ des donne´es personnelles est donc un e´le´ment critique des re´seaux
de communication. Les solutions de se´curite´ traditionnelles des re´seaux filaires ne sont pas
toujours ade´quates pour la protection des donne´es dans les re´seaux mobiles a` cause de la
mobilite´ des utilisateurs et de l’e´coute aise´e des communications sans fil. Ces caracte´ristiques
entraˆınent de nouvelles menaces, en particulier a` l’encontre des donne´es de localisation. Une
entite´ malveillante peut suivre les de´placements de certains utilisateurs et ainsi de´couvrir des
aspects de leurs vies prive´es qui ne sont pas apparents. Dans cette the`se, nous e´tudions ces
menaces et explorons diffe´rentes approches afin de prote´ger la confidentialite´ des donne´es de
localisation.
Conside´rant la popularite´ croissante des applications mobiles, nous commenc¸ons par l’e´tude
de la confidentialite´ des donne´es dans les services de localisation. Nos recherches permettent
d’identifier le type et la quantite´ de donne´es de localisation qui suffisent afin de statistique-
ment obtenir l’identite´ et les points d’inte´reˆt des utilisateurs d’un service de localisation. Ces
re´sultats clarifient le danger et ainsi encouragent l’adoption de mesures de protection. Nos
expe´rimentations indiquent que le risque est re´el pour les utilisateurs, meˆme s’ils re´ve`lent peu
de donne´es de localisation. Ceci souligne le besoin de prendre en compte la sphe`re prive´e dans
la conception de services de localisation.
Dans la deuxie`me partie de la the`se, nous proposons plusieurs me´canismes de protection
des donne´es dans les re´seaux de communication ad hoc. D’abord, nous e´valuons une archi-
tecture de se´curite´ base´e sur le concept de zones de confusion utilise´es afin de confondre une
entite´ malicieuse qui chercherait a` suivre les de´placements d’individus. Ensuite, nous mon-
trons qu’il est ne´cessaire de coordonner la cre´ation de zones de confusion a` l’aide de protocoles
de se´curite´. Nous conside´rons des approches de types centralise´ et distribue´. Etant donne´
que chaque individu peut avoir diffe´rents crite`res de protection, nous de´veloppons un mode`le
base´ sur la the´orie des jeux et une approche distribue´e afin d’analyser la capacite´ d’individus
rationnels a` coordonner leur efforts. Ce mode`le permet notamment de pre´dire la strate´gie
d’agents rationnels qui de´sirent minimiser leurs couˆts et maximiser leur confidentialite´ et
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ainsi de concevoir des protocoles plus efficaces. Finalement, nous e´valuons analytiquement le
niveau de protection obtenu a` l’aide des zones de confusion en utilisant un mode`le dynamique
d’interaction entre les utilisateurs mobiles. Nos re´sultats identifient le potentiel ainsi que les
limites de la protection a` base de zones de confusion.
Dans la troisie`me partie, nous explorons les aspects sociaux des re´seaux de communication:
les utilisateurs peuvent former des groupes appele´s communaute´s base´s sur leurs inte´reˆts, leur
proximite´ ou encore leurs relations sociales. Ces communaute´s peuvent notamment eˆtre util-
ise´e dans les re´seaux ad hoc afin d’interagir avec des personnes qui ont des inte´reˆts communs.
A l’aide d’une me´thodologie de de´fi-re´ponse, nous analysons les implications sur la vie prive´e
de ce genre de communications. Nous observons notamment que des interactions re´pe´te´es
entre membres d’une meˆme communaute´ permettent a` une entite´ malicieuse d’identifier les
membres de la communaute´.
Ce travail vise a` de´velopper des solutions technologiques qui prote`gent les donne´es per-
sonnelles des utilisateurs de nouvelles technologies. Dans ce contexte, l’auteur espe`re que les
re´sultats obtenus, avec leurs limites et leurs promesses, puissent inspirer de futurs travaux sur
la protection de la vie prive´e.
Mots-Cle´s: protection des donne´es de localisation, re´seaux sans fil, re´seaux ad hoc, services
de localisation, rationalite´, the´orie des jeux, communaute´s
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Introduction
L’enfer, c’est les autres.
Huis clos - Jean-Paul Sartre
Wireless communication devices are increasingly integrated into everyday activities. It has
only taken two decades for cellular networks to evolve from a marginal feature to a worldwide
phenomenon. Cell phones help more than 5 billion people communicate by making calls,
exchanging short messages (SMS), emails or photographs, downloading videos and updating
their online social network profile. As currently experienced with the surge of applications for
handheld devices, mobile communication devices provide tremendous benefits for end users
and service providers. Following this trend, the field of ubiquitous computing foresees an
era where computing devices will be everywhere and wirelessly inter-connected using using
WiFi, Bluetooth, radio-frequency identification (RFID) or near-field communications (NFC).
Such pervasive communications offer opportunities to interact in new ways and facilitate the
sharing of information.
One important feature of mobile devices is their ability to collect contextual information:
cell phones can use sensors such as a microphone, a GPS receiver, or WiFi wireless interface
in order to identify users’ environment in the real world. This understanding of users’ context
enables mobile devices to infer what users may be looking for and offer, for example, cus-
tomized services. Location information is an important piece of contextual data commonly
available in modern handsets: users can share their location information with third-parties
via infrastructure-based communications in return for location-based services [65, 197]. In the
future, most information shared on the Internet may have a location coordinate. Another as-
pect of contextual data is the neighborhood of communication devices: if mobile devices could
wirelessly interact, they would know the set of devices in proximity and increase their envi-
ronment awareness. Technologies, such as WiFi and Bluetooth, are likely to fuel the adoption
of so-called peer-to-peer wireless communications. In addition to classic cellular communica-
tions, peer-to-peer wireless communications have the potential to enable new services based
on the location of users and the devices in proximity, such as vehicular networks [113] and
pervasive social networks [1, 3, 4, 10, 189].
These technological advances are admirable in many respects, but also raise fundamental
privacy implications. Until recently, users exploited the natural obscurity provided by real-
world constraints in order to protect their privacy. However, new communication technologies
change the medium of interaction and may thus create new privacy threats [14]. In particular,
when users share their precise location information with location-based services, operators of
those services learn users’ visited locations. Even if users access those services episodically,
revealed locations may enable the identification of users interests. Similarly, peer-to-peer
wireless communications based on WiFi in ad hoc mode (e.g., WiFi Direct [11] or Nokia
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Instant Community [32]) or similar technology (e.g., FlashLinQ [144]) reveal the presence
of a given device to eavesdroppers. Unlike communications with location-based services,
such communications happen frequently and are easy to observe. This thrust of peer-to-peer
wireless technologies will intensify the amount of personal data sent over the air. Third-parties
may thus track users’ whereabouts with high granularity based on the broadcasted wireless
messages. In other words, if users access location-based services or broadcast wireless messages
to nearby devices, malicious entities could learn users’ whereabouts, thus threatening location
privacy . Location information only reveals where users are or have been. Yet, a persistent
collection of location data can expose aspects of users’ private lives that may not be apparent
at first. For example, an eavesdropper may obtain users’ identities and profile their interests
based on users’ presence or absence at specific locations. As communication technologies
become pervasive, users and network designers face new challenges to limit the undesirable
spread of personal information.
In view of this problem, the subject of this thesis is the design of privacy mechanisms
that protect the location privacy of users in current and upcoming wireless networks. We
explore emerging location privacy threats, investigate the use of privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms and analyze their performance in various conditions. Before describing our approach
and contributions, we introduce the notion of privacy in the following section.
Understanding Privacy
Society values privacy. In nearly every nation, constitutional rights seek to protect privacy as
it is considered a fundamental right [13, 24, 163, 209]. Multiple reasons motivated legislators
to protect citizens’ privacy. They boil down to one major concern. In many cases, knowing
information about an individual means having power on that individual. Such asymmetric
situation could be misused by governments, corporations or isolated persons that collected
private information. Yet, privacy is a concept in disarray [205] as new technologies increasingly
simplify the sharing of personal information. Although the development of technology already
raised privacy concerns in the past, with photography or landline phones for example [219,
220], the scale of the problem is much larger with the rise of the personal computer, of the
Internet and of pervasive communications. End users increasingly share personal data with
global service providers such as Google and Yahoo including search and location-based queries.
Some consider that the potential benefits of upcoming technologies may outweigh the
possible loss of privacy. Studies show that a larger connectivity in a communication network
improves the efficiency of the network to transmit information [201]. In particular, it simplifies
the sharing of information, the acquisition of knowledge and the active participation in society.
For example, the online encyclopedia Wikipedia is the unique result of global sharing of
knowledge. In this setting, privacy can even be considered detrimental as it may be perceived
as an antisocial conduct, conflicting with the efficiency of society by making it, for example,
more difficult to control misbehavior. In addition, people sometimes suffer from their inability
to relate in a meaningful way and may feel isolated from the rest of the world. Pervasive
communications have the potential to alleviate this issue by enabling new and perhaps better
ways to interact. For example, social media such as Twitter and Facebook provide new ways
to socialize and new kinds of publicity [36]. Such tools are often described as privacy invasive
applications. Yet, for most people, features outweigh potential privacy concerns. Social media
is addictive because of the reinforcement of feeling connected and influential. These tools can
3help people exist in a hyper-connected world through the creation of online alter egos and
share with a global audience.
Still, there is value in not opening entirely to new technologies: isolation creates the
solitude necessary to interact with ourselves. Solitude is crucial to develop reflection, build
opinions and ultimately have a private life. After all, the essence of private life is to allow
people to actually have something to share, in order to have a public life [133]. Privacy in
other words, is essential in the process of identity construction. Hence, users should be able
to share private information with others and maintain the control of their information, i.e.,
how the information is used and by whom. In that way, the usage of private information
remains in context, used exclusively in the way the data owner had in mind.
The delicate balance between solitude and social life emerged during the Age of Enlight-
enment expressing that “La liberte´ des uns s’arreˆte la` ou` commence celle des autres”.1 Since
then, society makes space for individuals because of the social benefits this space provides.
Yet, with new communication technologies such as the Internet, personal information is often
shared publicly by default: all activities take place in public. In this setting, users of the
Internet actively contribute to the globalization of surveillance: their personal data can be
collected by third parties, processed in order to profile their preferences and exploited for
unintended use. Hence, it becomes crucial to understand privacy in order to design commu-
nication protocols that actually help people better communicate.
Contextual Privacy
Privacy is usually defined as the right to be left alone. In information systems, it refers to
the ability of users to control the spread of their personally identifiable information (PII). In
practice, the definition of privacy is often misinterpreted because of the peculiarities of real
world scenarios. Privacy is often treated as a unitary concept, one essential common feature
applicable to all scenarios. For example, some consider privacy as secrecy, bringing forth
the “nothing to hide” argument [206]. Under this argument, users should not be allowed to
perform anonymous actions (i.e., to hide their identity while performing an action). Instead,
transparency should be encouraged because innocent people have nothing to hide and do not
need anonymity. This prevents the use of anonymity for negative purposes, such as hate
speech or Internet trolling. Yet, in other contexts, anonymity is essential to preserve free
speech so that people express ideas without facing risks. For example, minorities can express
their opinions without risking blame from the majority. Hence, the nothing-to-hide argument
speaks to some problems, but not to others and is not a good interpretation of the definition
of privacy.
Instead, scenarios in which privacy is an issue may consist of different yet related compo-
nents, where no feature is common to all. Hence, privacy should be seen as a multi-dimensional
concept [204, 207], drawn from a common pool of similar elements, very much like the phys-
ical resemblance of members of a family [221]. Even if practical situations share common
features, each of them may have different privacy issues. Hence, privacy challenges change
from scenario to scenario, and every detail matters.
The conceptualization of each privacy problem should thus begin from its particular con-
text [164]. The context helps understand privacy threats and design privacy protections. In
particular, the context defines the type of data to protect, how this data is shared and with
1One’s freedom ends where that of another begins.
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whom. Consider, for example, the problem of location privacy in wireless networks: mobile
devices share their location with third parties in return for personalized services. The asso-
ciated threat is the risk that unauthorized third parties link location information to users’
identities in order to track their whereabouts, thus jeopardizing their location privacy. Duck-
ham and Kulik [82] formally defined location privacy as a special type of information privacy
which concerns the claim of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent, their location information is communicated to others.
Privacy Protection
To attain privacy, legal and technological means must be put in place. Privacy regulations can
enforce privacy protection at a large scale using legal actions, such as data protection directives
and fair information practices. This approach is mostly reactive: regulations are defined after
technology is put in place. In addition, corporations have an incentive to slow down the
regulation process in order to reduce the potential costs to comply with new regulations and
to maintain higher degrees of freedom. Another aspect of the problem is that the legal system
is not consistent across different countries or regions, whereas, communication technology is
mostly the same everywhere. This leads to situations where laws protecting privacy are
different from country to country. Consider for example the ongoing debate on the status
of GPS locations [84]: in some US states, location tracking necessitates a warrant; in other
states, its legal status is still unclear.
To avoid this issue, privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) [55, 109, 143] can be incorpo-
rated into the design of new communication protocols. PETs protect privacy by eliminating
or obfuscating personal data, thereby preventing unnecessary processing, misuse or involun-
tary loss of data, without affecting the functionality of the information system [215]. Their
objective is to make it difficult for a malicious entity to link information to specific users. For
example, in the case of location privacy, the adversary should not be able to link a location to
a user. In order to obfuscate personal data, PETs often rely on cryptographic primitives, such
as anonymous authentication and encryption. For example, private information retrieval [63]
is a cryptographic tool that allows a user to retrieve an item from a server’s database without
revealing which item it is retrieving. In mobile networks, PETs are often executed on mobile
devices. Resource constraints of mobile devices might not allow for the use of costly cryp-
tographic techniques. An alternate solution consists in using statistical obfuscation methods
such as data obfuscation. For example, a user can hide the item it retrieved from a database
by simply retrieving a large number of items. In contrast with the strong protection provided
by cryptography, statistical methods provide best-effort protection.
In some systems, cryptographic techniques may be insufficient to provide privacy. In
computer networks, because of the way networking protocols operate, a detailed analysis
of the timing of messages (e.g., time of transmission and reception) can reveal significant
information about communicating parties even if messages are encrypted. For this reason,
anonymous communications techniques usually rely on statistical mixing of data traffic in
addition to cryptographic techniques. The same problem arises in wireless networks where
wireless communications can be observed by passive eavesdroppers. Hence, in this disserta-
tion, we use a combination of cryptographic and statistical obfuscation methods to provide
location privacy in wireless networks.
5The Future of Privacy
The ongoing debate about the future of privacy sees two main trends: some believe that
privacy is “dead”, whereas others believe that privacy remains fundamental.
Some advocate post-privacy optimism: they foresee a transparent society where new in-
stitutions and practices provide benefits that compensate for the loss of privacy. [41, 114]. If
society thrives on differences instead of conformism, openness could facilitate the expression
of personality and the externalization of identity over new communication technologies.
In contrast, post-privacy negativists associate the end of privacy with the end of civiliza-
tion [37, 125, 167]. They argue that the global exposure of all actions in a transparent society
may prompt self-censorship in the form of the chilling effect [196]: some conduct would be
suppressed by fear of penalization and this process would fuel the standardization of society.
Similarly, the difficulty in guaranteeing symmetric access to surveillance technologies would
lead to the exploitation of information by a few, thus making social sorting [151] a reality:
surveillance technology could automate categorization of people in order to influence their life
choices.
Approach
In this thesis, we believe in a society that protects individuals: privacy should be actively
protected to regulate the advancement of technology and to maintain technology at the service
of people. People should have access to tools to control their privacy and determine how to
participate online. In other words, we consider that the goal of communication technology is
to enable people to better communicate and share more with the right people. This task will
certainly become increasingly complex as technologies surpass human capabilities [141] and
become more intertwined with society.
As previously discussed, the design of privacy protocols should start from the context
of the considered scenario. In communication networks, essential pieces of this context are
performance and security properties of communication protocols. For example, in location-
based services, performance depends on the number of communications and computations,
while security depends on authentication and encryption mechanisms. In this dissertation, we
focus on the overhead introduced by privacy-preserving mechanisms. We notably investigate
the influence of cost on the performance of privacy-preserving mechanisms and the effect of
rational behavior by cost-averse entities on the achievable privacy. The consideration of cost
in our analysis may lead to the design of more efficient privacy-preserving protocols.
Information required by communication protocols should be designed to disclose the mini-
mal amount of information. For example, network identifiers used in communication protocols
can aid the traceability of users, thus jeopardizing location privacy. Similarly, in location-
based services, multiple queries containing location information could be linked to a specific
user if a network pseudonym (e.g., IP address) uniquely identifies the user.
Privacy-preserving techniques can be used in conjunction with security mechanisms to
provide other services such as revocation and authentication. In this dissertation, we show
that protecting privacy does not impede security. We develop privacy-preserving mechanisms
that enable misbehavior detection and establishment of trust [185]. We rely on cryptographic
primitives to guarantee security in privacy-preserving communication networks.
We consider privacy-preserving mechanisms that rely on the properties of mobile net-
works and on cryptographic primitives. In particular, the proposed mechanisms exploit the
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randomness of users’ mobility to inhibit tracking users’ whereabouts. We consider distributed
privacy-preserving protocols, as they are particularly suited for decentralized communication
networks such as ad hoc networks. We rely on analytical tools, such as optimization theory,
game theory and mean field theory to model interactions of multiple mobile devices protecting
their location privacy. These tools enable us to predict the result of complex interactions and
evaluate the effectiveness of privacy-preserving mechanisms.
Contributions
We consider the problem of location privacy in existing and emerging networks. We
identify location privacy threats and evaluate location privacy preserving mechanisms. A clear
understanding of location privacy threats is required to design efficient privacy-preserving
mechanisms. Also, privacy-preserving mechanisms change location privacy threats. We con-
sider several system models capturing existing location-based services, emerging wireless net-
works and social networks.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. We investigate location privacy threats in existing location-based services. Although
location-based services are already widely deployed, there is a growing concern over
their privacy implications. We evaluate the relation between the quantity and type
of location information and the ability of the adversary to obtain users’ real identity
and interests. Our analysis quantifies privacy risks in sharing location information
with third parties. We show that, in some cases, third parties can recover personal
user information after a small number of location-based queries and that users with a
regular routine are particularly prone to such threats. These results question the ability
of privacy-preserving mechanisms to obfuscate highly correlated information such as
users’ whereabouts.
2. We evaluate state-of-the-art security and privacy architectures of peer-to-peer wireless
networks. Because these architectures rely on authentication and network identifiers,
devices’ locations can be tracked. We investigate the use of mix zones to anonymize
location traces while preserving functionalities of peer-to-peer wireless services. Mix
zones, like most privacy-preserving algorithms, aim at engineering an anonymity set by
mixing the actions of a set of wireless devices. We propose several protocols to deploy
mix zones in wireless networks and, in particular, a distributed solution - PseudoGame
- that takes rationality into account in order to optimize the trade-off between privacy
and cost. We compare different protocols and show that strategic behavior can lead to
efficient mixing strategies at a reasonable cost.
3. We study a communication primitive that allows users to rely on communities in order to
share information in an ad hoc fashion and enhance social interaction. Communications
induced by this primitive may reveal users’ community membership to eavesdroppers.
We formalize this problem using the concept of community privacy. We propose com-
munication protocols to efficiently identify communities of users in a privacy-preserving
fashion. These protocols are similar to secret handshakes with a focus on cost reduc-
tion and unlinkability. We evaluate the achievable privacy using a challenge-response
formalization and analytically derive the relation between anonymity and unlinkability.
Our results shed light on the achievable unlinkability of secret handshake schemes.
7Outline
This thesis has three parts, all considering location privacy problems from a different angle:
Part I discusses location privacy threats in existing location-based services. It consid-
ers a system where mobile devices episodically share their location with third-parties via
infrastructure-based communications. In Chapter 1, we investigate privacy risks involved in
this type of sharing.
Part II studies location privacy in peer-to-peer wireless networks. We consider a system
model where mobile devices broadcast at high frequency wireless messages that can be easily
eavesdropped (e.g., WiFi in ad hoc mode or Bluetooth). We introduce in Chapter 2 the
network model and the privacy architecture based on mix zones used throughout Part II.
We consider centralized approaches to deploy mix zones in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we
consider distributed approaches to create mix zones in which privacy and cost are traded-
off by rational agents. We compare with simulations the proposed privacy protocols. In
Chapter 5, we push further the analysis of the distributed approach by providing a framework
to analytically evaluate the privacy obtained with mix zones.
Part III explores the relation between peer-to-peer wireless networks and social networks.
We consider a system model where a social network is on top of peer-to-peer wireless networks,
creating so-called pervasive social networks. In Chapter 6, in addition to location privacy,
we consider the data and community privacy issues of such communication networks.

Part I
Location Privacy in Modern
Communication Networks
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Chapter 1
Location Privacy Threats in
Location-based Services
Everyone has three lives: a public life, a
private life, and a secret life.
Gabriel Garc´ıa Ma´rquez
1.1 Introduction
In traditional cellular networks, users share their location with their network operator in
order to obtain voice and data services pervasively. With the emergence of data services,
users increasingly share their location with other parties such as providers of location-based
services (LBSs). Specifically, users first obtain their location by relying on the localization
capability of their mobile device (e.g., GPS or wireless triangulation), share it with LBSs and
then obtain customized services based on their location. Yet, unlike cellular operators, LBSs
are mainly provided for free and generate revenue with location-based advertisement. Hence,
there is a key difference between the business models of LBS providers and cellular operators:
LBS providers aim at profiling their users in order to serve tailored advertisement.
Subscribers of cellular networks know that their personal data is contractually protected.
On the contrary, users of LBSs often lack an understanding of the privacy implications caused
by the use of LBSs [101]. Some users protect their privacy by hiding behind pseudonyms that
are mostly invariant over time (e.g., usernames). Previous works identified privacy threats in-
duced by the use of LBSs and proposed mechanisms to protect user privacy. Essentially, these
mechanisms rely on trusted third-party servers that anonymize requests to LBSs. However,
such privacy-preserving mechanisms are not widely available and users continue sharing their
location information unprotected with third-parties. Similarly, previous work usually consid-
ers the worst-case scenario in which users continuously upload their location to third-parties
(e.g., traffic monitoring systems). Yet, with most LBSs, users do not share their location
continuously but instead, connect episodically to LBSs depending on their needs and thus
reveal a few location samples of their entire trajectory. For example, a localized search on
Google Maps [31] only reveals a location sample upon manually connecting to the service.
In this work, we consider a model that matches the common use of LBSs: we do not
assume the presence of privacy-preserving mechanisms and consider that users access LBSs on
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a regular basis (but not continuously). In this setting, we aim at understanding the privacy
risk caused by LBSs. To do so, we experiment with real mobility traces and investigate
the dynamics of user privacy in such systems by measuring the erosion of user privacy. In
particular, we evaluate the success of LBSs in predicting the true identity of pseudonymous
users and their points of interest based on different samples of mobility traces. Our results
explore the relation between the type and quantity of data collected by LBSs and their ability
to de-anonymize and profile users. We quantify the potential of these threats by carrying out
an experimentation based on real mobility traces from two cities, one in Sweden and one in
Switzerland. We show that LBS providers are able to uniquely identify users and accurately
profile them based on a small number of location samples observed from the users. Users with
a strong routine face higher privacy risk, especially if their routine does not coincide with that
of others. To the best of our knowledge, this work is among the first to investigate the erosion
of privacy caused by the sharing of location samples with LBSs using real mobility traces and
to quantify the privacy risk.
1.2 Related Work
Location-based services [10, 31, 89, 150] offer users to connect with friends, to discover their
environment or to optimize their mobility. In most services, users share their location episod-
ically when connecting to the service. Some services such as road-traffic monitoring systems
require users to continuously share their location. In this work, we consider users that man-
ually share their location and thus only reveal samples of their mobility.
The IETF Geopriv working group [22] aims at delivering specifications that will help
implementing location-aware protocols in a privacy-conscious fashion. It proposes to use
independent location servers that deliver data to LBSs according to privacy policies defined
by users. In other words, it provides user control over the sharing of their location data. In
this Chapter, we complement the IETF proposal by enabling to quantify the privacy threat
induced by the sharing of specific location data with LBSs.
Privacy-preserving mechanisms impede LBSs from tracking and identifying their users [28,
107, 117, 118, 120, 157, 228]. In general, the proposed mechanisms either run on third-
party anonymizing servers, or directly on mobile devices. Most mechanisms alter the user
identifier or the content of location samples. For example, anonymization techniques remove
the identifier from the user requests, and obfuscation techniques blur the location information.
The effectiveness of privacy-preserving mechanisms is usually evaluated by measuring the
level of privacy [77, 199, 202, 210]. However, privacy-preserving mechanisms are rarely used
in practice. One reason may be that users do not perceive the privacy threat because they
are not intensively sharing their location. In this work, we aim at clarifying the privacy
threat when users reveal samples of their mobility manually and do not make use of privacy-
preserving mechanisms.
Without privacy-preserving mechanisms, pseudonymous location information enables the
identification of mobile users [27, 30, 138, 159]. Beresford and Stajano [27] identified all
users in continuous location traces by examining where users spent most of their time. Using
GPS traces from vehicles, two studies by Hoh et al. [119] and Krumm [138] found the home
addresses of most drivers. De Mulder et al. [159] could identify mobile users in a GSM cellular
network from pre-existing location profiles by using statistical identification processes. These
works rely on continuous location traces precisely capturing users’ whereabouts in order to
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Figure 1.1: System model. Users episodically upload their location wirelessly to LBSs.
identify users. Yet, in most scenarios, users share location samples episodically and thus the
privacy threat in practice remains unclear. Partridge and Golle [104] could identify most
of the US working population using two location samples, i.e., approximate home and work
locations. It remains unclear however whether users of location-based services face this threat.
Hence, in this work, we consider real life scenarios of users sharing location information with
LBSs and investigate the privacy risk. In [153], Ma et al. study the erosion of privacy
caused by published anonymous mobility traces and show that an adversary can rapidly
relate location samples to published anonymous traces. In this work, we push further the
analysis by considering an adversary without access to anonymized traces.
1.3 Preliminaries
We present the assumptions regarding LBSs and the associated privacy threats.
1.3.1 Network Model
We study a network (Fig. 1.1) that involves mobile users equipped with wireless devices,
third-parties running LBSs and a wireless infrastructure. Wireless devices feature localization
technology such as GPS or wireless triangulation that lets users locate themselves. The
geographic location of a user is denoted by l = (lat, lon), where lat is the latitude and lon
is the longitude. The wireless infrastructure relies on technology such as WiFi, GSM or 3G
to let users connect to the Internet. LBSs are operated by independent third-parties that
provide services based on the location of mobile users.
Cellphone users send their location together with a service request to LBSs through the
wireless infrastructure. For each request sent, users may identify themselves to the LBS using
proper credentials. In general, we assume that users are identified with pseudonyms (i.e.,
fictitious identifiers), such as their username, their HTTP cookie or their IP address: some
services may require users to register and provide the corresponding username and password,
whereas others may use HTTP cookies to recognize users.
LBSs provide users with services using the location information from requests. LBSs store
the information collected about their users in a database. As defined in [203], each location
sample is called an event denoted by < i, t, l >, where i is the pseudonym of a user, t is the
time instance at which the event occurred, and l is the location of the user. The collection of
events from a user forms a mobility trace.
1.3.2 Threat Model
LBS operators passively collect information about the locations of pseudonymous users over
time. For example, an LBS can observe location samples of user A over the course of weeks
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Figure 1.2: Threat model. The LBS learns multiple locations of user A over several days. It
can then infer the activities of user A and possibly obtain his true identity.
(Fig. 1.2). A priori, the LBS also knows the map over which users move and has access to
geographic information systems that provide details such as points of interest in maps [64].
In addition, the LBS may use the increasing amount of location information available from
other sources such as public transportation systems [190].
We consider that the LBS aims at obtaining the true identify of its users and their points
of interest. To do so, the LBS studies the collected information. Even if communications
are pseudonymous, the spatio-temporal correlation of location traces may serve as a quasi-
identifier [28, 30, 70, 104]. This is a significant threat to user privacy as such information can
help the LBS to profile users.In this work, we investigate the ability of LBSs to identify users
and their points of interest based on the collected information.
1.4 Privacy Erosion
In this section, we describe the process of privacy erosion caused by the use of LBSs. To do
so, we first discuss how users tend to share their location with LBSs. Then, we explain how
LBS operators can obtain the true identity of their users and their points of interest from the
collected information.
1.4.1 Collection of Traces by LBSs
Depending on the provided service, LBSs collect location samples about their users. For
example, typical services (such as Foursquare, Google Maps, Gowalla, or Twitter) offer users
to connect with friends, to discover their environment or to optimize their mobility. Depending
on their needs, users access such LBSs at different times and from different locations, thus
revealing multiple location samples. In general, users of these services do not continuously
share their locations. Instead, users have to manually decide to share their location with their
mobile devices. We classify most popular LBSs into three broad categories and describe the
information shared by users in each case.
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Localized Search
Many LBSs enable users to search for local services around a specific location (e.g., localized
Google Search [31]). Localized searches offer mobile subscribers spontaneous access to nearby
services. Hence, a user location acts as a spatial query to the LBS. For example, users can
obtain the location of nearby businesses, products, events, restaurants, movie theaters or
other local information depending on the type of information provided by the LBS.
Such localized searches help users navigate unfamiliar regions and discover unknown
places. Thus, users episodically connect to LBSs, revealing samples of their mobility. LBSs
obtain statistical information about the visited locations of mobile users and learn popular
locations and user habits. Yet, LBSs do not learn the actual activity of mobile users (e.g.,
the name of the visited restaurant) as they do not know the decision of the user about the
provided information.
Street Directions
Another popular use of LBSs consists in finding a route between two locations. Typically, a
user shares its location with an LBS and requests the shortest route to another location (e.g.,
Google Maps).
Users of such services usually reveal their current location and a potential destination.
Hence, users may leak their home/work locations to LBSs in addition to samples of their
mobility. This enables LBSs to obtain statistical information about the preferred origins and
destinations of mobile users.
Location Check-ins
A novel type of location-based service offers users to check-in to specific places in return for
information related to the visited location [89]. For example, it can be used to check into
shops, restaurants or museums. It allows users to meet other users that share similar interests
and to discover new aspects of their city through recommendations [150].
With such services, users not only precisely reveal their location (GPS coordinates), but
also their intention. Indeed, the LBS can learn the current activity of its users. Users can
check-in to public places, but also private homes.
In summary, depending on the provided service, users share different samples of their
mobility. In order to take this into account, in the following, we consider that LBSs obtain
various type of location samples out of users’ whereabouts.
1.4.2 Attacks by LBSs
The spatial and temporal information contained in mobility traces may serve as location-
based quasi-identifiers [30, 70]: an LBS may obtain the true identity and points of interests
of its pseudonymous users from the collected mobility traces.
Location-Based Quasi-Identifiers
Quasi-identifiers were introduced by Delenius [70] in the context of databases. They charac-
terize a set of attributes that in combination can be linked to identify to whom the database
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refers (see [161] for more). In [30], Bettini et al. extend the concept to mobile networking.
They consider the possibility to identify users based on spatio-temporal data and propose the
concept of location-based quasi-identifiers. They describe how a sequence of spatio-temporal
constraints may specify a mobility pattern that serve as a unique identifier. For example, as
already mentioned, Golle and Partridge [104] identify location-based quasi-identifiers by show-
ing that home and work locations uniquely identify most of the US population. Hence, if an
LBS learns users’ home and work locations, it can obtain their identity with high probability.
In this work, we assume that the LBS succumbs to the temptation of finding the identify
of its users. To do so, we consider that the LBS uses the home and work locations of users as
location-based quasi-identifiers.
Inferring Home and Work Locations
Previous works investigated the problem of characterizing and extracting important places
from pseudonymous location data. These works propose various algorithms to infer important
locations based on the spatial and temporal evidence of the location data. We group the
existing works in two categories. In the first category [16, 119, 138], the authors use clustering
algorithms to infer the homes of mobile users. For example in [138], Krumm proposes four
different clustering techniques to identify the homes of mobile users in vehicular traces: traces
are pseudonymous and contain time-stamped latitudes and longitudes. Similarly, in [119],
Hoh et al. propose a k-mean clustering algorithm to identify the homes of mobile users in
anonymous vehicular traces: traces do not have pseudonyms, but contain the speed of vehicles,
in addition to their location. In the second category [147, 148], Liao et al. propose machine
learning algorithms to infer the different type of activities from mobile users data (e.g., home,
work, shops, restaurants). Based on pedestrian GPS traces, the authors are able to identify
(among other things) the home and work locations of mobile users.
We rely on previous work to derive an algorithm that exclusively infers the home and
work locations of mobile users based on spatial and temporal constraints of pseudonymous
location traces. The algorithm operates in two steps: first, it clusters spatially the events to
identify frequently visited regions; second, it temporally clusters the events to identify home
and work locations.
The spatial clustering of the events uses a variant of the k-means algorithm as defined
in [16]: it starts from one random location and a radius. All events within the radius of
the location are marked as potential members of the cluster. The mean of these points is
computed and is taken as the new centre point. The process is repeated until the mean stops
changing. Then, all the points within the radius are placed in the cluster and removed from
consideration. The procedure repeats until no events remain. The number of points falling
into a cluster corresponds to its weight and is stored along with the cluster location. Clusters
with a large weight represent frequently visited locations.
Based on the output of the spatial filtering, the algorithm then uses temporal evidence as a
criterion to further refine the possible home/work locations. In practice, users have different
temporal patterns depending on their activities (e.g., students). The algorithm considers
simple heuristics that apply to the vast majority of users. For example, most users spend
the night at home and commute in the beginning/end of the day. In order to apply the
temporal evidence, the algorithm considers all events in each cluster and labels them as home
or work. Some events may remain unlabeled if they do not match any temporal criterion.
The algorithm considers two temporal criteria. First, the algorithm checks the duration of
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stay at each location. To do so, it computes the time difference between the arrival of a trip
at a certain location, and the departure time of the following trip. A user that stays more
than 1 hour in a certain location over night is likely to have spent the night at home. Hence,
the algorithm labels events occurring at such location as home events. Second, the algorithm
labels events occurring after 9am and before 5pm as possible work events. Finally, for each
cluster, the algorithm checks the number of events labelled home or work and deduces the
most probable home and work locations.
Inferring User Points of Interest
Usually, LBSs use the content of queries to infer the points of interest of their users. Yet,
LBSs may further profile users by analyzing the location of multiple queries and inferring
users’ points of interest.
We use the spatial clustering algorithm defined above to obtain the possible points of
interest of users that we call uPOIs: a uPOI is a location regularly visited by a user. For
each identified uPOI, we store the number of visits of the user and derive the probability P iv
that a user i visits a specific uPOI, i.e., the number of visits to a uPOI normalized by the
total number of visits to uPOIs.
Metrics
The real home/work addresses are unavailable in our data sets. Hence, we apply our algorithm
to the original mobility traces and derive a baseline of home/work locations. We then evaluate
the probability of success of the LBS by comparing the baseline to the outcome of our algo-
rithm on the samples of location data collected by the LBS. In other words, we compare the
home/work location pairs predicted from the sampled traces with the baseline. In practice, it
is complicated to obtain the real home and work locations of users (i.e., the ground truth) in
mobility traces without threatening their privacy. Because no real ground truth is available,
this approach does not guarantee that we have identified the real home/work locations. Yet,
it allows us to compare the effectiveness of the attack in various conditions.
The probability Ps of a successful identification by the LBS is then:
Ps =
Number of home/work pairs correctly guessed
Total number of home/work pairs
(1.1)
This probability measures the ability of LBSs to find the home/work locations from sampled
traces and thus uniquely identify users. This metric relies on the assumption that home/work
location pairs uniquely identify users [104] (in Europe as well): it provides an upper-bound
on the identification threat as home/work location pairs may in practice be insufficient to
identify users especially in the presence of uncertainty about the home/work locations.
We also evaluate the normalized anonymity set of the home and work pairs of mobile
users. To do so, we compute the number of home/work locations that are in a certain radius
from the home/work location of a certain user i. For every user i, we define its home location
as hi and its work location as wi. For each user i, we have:
Aihome =
1
|h|
∑
j 6=i
1|hj−hi|<RA (1.2)
Aiwork =
1
|w|
∑
j 6=i
1|wj−wi|<RA (1.3)
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where RA specifies the radius considered for the anonymity set.
We measure the ability of LBSs to infer uPOIs by considering for each user i, the number
of uPOIs correctly inferred. For every user i, we have:
P iuPOI =
Number of uPOIs correctly guessed
Number of uPOIs
(1.4)
We also use the notion of Kullback-Leibler divergence [140] to measure the ability of the
adversary to guess the probability of each user visiting specific uPOIs. For every user i, we
have:
DKL(P iv||Qiv) =
∑
j
P iv(j) log
P iv(j)
Qiv(j)
(1.5)
where P iv is the actual probability that user i visits specific uPOIs and Q
i
v is the probability
guessed by the adversary.
1.5 Evaluation
We present our methodology to evaluate the erosion of privacy caused by LBSs.
1.5.1 Setup
We start from data sets of real mobility traces. The data sets contain the location of users at
a high granularity. Because users usually reveal only a few location samples to LBS operators,
we artificially reduce the information available to the LBSs by selecting a few events from
the traces. Then, we consider various de-anonymization attacks on the location traces. In
practice, we load mobility traces in Matlab and apply the algorithm described in Section 1.4.2.
We repeat every analysis 100 times and consider the average.
1.5.2 Mobility Traces
There exist several publicly available data sets of human mobility. For example, there are
mobility traces of taxis [180], of student mobility in campus [83], or of sport activities [179].
Yet, most of these data sets have a limited applicability to our problem because the mobility
of users is tied to specific scenarios (e.g, taxis, campus).
In this work, we consider two data sets representing normal activities of users in cities.
These mobility traces contain several trips for each user. A trip defines a trajectory of a user
going from one source location to a destination (e.g., a user commuting from home to work).
Users move on a map following road constraints.
Borlange Data Set
The city of Borlange is a middle-sized (15 × 15km2) Swedish city of approximately 46000
inhabitants. Borlange has 3077 road intersections interconnected by 7459 roads (Fig. 1.3
(a)). The data set was collected over two years (1999-2001) as part of an experiment on
traffic congestion that took place there.1 About 200 private cars (with one driver per car)
within a 25 km radius around the city center were equipped with a GPS device. At regular
1The data set is available at http://icapeople.epfl.ch/freudiger/borlange.zip .
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Figure 1.3: Borlange data set. (a) Map of Borlange, Sweden. The city has 46000 inhabitants
and spreads over 15×15km2. (b) Spatial histogram showing the density of users per cell c(z).
intervals (approximately every 5 seconds), the position, time and speed of each vehicle was
recorded and stored. Mostly because of GPS accuracy issues, many observed trips did not
match the Borlange map. The data was thus manually verified and corrected using road fitting
algorithms for a subset of 24 vehicles resulting in a total of 420814 “clean” trips (see [92] for
more details). This data set was obtained by civil engineers and used to analyze the route
choices of mobile users.
Lausanne Data Set
The Lausanne area in Switzerland is a region of 15× 7km2 of approximately 120000 inhabi-
tants (Fig. 1.4 (a)). In September 2009, Nokia began running a data collection campaign in
Lausanne area. Around 150 users are equipped with GPS-enabled Nokia phones that record
their daily activities and upload them on a central database. Among other things, the phones
measure the GPS locations of users at regular intervals (approximately every 10 seconds). In
July 2010, we took a snapshot of the database containing traces of 143 users tracked over
12 months.2 Note that the database contains traces of pedestrians, but also of users in cars,
buses and trains. It has thus a larger diversity in terms of mobility patterns than the Borlange
data set. We focus on the traces that start and finish in the Lausanne area and obtain around
106600 trips.
In order to evaluate the statistical relevance of the mobility traces, we compute statistics
of mobility in the data sets. We divide the whole region of Borlange/Lausanne into square
cells of equal size (500×500m). and evaluate the distribution of users’ visits in each cell.
We define a variable Cz that counts the number of events among all users that happen in
each cell z. For each cell, we compute the empirical probability that an event falls into the
cell z, c(z) = CzP
x Cx
. In Figure 1.3 (b), we show the density map (i.e., the set of cells with
their corresponding c(z)) for the Borlange data set. We observe that the activity of users
is concentrated in a few regions. We observe a similar distribution in the Lausanne data
set (Fig. 1.4 (b)). Yet, in the latter, there is a small bias towards one location (the EPFL
2The data set is not publicly available.
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Figure 1.4: Lausanne data set. (a) Map of Lausanne area, Switzerland. The city has 120000
inhabitants and spreads over 15 × 7km2. (b) Spatial histogram showing the density of users
per cell c(z).
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Figure 1.5: Empirical CDF of c(z) in semi-log scale. We observe a linear behavior for both
data sets indicating a heavy-tailed distribution of user density in the network.
campus), indicating that many users from the experiment share the same work place. The
Lausanne data set reflects scenarios in which many users share the same work place, for
example, downtown of a large city.
In Figure 1.5, we show the empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of c(z)
for both data sets in semi-log scale. We observe that the CDF increases linearly, indicating
a heavy-tailed distribution of user density. This confirms that some cells have a density
much above the average. Our observations about the heavy-tailed distribution match existing
results in the literature on mobility traces [57, 179, 218] and confirm the statistical relevance
of the data sets. Intuitively, the heavy-tailed distribution may indicate that users are easily
identifiable as they share few locations.
1.5.3 Modeling the Collection of Traces by LBSs
We start from mobility traces containing location samples at high granularity. As described
in Section 1.4.1, the type and quantity of location information collected by LBSs depends on
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the services and their usage. To take this into account, we select a few events from the entire
traces in various ways. Each selected event effectively represents a query to LBSs.
Uniform Selection (UF)
We select events uniformly at random from the set of all possible events of each user. This
captures scenarios in which users are likely to use an LBS anytime and anywhere.
Home/Work Selection (HW)
We distinguish between three types of events: home, work and miscellaneous. Home and
work events refer to queries made from home and work, respectively, whereas miscellaneous
events refer to other visited locations. Based on these type of events, we select location samples
uniformly in each set corresponding to home/work events with probability ρ and miscellaneous
events with probability 1−ρ. A large ρ captures scenarios in which users access LBSs mostly
from home and work (e.g., street directions), whereas a small ρ captures scenarios in which
users access LBSs mostly on the go (e.g., localized search or location check-ins).
Points of Interest Selection (PO)
We distinguish between two types of events: cPOIs and miscellaneous. cPOI events refer
to queries made from regions of a city with many points of interest (e.g., POIs of the city
such as restaurants and shops), whereas miscellaneous events refer to other visited locations.
Based on these type of events, we select location samples uniformly in each set corresponding
to cPOI events with probability ρ. A large ρ captures scenarios in which users access LBSs
mostly from popular locations (i.e., localized search), whereas a small ρ captures scenarios in
which users access LBSs mostly in unpopular areas such as residential areas.
Preferred Selection (PF)
We distinguish between two types of events: preferred and miscellaneous. Preferred events
refer to queries made from locations frequently visited by each user (i.e., uPOIs such as gyms
and friends’ places ), whereas miscellaneous events refer to other visited locations. Based
on these type of events, we select location samples corresponding to preferred events with
probability ρ. A large ρ captures scenarios in which users access LBSs mostly during their
routine, whereas a small ρ captures scenarios in which users access LBSs mostly in unfamiliar
areas.
We tune the selection type using probability ρ. Note that home/work selection strategy
with ρ = 0.5 is different from the uniform selection strategy: with ρ = 0.5 in home/work
selection, home/work events and miscellaneous events have the same probability to be chosen,
whereas with the uniform selection, all events have the same probability to be chosen. We
consider various number of queries λ in order to model the quantity of data collected by LBSs.
For example, a number of queries λ = 60 means that 60 samples of all location samples of
each user are shared with the LBS.
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Figure 1.6: Normalized size of anonymity set Aihome, A
i
work and A
i
homeWork. Borlange with
(a) RA = 1km and (b) RA = 5km. Lausanne with (c) RA = 1km and (d) RA = 5km.
1.5.4 Results
Unless otherwise stated, we consider that users share their location with the LBS with a 10
meters precision (i.e., GPS), that the clustering radius in the spatial clustering algorithm is
100 meters and that the adversary has a tolerable error margin of 50 meters to correctly guess
a home/work/uPOI locations.
Size of Anonymity Set
The graphs in Fig. 1.6 detail the size of the anonymity set for home locations, work locations,
or both normalized with the number of users in the data set. On the x-axis, the graphs
show the fraction of users that has an anonymity set of less than a given normalized size
on the y-axis. We consider two radius RA = 1km and RA = 5km. As predicted in [104],
the anonymity set size is low especially when a small radius is used and revealing the home
and work locations is much more identifying than only revealing one of them. In general,
we observe that more users share a common work place than home. In the Lausanne data
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Figure 1.7: Privacy erosion in Borlange with varying selection probability ρ and number of
queries λ. (a) Home identification. (b) Work identification. (c) Home and work identification
(Ps).
set, many users have a larger anonymity set than in the Borlange data set due to the larger
number of users.
Privacy Erosion
We evaluate the privacy erosion of users from the Borlange and Lausanne data sets in multiple
scenarios. We measure the probability that an LBS successfully identifies the home location,
the work location, or both. In the case of a successful home and work identification, the LBS
successfully identifies its users. We consider different data collection scenarios as described
earlier (UF, HW, PO and PF) with three selection probabilities: ρ = 0.1, ρ = 0.5 and ρ = 0.9.
We also vary λ, the amount of information shared with LBSs.
In Fig. 1.7 and Fig. 1.8, we show the erosion of privacy in Borlange and Lausanne for
various ρ, λ and selection strategies. We observe that with HW selection, the probability of
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Figure 1.8: Privacy erosion in Lausanne with varying selection probability ρ and number of
queries λ. (a) Home identification. (b) Work identification. (c) Home and work identification
(Ps).
Data Set
uPOIs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Borlange 0.357 0.209 0.112 0.078 0.052 0.031 0.021 0.017 0.015 0.012
Lausanne 0.401 0.14 0.092 0.063 0.045 0.035 0.028 0.023 0.019 0.016
Table 1.1: Average probability E[P iv] of visiting a uPOI.
identification of a home, work, or home/work pair increases the fastest with respect to the
number of sent queries indicating that LBSs uniquely identify users with few locations: in
Borlange, if ρ = 0.9, 20 queries are sufficient to identify 65% of users. We observe that as ρ
increases, so does the identification success. In Lausanne, the identification success is slightly
higher but still leads to the same conclusions. We observe that PF selection with ρ = 0.1
makes de-anonymization particularly difficult. In this case, users share their location only in
unfamiliar areas and it is thus difficult for LBSs to infer users’ identity. For other selection
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Figure 1.9: Inferring the top ten uPOIs in Borlange data set. (a) Average fraction of uPOIs
identified E[P iuPOI ]. (b) Average divergence E[DKL(P
i
v||Qiv)].
strategies, the identification success saturates around 20 to 40% and increases slowly with the
number of queries.
Inferred User Points of Interest
Table 1.1 shows the average fraction of visits to uPOIs. Each uPOI identifies a region of 200
meters radius frequently visited by each user. In both data sets, the distribution is long tail
showing that few uPOIs are frequently visited.
In Figure 1.9 and 1.10, we show the ability of LBSs to infer the top ten uPOIs of each
user: we compute the average fraction of uPOIs identified E[P iuPOI ] within a 100 meters error
margin and evaluate the average divergence E[DKL(P iv||Qiv]. We observe that the adversary
can infer a large number of uPOIs with a small number of samples: with 30 samples, it can
learn up to 65% of uPOIs in the case of PF ρ = 0.9. The best selection strategies are PF
ρ = 0.9, HW ρ = 0.1 and UF. Intuitively, revealing preferred visited locations reveals clusters,
similarly, uniform across visited locations will have high probability to sample from frequently
visited location. On the contrary, with PO ρ = 0.9, HW ρ = 0.9 or PF ρ = 0.1, the attack
works less efficiently. Hence, even with a few location samples, the adversary is also able to
infer most uPOIs.
In terms of divergence, a divergence of zero indicates a perfect match. We observe that
the divergence decreases fast indicating that the adversary obtains a probability distribution
similar to the true one and identifies the most probable uPOIs. We observe a similar behavior
with the Lausanne data set. Note that the ability to infer uPOIs is at odds with the ability
to infer users’ identity: with HW ρ = 0.9, it is harder to identify uPOIs and easier to identify
users.
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Figure 1.10: Inferring the top ten uPOIs in Lausanne data set. (a) Average fraction of uPOI
identified E[P iuPOI ]. (b) Average divergence E[DKL(P
i
v||Qiv)].
1.6 Conclusion
We have considered the problem of privacy erosion when using location-based services. We
identify the quantity and type of location information that statistically helps LBSs find users’
real identity and points of interest. In contrast with previous work (mostly showing that
de-anonymization based on location information is possible), we push the understanding of
the threat further by showing how de-anonymization depends on the collected data. We
experiment with two real data sets of mobility traces, model the collection of traces by LBSs
and implement various attacks. Our results show that in many scenarios a small amount
of information shared with LBSs may enable to uniquely identify users. These results stem
from the fact that the spatio-temporal correlation of location traces tends to be unique to
individuals and persistent. We also show that in some scenarios, users have high privacy
without using privacy-preserving mechanisms.
The results of this work can help prevent the false sense of anonymity that users of LBSs
might have by increasing the awareness of location privacy threats. In particular, it may en-
courage users to stop revealing sensitive information to third-parties, such as their home and
work locations, and adopt privacy-preserving mechanisms. These results notably question
the ability of privacy-preserving mechanisms to obfuscate highly correlated information such
as users’ whereabouts. They can also help design more efficient privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms [94, 95, 99] and may encourage the use of distributed solutions in which users store
maps and the related information directly on their mobile devices.
Publication: [100]
Part II
Location Privacy in Peer-to-Peer
Wireless Networks
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Chapter 2
Mix Zones for Location Privacy
Tout esprit profond avance masque´.
Rene´ Descartes
2.1 Introduction
In virtually all deployed wireless networks, mobile devices communicate through a wired in-
frastructure, typically through a cellular base station or a WiFi access point. However, the
growing popularity of Bluetooth, WiFi in ad hoc mode [11] and other similar techniques is
likely to fuel the adoption of peer-to-peer wireless communications. Corporations are develop-
ing wireless peer-to-peer technologies such as Nokia Instant Community [32] and Qualcomm
FlashLinQ [144]. In addition to classic infrastructure-based communications, mobile devices
can communicate directly with each other in an ad hoc wireless fashion. Such communications
dramatically increase mobile devices’ awareness of their environment, enabling a new breed
of context-aware applications. For example, cell phones could exchange messages with other
nearby cell phones to provide a geographic extension of online social network [3, 4, 10, 86];
likewise, vehicles could communicate with each other, thereby increasing road safety and
optimizing traffic [113, 222].
The integration of peer-to-peer wireless communications into mobile devices brings new
security challenges, due to their mobile and ad hoc nature. Unlike wired communications,
wireless communications are inherently dependent on geographic proximity: mobile devices
detect each other’s presence by periodically broadcasting beacon messages. These messages
include pseudonyms such as MAC/IP addresses and public keys in order to identify communi-
cating parties, route communications and secure communications. Security of these messages
is essential in order to authenticate mobile nodes [45], revoke misbehaving nodes [184] and
ensure communication integrity.
Much to the detriment of privacy, external parties can monitor pseudonyms in broadcasted
messages in order to track the locations of mobile devices, thus compromising location privacy.
Even if pseudonyms are not directly related to the real identity of mobile device owners,
previous work [27, 119, 138] shows that, by using the spatial and temporal correlation between
successive pseudonymous locations of mobile devices, an external party can infer the real
identity of mobile devices’ owners.
29
30 Chapter 2. Mix Zones for Location Privacy
Hence, we must avoid revealing privacy-sensitive information, such as network identifiers
and authentication credentials. There are multiple solutions to anonymously authenticate
mobile devices. One possible solution is the multiple pseudonym approach [58] suggested in
the context of Internet communications: it assigns to every device a list of public keys that
are used alternatively to achieve pseudonymous authentication. Network identifiers must also
be anonymized in order to avoid traceability at the networking layer. In line with the mul-
tiple pseudonym approach, long-term identifiers should be replaced by short-term identifiers.
For example, MAC addresses could serve solely for short-term communications [108]. Both
industry [7, 8, 158] and academia [28, 43, 122, 145, 195] have adopted the multiple pseudonym
approach at the network layer in order to achieve location privacy. In particular, GSM-based
cellular networks are the most prominent example of privacy protection based on short-term
identifiers [19, 116].
A pseudonym changed by an isolated device in a wireless network can be trivially guessed
by an external party observing beacon messages. Hence, a change of pseudonym should
be spatially and temporally coordinated among mobile devices [28]. More specifically, a
device cannot free-ride on the pseudonym change of others to achieve location privacy as its
pseudonym can still be tracked. Hence, in peer-to-peer wireless networks, location privacy
requires a collective effort by neighboring mobile devices.
The coordination of pseudonym changes has become a central topic of research with var-
ious approaches proposed. One solution [43] consists in changing pseudonyms periodically,
at a pre-determined frequency. The mechanism works if at least two mobile devices change
their pseudonyms in proximity, a condition that is rarely met (as the probability of a syn-
chronous change is low). Base stations can be used as coordinators to synchronize pseudo-
nym changes [122, 75], but this solution requires help from the infrastructure. The approach
in [108] enables mobile devices to change their pseudonyms at specific time instances (e.g.,
before associating with wireless access points). However, this solution achieves location pri-
vacy only with respect to the infrastructure of access points. Another approach [28, 97, 99]
coordinates pseudonym changes by forcing mobile devices to change their pseudonyms within
pre-determined regions called mix zones. The effectiveness of a mix zone, in terms of the
location privacy it provides, depends on the adversary’s ability to relate mobile devices that
enter and exit the mix zone [27]. Hence, mix zones should be placed in locations with high
device density and unpredictable mobility [28, 122]. This approach however may lack flexi-
bility because the locations of mix zones are fixed by a central authority and must be learned
by mobile devices prior to entering the network. Several researchers advocated the use of a
distributed solution [121, 122, 145], where mobile devices coordinate pseudonym changes to
dynamically obtain mix zones. To do this, a mobile device broadcasts a pseudonym change
request to its neighbors.
The multiple pseudonym approach has drawbacks that affect performance of current so-
lutions. First, a pseudonym change causes considerable overhead, thus reducing networking
performance: for example, routing algorithms must update their routing tables [198]. Second,
given the cost of asymmetric key generation and management by the central authority, mo-
bile devices are usually assigned a limited number of pseudonyms that can quickly become a
scarce resource if changed frequently. Pseudonyms used in pseudonymous authentication may
thus be costly to acquire and use. Third, mix zones have a cost because they impose limits
on the services available to mobile users: in order to protect against spatial correlation of lo-
cation traces, mix zones can conceal the trajectory of mobile devices by not allowing devices
in the mix zone to communicate [121]. Hence, the number of mix zones traversed by mobile
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devices must be kept small. Finally, even if the distributed solution synchronizes pseudonym
changes, it does not align incentives between mobile devices: because the achieved location
privacy depends on both the device density and the unpredictability of device movements in
mix zones [28], a selfish mobile device might decide not to change its pseudonym in settings
offering low location privacy guarantees.
In this Chapter, we introduce a privacy architecture for peer-to-peer wireless networks
based on the mixing of network identifiers. We describe multiple techniques to create mix
zones, show the criteria for a successful pseudonym change and introduce measures of mixing
effectiveness. Then, in the following Chapters, we tackle one of the main issues that has
hindered the use of multiple pseudonym schemes in mobile networks. We propose and evaluate
novel approaches to deploy mix zones. First, we consider a trusted central authority that
uses a centralized algorithm for deploying mix zones in a given area and investigate several
deployment strategies. Second, we propose a distributed solution for deploying mix zones
that takes rationality into account. Rational mobile devices locally decide whether to change
their pseudonyms based on their degree of privacy and cost. Third, we provide a framework
for analytically evaluating privacy obtained with mix zones. We focus on the time period over
which a pseudonym is used, i.e., the age of a pseudonym, and provide critical conditions for
the emergence of location privacy in mobile networks.
2.2 Related Work
Research on location privacy has recently gained tremendous momentum with the appari-
tion of location-based services. Given privacy implications of such services, previous work
investigated privacy threats and proposed several privacy-preserving mechanisms.
Location Privacy Threats
Previous work [27, 119, 138] shows that the adversary can implicitly obtain the true identity
of the owner of a mobile device from the analysis of its visited locations. For example, using
pseudonymous location traces collected in an office environment, Beresford and Stajano [27]
correctly identify all participants by simply examining where the participants spent most of
their time. Similarly, using pseudonymous GPS traces from vehicles, two studies by Hoh et
al. [119] and Krumm [138] find the identities of most drivers. Hence, pseudonyms are not
sufficient to protect the location privacy of mobile nodes and should be changed to avoid such
attacks. But even if location traces of mobile nodes do not contain any pseudonyms (i.e.,
they are anonymous), Hoh and Gruteser [117] reconstruct the tracks of mobile nodes using
a multiple target tracking (MTT) algorithm. Hence, location traces should also be altered
spatially to reduce the granularity of location traces. In other words, spatial and temporal
correlations between successive locations of mobile nodes must be carefully eliminated to
prevent external parties from compromising their location privacy. In this work, location
privacy is achieved by changing pseudonyms in regions called mix zones [27], thus eliminating
temporal and spatial correlations of pseudonymous location traces.
Previous work also shows that it is possible to identify devices relying on their distinctive
characteristics (i.e., fingerprints) at the physical, link and application layer. At the physical
layer, the wireless transceiver has a wireless fingerprint that can identify wireless devices
in the long term by using modulation-based [40], transient-based [71] or amplitude-based
techniques [214] or a combination of features [110, 181]. However, these techniques are only
32 Chapter 2. Mix Zones for Location Privacy
evaluated with specific technologies and countermeasures could be developed. Recent results
by Danev et al. [72] show that wireless fingerprints can be impersonated, i.e., a device can
copy the wireless fingerprint of another device. Ability to impersonate a wireless fingerprint
is directly related to the ability of an adversary to recognize a fingerprint. In other words, if
it is easy for an adversary to fingerprint wireless interfaces, it is also easy for a mobile device
to change its wireless fingerprint. At the link layer, it is possible to distinguish between a
number of devices and drivers [90, 170]. At the application layer, devices can be identified
based on clock skews [136]. However, such techniques require an active adversary and can be
countered by ignoring requests sent by the adversary. Similarly, a reduction of the differences
between drivers would limit the effectiveness of such attacks. In this thesis, we do not consider
fingerprinting threats. Note that, independently from the presence of fingerprinting attacks,
higher-layer privacy mechanisms such as mix zones remain useful. Some applications may, for
example, require keeping location traces (e.g., for congestion analysis).
Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms
The multiple pseudonym approach considered in this dissertation is a popular mechanism to
preserve location privacy: it is used in cellular networks and Bluetooth [85] to provide location
privacy. For example, in cellular networks, cell phones periodically register their location to
the cellular network operator in order to enable the routing of calls. A unique identifier
sent in clear, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) identifies users in these
registration messages. In order to avoid traceability, the IMSI is most of the time replaced by
a temporary identifier, the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI), that changes over
time. The TMSI is changed when a user moves from one group of adjacent cells to another
(called location areas). Cellular networks thus make use of network-issued pseudonyms to
protect location privacy. In contrast, in Bluetooth, devices can independently change their
MAC address over time: the MAC address is composed of a random number concatenated
with the encryption of the same random number. The random number is encrypted with
a shared secret previously derived from a pairing operation, thus allowing paired devices to
recognize each other. In this thesis, we push the multiple pseudonym approach further by
investigating its use in distributed wireless networks.
There are other techniques, besides the multiple pseudonyms approach, for achieving loca-
tion privacy [139, 19]. In location-based services, mobile nodes can intentionally add noise to
their location [107] by for example reporting their location as a region instead of a point [210].
Mobile devices can also send dummy messages containing dummy locations [96]. However, in
mobile wireless networks, even if messages do not contain location information, the peer-to-
peer communications between mobile nodes implicitly reveal their locations. Hence, obfus-
cating the location data contained in messages is insufficient to protect the location privacy of
mobile nodes. Another possibility [106] is to encrypt communications and include the MAC
address in the encrypted part of packets. This way, the link layer protocol is identifier-free and
packets are completely anonymized. This works well in the case of WiFi access points [106]
but would not scale to peer-to-peer wireless communications because of the ad hoc nature of
communications.
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2.3 System Model
We study a network where mobile devices/nodes are autonomous entities equipped with WiFi-
enabled devices that communicate upon coming in range. In other words, we describe a
pervasive communication system (a mobile ad hoc network) such as a vehicular network [113],
a delay tolerant network [86], or a network of directly communicating hand-held devices [3,
4, 10] where mobile nodes in proximity automatically exchange information.
As commonly assumed in such networks [171], we consider an oﬄine Certification Au-
thority (CA) run by an independent trusted third party that helps manage, among other
things, security and privacy of the network. In line with the multiple pseudonym approach,
we assume that, prior to joining the network, every mobile node i registers with the CA
that preloads a finite set of pseudonyms and required cryptographic material for anonymous
authentication (e.g., a set of asymmetric keys for pseudonymous authentication or a set of
anonymous credentials). Upon changing pseudonyms, we consider for simplicity that the old
pseudonym expires and is removed from the node’s memory. Once a mobile node has used
all its pseudonyms, it contacts the CA to obtain a new set or generates a new set by itself.
We consider a discrete time system with initial time t = 0. At each time step t, mobile
nodes move in the network. We assume that mobile nodes automatically exchange informa-
tion (unbeknownst to their users) as soon as they are in communication range. Note that
our evaluation is independent from the communication protocol. Still, we align our com-
munication model with common assumptions of pervasive communication systems: mobile
devices advertise their presence by periodically broadcasting proximity beacons containing
their identity and the current time. We consider a beaconing mode similar to that in Ad
Hoc mode of IEEE 802.11. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications, beacons
enable mobile devices to discover their neighbors and can be used for time synchronization.
When node i receives a beacon from node j, node i can start interacting with node j by
using data messages. Any node can control the validity of data messages by requesting the
certificate of the public key from the sender and verifying the signatures on data messages.
Subsequently, if confidentiality is required, a security association can be established (e.g.,
with Diffie-Hellman). Note that there is ongoing work in the literature [46, 53] to reduce the
cryptographic overhead induced by the processing of all messages.
2.4 Threat Model
We assume that an adversary A aims to track the whereabouts of mobile nodes using inference
attacks. We consider that A can have the same credentials as mobile nodes (e.g., insider
attack) and can eavesdrop communications. In practice, A can be a rogue individual, a set of
malicious mobile nodes, or may even deploy its own infrastructure by placing eavesdropping
devices in the network. In the worst case, A obtains complete coverage and tracks nodes
throughout the entire network. We characterize the latter type of adversary as global.
The nature of wireless communications makes eavesdropping particularly easy. A can
collect identifying information (i.e., pseudonyms) from the entire network and obtain location
traces. Finally, we assume that the key-pair generation and distribution process cannot be
altered or controlled by the adversary.
In addition to eavesdropping abilities, the knowledge of the adversary depends on other
information it has, e.g., background information about users’ mobility and points of interest.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of a pseudonym change. All identifiers and quasi-identifiers of the net-
working stack must change. In this example, the maximum transmission rate is momentarily
set to zero to stop all wireless communications of the device during the pseudonym change.
2.5 Privacy Architecture
Peer-to-peer wireless networks have to meet security requirements such as confidentiality,
integrity, availability, authentication and real-time delivery in order to enable successful de-
ployment of higher-layer services. They also need to protect the privacy of mobile users. In
this section, we discuss multiple primitives to protect privacy.
2.5.1 Atomicity of Pseudonym Change
In wireless networks, a pseudonym change is successful if and only if a mobile device, before
a pseudonym change, cannot be identified after a pseudonym change. A pseudonym change
must be atomic: even if a single identifier remains unchanged, the entire pseudonym change
fails (Fig. 2.1).
Mere removal of explicit identifiers, such as network identifiers, may be insufficient because
individuals can be tracked by linking so-called quasi-identifiers [70, 192, 193], i.e., distinctive
attributes that facilitate the indirect re-identification of individuals.
Identifiers
Network protocols use explicit identifiers to route packets from sources to destinations (e.g.,
MAC and IP addresses) and to link multiple user interactions (HTTP cookies or usernames).
Similarly, authentication protocols may use explicit identifiers to link the identity of a user
to a certificate.
A pseudonym change must guarantee that these explicit identifiers change. In practice,
it may be difficult to alter network-assigned identifiers such as HTTP cookies or usernames.
Thus, such information should be transmitted over an encrypted channel to thwart eaves-
dropping.
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Quasi-Identifiers
In addition to explicit identifiers, implicit identification based on quasi-identifiers may be
used to track mobile devices. Quasi-identifiers characterize a set of attributes of a mobile
device that in combination may be linked to identity users. For example, the communication
pattern, the TCP sequence number, or device fingerprints may be unique to a mobile device
(Fig. 2.1). Even if a pseudonym change occurs, an adversary could track a mobile device
based on its communication pattern.
To overcome the threat of quasi-identifiers, a pseudonym change must also guarantee that
all fingerprints of a device disappear or change to make a device indistinguishable from others.
2.5.2 Authentication
The promised ad hoc sharing of information might turn into a pervasive nightmare if undesired
communications cannot be filtered out: for example, if mobile nodes cannot verify the source
of information, they are susceptible to mobile spam. To thwart rogue devices from polluting
the network, nodes should authenticate each other: the existence of an authentication feature
(and the implied procedure to obtain the appropriate credentials) makes it more difficult for
attackers to join the network in the first place and thus increases the cost of misbehavior.
Hence, by verifying the authenticity of their interlocutor before exchanging information, mo-
bile nodes reduce the amount of undesired data. Authentication also enables the creation of
security associations in order to encrypt communication and protect data privacy.
Misbehavior by insiders is still possible: for example, an authenticated mobile node can
engage in spamming attacks. However, because mobile devices are authenticated, the CA can
then exclude misbehaving nodes by revoking their keying material. To do so, keys can be
blacklisted using traditional revocation algorithms [226].
If authentication is done without appropriate precautions, it would break the atomicity
property of pseudonym changes, thus rendering the privacy problem particularly challeng-
ing [194]. Multiple techniques can be used to anonymously authenticate mobile users.
Pseudonymous Authentication
In pseudonymous authentication, a set of asymmetric keys is preloaded into mobile devices by
an off-line certification authority [198] or directly generated by mobile nodes [46, 142, 155, 225].
At each pseudonym change, the material used for authentication is changed. Typically, the
validity period of a public key certificate is short and overlaps in time with another certificate
to provide flexibility with the timing of pseudonym changes.
This approach enables fast authentication of users and effective revocation. It is thus
favored for real-time systems, such as vehicular networks. In case of preloaded pseudonyms,
pseudonymous authentication may require intensive key management from the certification
authority to maintain availability of the system in place. Recent results for directly generated
pseudonyms demonstrate their feasibility for real-time systems such as vehicular networks [46].
Group Signatures
Another type of pseudonymous authentication consists in using a group identifier instead
of a user identifier: Group signatures [60] allow a group member to sign on behalf of a
group without revealing the identity of the signer. Highly efficient group signatures schemes
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exist with constant size signatures and efficient signing and verification even when nodes are
revoked [18, 35, 51]. The size of the group determines the achievable privacy of its member.
Group signatures require a group manager to add and revoke group members thus making
the flexibility of groups dependent on the availability and computational capacity of the group
manager. One important drawback is that if several groups coexist in a mobile network, mobile
users may be traceable based on their group membership (see the work on secret handshakes
described in Chapter 6).
Like group signatures, ring signatures [188] allow nodes to sign on behalf of an ad hoc group
of nodes. Unlike group signatures, they do this without the help of a central coordinator.
The location privacy provided by ring signatures is investigated in [98]. The main drawbacks
of ring signatures are their significant communication overhead and the impossibility to trace
the origin of the signer even in case of misbehavior. Hence, group signatures seem more
appropriate for many peer-to-peer wireless applications.
Anonymous Credentials
Usually based on group signatures, anonymous credentials [47, 49, 50, 59, 152] allow mobile
nodes to anonymously prove ownership of credentials to third parties, with the help of an on-
line credential issuer. They can thus be used for anonymous authentication as well. However,
these schemes require the online availability of a credential issuer, which is often not possi-
ble in wireless networks, and do not prevent misbehavior: a rogue device can undetectably
provide misleading data in bulk. To circumvent the issue, techniques based on unclonable
identifiers, such as e-tokens [48], allow nodes to anonymously authenticate themselves a given
number of times per period. This limits the amount of false information a rogue device can
provide per time period. Nevertheless, anonymous credentials impose a high overhead due to
costly credential verification (i.e., zero knowledge proofs) and costly revocation procedure.
In this thesis, we consider that any of these mechanisms can be used to provide anonymous
authentication.
2.5.3 Darwinian Privacy
As privacy threats evolve, strategies to counter the threats must also be adaptive [191]: it is
important to craft efficient security strategies based on the potential of threats and the cost
of privacy mechanisms. The presence of a passive adversary is uncertain in mobile networks
as it requires much effort to detect eavesdropping attacks. This makes it difficult to identify
the potential of the threat and properly allocate resources to privacy-preserving mechanisms.
For these reasons, in this thesis, we consider a worst-case adversary (i.e., global) and model
the cost as an abstract parameter of pseudonym change protocols. Then, we predict the effect
of cost on the privacy-preserving strategy.
The multiple pseudonym approach incurs various types of costs on mobile devices and
network operators. First, mix zones impose limits on services available to mobile users: in
order to protect against spatial correlation of location traces, mix zones can conceal the
trajectory of mobile devices by not allowing devices in the mix zone to communicate [121].
Hence, the number of mix zones traversed by mobile devices must be kept small. Second,
anonymous authentication is costly. Any anonymous authentication technique can be used
to protect location. Consider the pseudonymous authentication approach: given the cost
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of asymmetric key generation and management by the central authority, mobile devices are
usually assigned a limited number of pseudonyms that can quickly become a scarce resource
if changed frequently. Pseudonyms may be costly to acquire and use. Note that it is still
unclear whether nodes could reuse their previous pseudonyms. It could facilitate tracking
by an adversary and make it difficult to prevent Sybil attacks [80]. It could also reduce
costs and provide the ability to recognize the same device without identifying it. Third, a
pseudonym change causes considerable overhead, thus reducing networking performance. For
example, routing algorithms must update their routing tables [198]. Similarly, if a mobile
device changes its pseudonyms very frequently, it makes it more difficult for another device in
vicinity to initiate a communication session. Finally, the multiple pseudonym approach does
not align incentives between mobile devices. Because the achieved location privacy depends
on both device density and unpredictability of device movements in mix zones [28], a selfish
device might decide not to change its pseudonym in settings that offer low location privacy
guarantees.
Consequently, the multiple pseudonym approach has to be carefully crafted into the design
of the network in order to provide efficient privacy protection at tolerable cost. In Chapters 3
and 4, we propose multiple designs and evaluate their trade-off between privacy and cost.
The analysis of such trade-off is essential to understand how privacy-preserving mechanisms
affect communications.
Note that the design of privacy-preserving mechanisms could also take into account the
cost of attacks [124]. Passive attacks typically require a phase of data collection and a phase
of data analysis. The first phase involves the deployment of sniffing stations in order to collect
wireless messages in the area under attack. The data analysis phase requires processing power
and background information to mine collected data. We consider a worst-case adversary that
can afford to implement global passive attacks.
2.6 Privacy Analysis
We describe how to create mix zones and their effectiveness in achieving location privacy.
2.6.1 Mix Zone Definition
In order to protect against the temporal and spatial correlation of location traces, mobile
devices can change their pseudonyms in mix zones. Mix zones can conceal the trajectory of
mobile nodes to the external adversary by using: (i) Silent/encrypted periods [44, 97, 121, 145],
(ii) a mobile proxy [195], or (iii) regions where the adversary has no coverage [43]. Note that,
if the beaconing mechanisms is probabilistic (e.g., using a backoff window), trajectories are
concealed without requiring special techniques because devices will not beacon at regular
intervals.
Consider a group of n(t) mobile nodes at time t that are in proximity. They conceal their
trajectories using one of the methods described above. At the end of the silent period, it
appears to an external adversary as if all pseudonym changes occurred simultaneously.
A mix zone i ∈ Z is defined by a pair of coordinates (xi, yi), where Z is the set of all mix
zones in the considered area. The xi and yi coordinates are the center of the mix zone i and
determine the location of the mix zone in the network.
If a centralized algorithm is used to deploy mix zones, the central authority can pre-
determine the size and shape of mix zones, forcing all nodes to conceal their trajectory for the
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same time period. In this thesis, we consider for simplicity that every mix zone i will have
the shape of a circle with a certain radius Ri. We assume constant mix zones sizes, Ri = R,
for all centralized algorithms. Recent work considered other shapes for mix zones and show
that it can improve the achievable privacy [168]. If a distributed algorithm is used to deploy
mix zones, each mix zone will have a different shape and size depending on how long nodes
conceal their trajectory and on their trajectory.
Finally, there is a mixing attempt if and only if at least two nodes change pseudonyms in
a mix zone.
2.6.2 Mix Zone Effectiveness
Mix zones are effective in anonymizing the trajectory of mobile nodes if the adversary is
unable to predict (with certainty) the relation between mobile nodes entering and exiting mix
zones. In particular, a mix zone becomes a confusion point for the adversary if the mixing
attempt achieves high location privacy.
Adversary A observes a set of n(T ) nodes changing pseudonyms, where T is the time
at which the pseudonym change occurs. Assuming that A knows the mobility profile of the
nodes within each mix zone, the adversary can attempt to map entering to exiting events.
In the following, we discuss various metrics to measure location privacy achieved with
mix zones. In general, we show that mix zones should be placed in locations with high node
density and unpredictable mobility [28, 122].
As presented by Beresford and Stajano [27] for mobile networks and by Diaz et al. [77] and
Serjantov and Danezis [199] for mix networks, the uncertainty of the adversary (i.e. entropy)
is a measure of the location privacy/anonymity achieved by a mixing attempt.
Event-based Metric
The goal of the event-based metric is to measure untraceability of all users in a mix zone. It
measures the probability that the adversary finds the assignment of all entering events to all
exiting events.
Consider a sequence of entering/exiting nodes traversing a mix zone i over a period of T
time steps, the uncertainty of the adversary is:
HT (i) = −
I∑
v
pv log2(pv) (2.1)
where pv is the probability of different assignments of entering nodes to exiting nodes and I
is the total number of such hypothesized assignments. Each value pv depends on the enter-
ing/exiting nodes and the mobility profile. In other words, the anonymity provided by mix
zones mostly depends on factors beyond control of the nodes. It is thus interesting to compute
the average location privacy provided by a mix zone to evaluate its mixing effectiveness. The
entropy measure is bound to the set of events happening in an interval of T time steps and
does not capture the average mixing of a mix zone. The average mixing effectiveness of a mix
zone i can be computed by taking the average entropy over n successive periods of T time
steps: E[H(i)] = 1n
∑n
v=1HTv(i).
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User-centric Metric
The goal of the user-centric metric is to measure the untraceability of a particular user travers-
ing a mix zone, instead of the mix zone in general. Let us define the setB of pseudonyms before
the change with the set R of pseudonyms after the change. Let pr|b = Pr(“Pseudonym r ∈
R corresponds to b ∈ B”), which is the probability that a new pseudonym r ∈ R corresponds
to an old pseudonym b ∈ B. The untraceability of node i using pseudonym b is defined as:
Ai(T ) = −
n(T )∑
r=1
pr|b log2(pr|b) (2.2)
The achievable location privacy depends on both the number of nodes n(T ) and mobility of
nodes pr|b in the mix zone. If node i changes its pseudonym alone, then the adversary can
track it, and we get Ai(T ) = 0. Entropy is maximal for a uniform probability distribution pr|b
and the achievable location privacy after a coordinated pseudonym change at time T is upper-
bounded by log2(n(T )). If at least two mobile nodes (including i) change their pseudonyms,
then the pseudonym change is successful and generates a confusion point. We denote T `i as
the time of the last successful pseudonym change of node i.
2.7 Application Scenario: Vehicular Networks
Vehicular Networks (VNs) consist of vehicles and Road-Side Units (RSUs) equipped with
radios and a collection of backbone servers accessible via the RSUs. Using Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications, vehicles share safety-related in-
formation and access location-based services. Initiatives in Europe [66] and the US [81] are
evaluating VNs promises of safer driving conditions and efficient traffic management. En-
visioned safety-related applications require vehicles to periodically broadcast their current
position, speed and acceleration in authenticated safety messages (Fig. 2.2).
Due to their relevance to life-critical applications, VNs have to satisfy several strict se-
curity requirements, namely sender and data authenticity, availability, liability, and real-time
delivery. Similarly to the work in [172, 173, 183, 186], we assume that a public key infrastruc-
ture is available and that the messages are properly signed to ensure liability. A certificate
is attached to each message to enable other vehicles to verify the sender’s authenticity. Ve-
hicles are equipped with Tamper-Proof Devices (TPDs) that guarantee correct execution of
cryptographic operations and non-disclosure of private keying material.
Although not designed with that purpose in mind, VNs facilitate tracking of vehicles.
In fact, the cost of tracking vehicles by radio eavesdroppers is reduced compared to that of
tracking vehicles with cameras. Similarly, tracking granularity is higher because an eaves-
dropper obtains identifiers, location and other information from safety messages. Moreover,
unlike mobile phones and laptop wireless adapters, vehicle transceivers cannot be switched
off [174]. Consequently, vehicles’ whereabouts can be monitored at all times. All an adversary
needs to do is deploy its devices across the area of the network that it wishes to monitor. In
this application scenario, we are concerned with achieving location privacy against such an
adversary.
To thwart tracking by an adversary, vehicles can use mix zones. Prior to entering the
network, each vehicle i has to register with a Certification Authority (CA) and preloads a
large set of pseudonyms Pi,k, with k = 1, ...,F , where F is the size of the pseudonym set.
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Figure 2.2: Example of vehicular network. Safety messages are emitted periodically (typically,
every 100 ms to 300 ms) [81]. The Certification Authority (CA) is accessible through the
RSUs. pi, si and ai are the vehicle i position, speed, and acceleration.
CAs are fully trusted and interoperable entities, operated by governmental organizations;
they conform to privacy policies and keep the relation of the pseudonyms to the driver’s real
identity secret. In case of liability issues, this relation can be learned by law enforcement.
For each pseudonym Pi,k the corresponding CA generates a unique public/private key pair
(Ki,k,K−1i,k ) and a corresponding certificate Certi,k(Ki,k). Each vehicle sequentially updates
its pseudonym at regular time intervals independently of other vehicles. Pseudonyms have a
short validity period and cannot be reused.
As previously described, mix zones prevent the adversary from accessing the content of
(safety) messages, including vehicle’s signatures that are trivially linkable to the correspond-
ing pseudonym. Silent mix zones or mobile proxies are difficult to implement in vehicular
networks because they challenge the effectiveness of safety messages in preventing collisions.
In particular, with silent mix zones, vehicles could not detect each others’ presence in many
situations and would fail at avoiding collisions. Recent work suggested to use them when
vehicles move slowly [44]. We propose a protocol to create cryptographic mix zones. This
solution thwarts computationally-bounded eavesdroppers while preserving the functionality
of safety messages and offering more flexibility that silent mix zones.
2.7.1 The CMIX Protocol
We introduce the CMIX Protocol for creating Cryptographic mix zones (CMIXes): all legit-
imate vehicles within a mix zone obtain a symmetric key from the road-side unit (RSU) of
the mix zone, and utilize this key to encrypt all their messages while within the zone. The
symmetric key is obtained through a key establishment phase. To ensure functionality of
safety messages, this mix zone key can be obtained by nodes approaching the mix zone with
the help of a key forwarding mechanism, and finally, the RSU can switch to a new key through
a key update mechanism.
CMIX Key Establishment
Vehicles rely on the presence of RSUs at mix zone locations (e.g., at road intersections) to
initiate a Key Establishment mechanism and obtain a symmetric key. RSUs advertise their
presence by periodically broadcasting beacons. As soon as vi enters the transmission range
of an RSU, RBeacon, it initiates the key establishment protocol described in Table 2.1. As the
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vi → RSU: Request,Tsi, Signi(Request,Tsi), Certi,k
RSU → vi: EKi,k(vi, SK,TsRSU , SignRSU (vi, SK,TsRSU )), CertRSU
vi → RSU: Ack,Tsi, Signi(Ack,Tsi), Certi,k
Table 2.1: Key Establishment protocol. Ts is a time stamp, Sign()˙ is the signature of the
message, Cert is the certificate of the message sender.
Mix-Zone
V2 V1
RSU
RCMIX
Extended Mix-Zone
(1)
(2)
RBeacon
Figure 2.3: Extended mix zones. (1) v1 uses the Key Establishment to learn the symmetric
key. (2) v2 uses the Key Forwarding protocol.
vehicle knows its own location and the location of the RSU (announced in the beacon), it can
estimate whether it is within the mix zone, defined by a transmission range RCMIX < RBeacon.
If so, vi broadcasts one or (if needed) several key request messages (first message in Table 2.1).
The RSU replies with the symmetric key SK encrypted with the public key of vehicle vi and
a signature. Vehicle vi receives and decrypts the message. If the message is validated, vi
acknowledges it and uses SK to encrypt all subsequent safety messages until it leaves the mix
zone. In case RSUs are co-located (i.e., their mix zones overlap), vehicles are aware of all
CMIX keys so that they can decrypt all messages. Note that GSM uses the same technique.
Alternatively, co-located RSUs could use the same CMIX key.
CMIX Key Forwarding
Vehicles in the extended mix zone, that is, at a distance d from the RSU where RCMIX <
d < RBeacon are unable to obtain directly the key from the RSU as they are beyond their
transceiver’s range for bidirectional communication and thus cannot decrypt safety messages
coming out of the CMIX. As vehicles know they are within an RSU transmission range, when
they receive encrypted safety messages, they issue one or, if needed, several key requests to
obtain the SK key from vehicles already in the mix zone.
Consider the example of Figure 2.3: vehicle v1 already knows the CMIX key and can
forward it to v2. When v2 enters the extended mix zone, as soon as it receives an encrypted
(intelligible) message, it initiates the broadcast of one or, if needed, several key requests. v1
eventually receives a key request from v2, and forwards it the symmetric key:
EK2,k(v2, v1, SK,TsRSU , SignRSU (v1, SK,TsRSU ))
The signature from the RSU, along with the time stamp, allows a receiver to validate the
transmitted symmetric key. Note that vehicles in the extended region do not encrypt their
safety messages with the CMIX key before entering the mix zone (RCMIX).
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CMIX Key Update
We propose a Key Update mechanism to renew or revoke CMIX symmetric keys. The RSU
is responsible for such key updates and determines when to initiate the process. Key updates
occur only when the mix zone is empty and vehicles obtain new keys via the key transport and
key forward protocols. The CA obtains the new symmetric key from the RSU over a secure
channel, to satisfy the liability requirements (i.e., possibly, decrypt safety messages in the
future). The robustness provided by the system is increased, if key updates are asynchronous
across different base stations.
2.7.2 Analysis of the CMIX Protocol
CMIX requires exchange of messages in the key establishment phase: a key request is sent until
either an RSU or a vehicle receives it and sends back a key reply. To avoid reply flooding,
vehicles sending key requests must acknowledge the acquisition of the key. Cryptographic
overhead can also be easily sustained with relatively low delay [182].
In terms of security, the adversary is computationally bounded and cannot launch brute-
force cryptanalytic attacks on the mix zone encrypted messages. Because messages are au-
thenticated, an external adversary cannot impersonate vehicles, and replay attacks would
not be successful either, thanks to time stamps. Similarly, the adversary cannot forge RSU
messages or impersonate an RSU; as a result, the adversary cannot create fictitious mix zones.
Recent work by Dahl et al. [69] provided a formal analysis of the CMIX protocol. The
authors identify an attack in which the CMIX protocol can inadvertently leak information.
An adversary can obtain the pseudonym of a vehicle in a mix zone by triggering a key
establishment while the vehicle is still in a mix zone. The authors propose a fix of the CMIX
protocol that encrypts key establishment operations and impedes such attacks.
2.8 Summary
In this Chapter, we have introduced the location privacy problem in peer-to-peer wireless
networks. We described multiple solutions and focused on the description of the multiple
pseudonym approach. We introduced the concept of mix zone used to achieve untraceability in
wireless networks with the multiple pseudonym approach. We described existing mechanisms
to create mix zones and to measure their effectiveness. Because mix zones introduce a cost
on both mobile devices and network operators, we argue that privacy-preserving mechanisms
must take into account the overhead they introduce in order to, first, predict the effect of cost
on the privacy-preserving strategy and, second, understand the effect of privacy-preserving
mechanisms on communication networks. Finally, we provided a detailed example of the
application of mix zones in vehicular networks. Our proposal suggests to authenticate vehicles
in local areas and encrypt their wireless communications for short periods of time in order to
provide location privacy without altering potential features of vehicular networks.
Publication: [97]
Chapter 3
Centralized Coordination of
Pseudonym Changes
The appalling present, the awful reality
- but sublime, but significant, but
desperately important precisely because
of the imminence of that which made
them so fearful.
Brave New World - Aldous Huxley
3.1 Introduction
While traversing a given area, mobile nodes may go through a sequence of mix zones. Between
mix zones, the adversary can trivially track the locations of mobile devices. However, at
each mix zone, the adversary has to infer the most likely assignment of entering and exiting
devices. Considering the confusion created by each mix zone, the adversary may not be able
to track trajectories of nodes. In particular, a sequence of traversed mix zones may create
an exponential number of possible trajectories making it difficult to track devices. Hence, by
traversing a sequence of mix zones, mobile devices “accumulate” untraceability [43, 123].
Unlike wired mix networks, such as Tor [79], where packets can be freely routed, the
sequence of mix zones traversed by mobile nodes depends on the mobility of each node. In
other words, the path of mobile nodes cannot be controlled to increase the number of traversed
mix zones. Instead, we propose to control the placement of mix zones. Mix zones can be
deployed to maximize both the number of traversed mix zones and their mixing effectiveness.
However, similar to the delay introduced by mix nodes on packets, mix zones induce a
cost for mobile nodes. With silent mix zones, mobile nodes cannot communicate while they
are in the mix zone, and with a mobile proxy, all messages have to transit through the same
mobile node. Hence, the number of deployed mix zones over a given area must be kept small.
In this Chapter, we evaluate centralized algorithms for deploying mix zones. We consider
that a trusted central authority (responsible for the establishment of security and privacy in
the network) deploys a limited number of mix zones in a given area. We introduce a novel
metric, based on mobility profiles, that helps the CA evaluate the effectiveness of possible
mix zone locations prior to network operation. Then, we analyze optimal placement of mix
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Figure 3.1: Example of flow-based mobility model. Nodes move on plane (x, y) according to
trajectories defined by flows a, b, and c. To achieve location privacy, nodes change pseudonyms
in mix zones.
zones in a constrained mobility environment with combinatorial optimization techniques.
We propose an algorithm to find optimal placement of mix zones by maximizing mixing
effectiveness of the system at an acceptable cost for mobile devices. The algorithm offers
minimum location privacy guarantees by enforcing a maximum distance between traversed
mix zones. Finally, we compare optimal deployment of mix zones to other deployments by
using a realistic mobility simulator [5]. Simulations show that the placement recommended
by our algorithm significantly reduces tracking success of the adversary.
3.2 Related Work
Huang et al. suggest in [123] the use of cascading mix zones. Mix zones are created by
repeatedly turning off the transceivers of mobile nodes. The authors evaluate the quality
of service implications on real-time applications of users traversing several mix zones, but
do not evaluate strategies of mix zones deployments. In [43], Buttyan et al. evaluate the
performance of sequences of mix zones for vehicular networks. The locations of mix zones
correspond to regions where the adversary has no coverage. In their system, the adversary
is highly successful in tracking mobile devices because of insufficient mixing of vehicles. In
this work, we provide an alternative solution that optimizes placement of mix zones in a
considered area.
In wired anonymous networks, multiple mixing strategies were investigated [34]. The
mixing network can form mix cascades and force all packets to go through a predefined
sequences of mixes. Nodes can also freely select their routing strategy over fully connected mix
network [29] or over a restricted mix network [73] (each mix only communicating with a few
neighbors). Recent work also evaluated the effectiveness of different mix network topologies
to thwart active timing attacks in low latency anonymous communications [76, 131]. In this
work, we study an equivalent problem for mobile networks considering optimal positioning of
mix zones and its effect on achievable location privacy.
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3.3 System Model
As introduced in the system and threat model of Chapter 2, we consider mobile devices
equipped with peer-to-peer wireless interfaces and a global passive adversary. In order to
measure the mixing provided by different mobile environments, we rely on a generic mobility
model based on statistical mobility information. In particular, we use the notion of mobility
flows to model the probability to move from one location to another.
3.3.1 Flow-based Mobility Model
As shown by Gonzalez, Hidalgo and Barabasi [105], mobile users tend to regularly return
to certain locations (e.g., home and workplace), indicating that, despite diversity of their
travel locations, humans follow simple patterns. Hence, we consider a flow-based mobility
model (Fig. 3.1). Based on real trajectories of mobile nodes (e.g., pedestrian or vehicular), we
construct f ∈ F flows of nodes between few highly frequented locations, where F is the set of
all flows. In practice, such real trajectories could be provided, for example, by city authorities
in charge of road traffic optimization. Thus, each flow f defines a trajectory shared by several
nodes during a period of time. For example, in Fig. 3.1, each node is assigned to one of the
three flows a, b, or c and follows the trajectory defined by the flow. In stationary regime, a
flow is characterized by its average number of nodes, λ. Note that, during the course of the
day, flows usually vary. For simplicity, we consider one of the possible stationary regimes of
the system. Flows are defined over the road segments in the considered area. Nodes’ mobility
is thus bound to road segments.
3.4 Mixing Effectiveness and Flows
Each mix zone i is traversed by flows fj ∈ Fi ⊆ F . Mobile nodes traversing a mix zone
create entering and exiting events. Each node in a flow takes a certain amount of time, called
sojourn time, to traverse the mix zone. Sojourn time models the speed diversity of mobile
nodes traversing mix zones. Speed differences can be caused, for example, by a higher density
of nodes on specific flows or by traffic lights. Each mix zone i has a set of entry/exit points
Li typically corresponding to the road network. Consider the example in Fig. 3.1: mix zone
3 has three entry/exit points all traversed by some flows. Based on flows traversing a mix
zone, we can evaluate different trajectories of nodes in each mix zone. The mobility profile of
a mix zone captures the typical behavior of mobile nodes traversing the mix zone (i.e., their
sojourn time and trajectory). In practice, city authorities in charge of traffic lights could
provide measured sojourn time distributions as well as typical trajectories over the course of
the day as done in [124]. For example in Fig. 3.1, three mix zones have been established, each
encompassing an entire intersection.
In order to efficiently place mix zones, we need to know - prior to deployment - their mixing
effectiveness. As the previously proposed entropy metric [27] depends on entering/exiting
events of mix zones (after deployment), we propose a new metric based exclusively on the
mobility profile of mix zones (before deployment).
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Figure 3.2: Example of exiting time distribution of two flows with hi,j(∆t) ∼ N (µj , σj),
j = 1, 2. In this example, (µ1, σ1) = (2, 1), (µ2, σ2) = (4, 1), ∆µ = µ2−µ1, and δ is the arrival
time difference between events of two flows (i.e., the first node arrives at time t = 0, and the
second one arrives at time δ).
Flow-Based Metric
We propose a new method to analytically evaluate the mixing effectiveness of mix zones.
The proposed metric relies on the statistics of the mix zone, i.e., mobility flows and mobility
profile, to compute the mixing effectiveness of the mix zone. The advantage of the proposed
metric is that the mixing effectiveness can be computed prior to the operation of the mobile
network as it does not rely on a particular set of events.
The metric is generic and independent of the nature of traffic. However, to simplify the
treatment, we model each flow fj as a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λj . The
distribution Pois(b;λj) denotes the probability that b nodes enter the flow fj during a time
step ts. Each flow fj that traverses a mix zone i is subject to a sojourn time distribution
hi,j(∆t), where ∆t is the time spent in the mix zone. Observing the exit of a mix zone i, the
adversary is confronted to a classical decision-theory problem: A must classify each exit event
x ∈ X happening at time tx as coming from one of the Fi possible entering flows.
Let m = |Fi| be the number of flows in mix zone i. Assume that m = 2 flows {f1, f2}
converge to the same mix zone exit l. The probability that the adversary misclassifies x
depends on the number of nodes that can potentially correspond to it. This is related to the
time spent in the mix zone and the inter-arrival time. We focus on a simple scenario where
one mobile node from each flow enters the mix zone. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the first mobile node arrives at time t = 0 from f1 and that the second node arrives
with a time difference δ from f2. Figure 3.2 shows the exiting time probability distribution
time for a given δ. We first compute the error probability with a fixed value of δ and then
generalize our model by considering different values of δ.
To compute the location privacy generated by a mix zone, we are interested in computing
the probability that an adversary misclassifies an event. In other words, for one exit l, a
successful mixing occurs whenever the adversary makes an error, i.e., assigns an exit event
to the wrong flow. It is well known that the decision rule that minimizes the probability
of error is the Bayes decision rule (i.e., choosing the hypothesis with the largest a posteriori
probability). According to Bayes’ theorem, the a posteriori probability that an observed
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event x belongs to flow fj is
p(fj |x) = pj(x)pij∑
v pv(x)piv
, j = 1, 2 (3.1)
where pj(x) = p(x|fj) is the conditional probability of observing x knowing that x belongs to
fj and pij = p(fj) is the a priori probability that an observed exit event belongs to flow fj .
The Bayes probability of error [115] is then given by:
pe(p1, p2) =
∑
x∈X
min(p1(x)pi1, p2(x)pi2) (3.2)
The a priori probabilities depend on the intensity of the flows and are equal to: pij =
λj/(
∑
v:fv∈Fi λv). The conditional probabilities p1(x), p2(x) are equal to the probability that
fj generates an exit event at time tx: p1(x) =
∫ tx+ts
tx
hi,1(t)dt and p2(x) =
∫ tx+ts
tx
hi,2(t− δ)dt.
A large body of research has focused on minimizing the probability of error. For example,
the MTT algorithm minimizes the probability of error when tracking multiple moving objects.
In the location privacy context, it is used to measure the effectiveness of path perturbation
techniques by Hoh and Gruteser [117]. In our case, we evaluate the probability of error in
order to find mix zones with high mixing effectiveness, i.e., that maximize the probability of
error. Because computing the probability of error is most of the time impractical [132] (when
m > 2), we consider the distance between the two probability distributions p1, p2 to compute
bounds on the error probability. Intuitively, the further apart these two distributions are,
the smaller the probability of mistaking one for the other should be. The Jensen-Shannon
divergence [149] (JS) is an information-theoretic distance measure that is particularly suitable
for the study of decision problems as the one considered here. It provides both a lower and
an upper bound for the Bayes probability of error.
JSpi(p1, p2) = H(pi1p1(x) + pi2p2(x))− pi1H(p1(x))− pi2H(p2(x)) (3.3)
where H is the entropy.
The JS divergence (3.3) provides a simple way to estimate the misclassification error of
the adversary over a mix zone. The Bayes probability of error is lower/upper bounded as
follows [149]:
1
4
(H(pi1, pi2)− JSpi(p1, p2))2 ≤ pe(p1, p2) ≤ 12(H(pi1, pi2)− JSpi(p1, p2)) (3.4)
where H(pi1, pi2) is the entropy of the a priori probabilities. The JS divergence is thus partic-
ularly useful in order to select mix zones with a high mixing effectiveness. In addition, the
JS divergence can be extended to a larger number of flows [149]:
JSpi(p1, ..., pm) = H(
m∑
i=1
piipi(x))−
m∑
i=1
piiH(pi(x)) (3.5)
Consider the following example: Two flows f1, f2 with equal input Poisson intensities
λj = 0.2 share an exit l of mix zone i. The sojourn times are distributed according to a
Normal distribution hi,j(∆t) = N (µj = 2, σj = 0.5), j = 1, 2, and δ = 0. Figure 3.3 shows
how the lower and upper bounds on the probability of error are influenced by a difference ∆µ
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Figure 3.3: Lower and upper bounds of the probability of error with Pois(b;λj), hi,j(∆t) =
N (µj , σj = 0.5), j = 1, 2, λ1 = 0.2, λ2 ∈ [0.2, 2], µ1 = 2s, and µ2 ∈ [2, 4]s. As λ2/λ1 increases,
the difference between the two probability functions increases as well and it becomes easier to
classify the events (pe becomes smaller). The decrease in pe is faster if ∆µ increases as well.
of the sojourn time distributions (∆µ = µ2 − µ1) and by the ratio λ2/λ1 of flows’ intensities.
We observe that if ∆µ increases and λ2/λ1 = 1, pe decreases, showing that, with a fixed
δ, a difference in the sojourn time distributions alone helps distinguish between the two
distributions. We also observe that if λ2/λ1 increases and ∆µ = 0, the probability of error
decreases. The intuition is that as the difference between the flows’ intensities increases, the
flow with higher intensity dominates the exit of the considered mix zone. In addition, we
observe that if both λ2/λ1 and ∆µ increase, pe decreases faster. The mixing effectiveness is
maximal when both flows have the same intensity and sojourn time distribution.
Until now, we focused on scenarios with one mobile node entering from each flow, and
a fixed δ. We generalize our model by considering the average difference in arrival time
of nodes in flows. More specifically, based on the average arrival rate λj , we compute the
average difference in arrival time between flows and the average number of nodes that can
potentially correspond to an exit event x. The average difference in arrival time between any
two flows depends on the flow intensities. The average number of nodes that can be confused
with an event x depends on the maximum sojourn time window ωi,l = maxfj∈Fi,l(∆tfj ),
where ∆tfj is the time spent in the mix zone by nodes in flow fj and Fi,l is the set of flows
in Fi that exit at l. For each flow fj ∈ Fi,l, there is a set of possible entering events with
average arrival time differences in a time window ωi,l with respect to beginning of the window:
ζij,l = {δj,v: v/λj ≤ ωi,l, v ∈ N}, where δj,v = v/λj . We compute the probability of error of
the adversary at exit l as follows:
pie,l =
∑
fj∈Fi,l
pe
(
pj(x, 0), pκ1(x, δκ1,v1), pκ1(x, δκ1,v2), ..., pκ2(x, δκ2,v1), ...
)
|Fi,l| (3.6)
where pj(x, 0) is the conditional probability pj(x) with δ = 0, pκ1(x, δκ1,v1) corresponds to
the conditional probability pκ1(x) with δκ1,v1 ∈ ζiκ1,l, and κ1, κ2, ..., κm−1 are not equal to
j. In other words, we evaluate the confusion of the adversary for each flow with respect to
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other flows. Finally, we compute the average probability of error caused by a mix zone i by
considering the error created by each exit l ∈ Li of mix zone i:
p¯ie =
∑
Li
pie,l
|Li| (3.7)
With this model, we consider the average arrival rate of the nodes and can thus compute
the mixing effectiveness prior to network operation. Note that we assumed for simplicity
that the sojourn time distribution is independent of the flows’ intensity. The model can be
extended to capture the interactions between nodes in the mix zone and their effect on the
sojourn time distributions [103].
3.5 Pseudonym Change Coordination
In principle, mix zones can be placed anywhere in the considered area. Their placement
determines the accumulated location privacy provided by each mix zone. Thus, the optimal
solution consists in placing mix zones on the entire surface of the considered area. However,
mix zones have a cost because they impose limits on services available to mobile users and
require a pseudonym change. Hence, the total number of mix zones deployed in the network
should be limited to minimize disruptions on mobile nodes. We assume that a central au-
thority is responsible for organizing mix zones in the network. Users must trust the central
authority protects their privacy. We propose a solution based on combinatorial optimization
techniques that relies on the divergence metric to select appropriate mix zones. By making a
possible algorithm public, our work increases trustworthiness of the authority and provides a
basis for comparison.
3.5.1 Mix Zones Placement
After Chaum’s seminal work on mixes [58], there have been multiple proposals on the way
mixes should be connected and organized to maximize anonymity [34]. This led to a classifi-
cation of different organization concepts. For example, the choice of the sequence of mixes is
either distributed (i.e., mix networks) or centrally controlled (i.e., mix cascades).
The system considered in this work, mix zones deployed over a considered area, presents
three different characteristics: (i) Organization of mixes depends on the placement of mix
zones in the area, (ii) nodes move in the considered area according to flows constrained
by the underlying road network, and (iii) the road network is a connected network with a
restricted number of routes. Hence, we must characterize mix zone placements that maximize
location privacy.
In order to evaluate location privacy provided by mix zones deployed over a mobile net-
work, one solution is to compute the uncertainty accumulated by the adversary with the joint
entropy [199]. However, complexity of the formulation increases with the number of mix zones,
making it hard to evaluate. Instead, to compute the overall location privacy, we maximize
the total probability of error of the adversary by considering the sum of error probabilities
over each deployed mix zone and we guarantee that the distance over which the adversary
can successfully track mobile nodes is upper-bounded.
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Distance-to-Confusion
The average distance-to-confusion (dtc) is defined as the average distance over which the
adversary can successfully track mobile nodes before entering a confusion point. A mix zone
is a confusion point if the error probability of the adversary is larger than a given threshold
Tr [118]. As shown in Chapter 1, few location samples can reveal significant information
about users. Hence, distance-to-confusion must be minimized. Yet, mix zones impose a cost
on mobile nodes that must be taken into account in the mix zone deployment phase. The
cost associated to each mix zone depends on the considered application. For example, with
silent periods, the cost is typically directly proportional to the duration of the imposed silent
period (i.e., the size of the mix zone). Similarly, the cost also depends on the number of used
pseudonyms. Pseudonyms are costly to use because they are a limited resource that requires
contacting the CA for refill.
By considering both the distance over which the adversary can track mobile nodes, and
the probability of error of the adversary at confusion points, we maximize the overall location
privacy in the considered area.
3.5.2 Placement Optimization
We model mix zones placement as an optimization problem. Formally, consider a finite set
Z of all possible mix zones’ locations, a set F of mobility flows in the system, and a mobility
profile for each potential mix zone in the considered area. The goal is to optimize placement
of mix zones to maximize the overall probability of error tracking nodes in the considered
area, while respecting cost and distance-to-confusion constraints. We select a subset Ẑ ⊆ Z
of active mix zones, which is a solution of the following combinatorial optimization problem:
maxbZ
∑
i∈Z
p¯ie · 1{i is active} (3.8)
subject to
∑
i∈fj
wi · 1{i is active} ≤Wmax,∀fj (3.9)
E[dtc(fj , Ẑ)] ≤ Cmax,∀fj (3.10)
where 1{i is active} returns one if mix zone i is active and zero otherwise, Ẑ is the set of active
mix zones, p¯ie captures the error introduced by mix zone i, wi is the cost associated with mix
zone i, Wmax is the maximum tolerable cost, E[dtc(fj , Ẑ)] is the average distance-to-confusion
of flow fj with the set of active mix zones Ẑ, and Cmax is the maximum tolerable distance-
to-confusion. We compute the probability of error p¯ie by using the lower bound obtained with
the Jensen-Shannon divergence in the previous section. The first constraint limits the number
of mix zones that can be deployed per flow by taking into account the cost associated with
each mix zone. The second constraint ensures that the average distance-to-confusion is upper
bounded, i.e., Cmax defines a maximal distance over which mobile nodes can be tracked on
average.
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3.6 Application Example
To test the relevance of our approach, we implemented a simulator in Java that evaluates
tracking efficiency.1 The simulator takes as input a mobility trace and a set of mix zone
locations. It first computes the mobility profile of mix zones and then attempts to predict
trajectories of mobile nodes using inference attacks.
3.6.1 Simulation Setup
We simulate mobility traces with Sumo [5], an urban mobility simulator, over a cropped
map [6] of Manhattan of 6 km2. Sumo features creation of routes using mobility flows. Each
flow is defined by a source, a destination and a traffic intensity. Each mobile node belongs to
a single flow and is routed from source to destination over the shortest path. Roads have one
lane in each direction, and intersections are modeled with yields. Some roads (e.g., highways)
have higher priority and do not have to yield.
In this application example, constraints of the optimization algorithm are defined as fol-
lows. The cost of mix zones wi is proportional to the cost of a pseudonym change γ. We assume
that the cost of a pseudonym change is fixed for all nodes, γ = 1. We set Wmax = 3, meaning
that each node can traverse a maximum of three mix zones. Similarly, we set Cmax = 2000m,
i.e., the adversary cannot track nodes over more than two kilometers. A total of 40 flows were
deployed over the area, generating 1210 nodes in a fluid scenario (λj ∼ 0.02) and 2000 nodes
in a congested scenario (λj ∼ 0.04). The radius of mix zones is a constant R = 100m. We
simulate a mobile network for 20 minutes with nodes moving at a maximum speed of 50km/h
and with an average trip time of 6 minutes. Finally, a mix zone is considered as a confusion
point if the introduced error is larger than zero, i.e., Tr = 0.
Mobility Profiles
We consider a powerful (worst-case) adversary that can construct a mobility profile of each mix
zone i by measuring the time when nodes enter/exit mix zones. We denote with Q the measur-
ing precision of the adversary, and assume Q = 1 second. A knows for each mix zone: (i) dis-
tribution of nodes’ trajectories, and (ii) sojourn time distributions. The distribution of nodes’
trajectories is captured in a matrix of directions Di. For each entering/exiting points (k, l),
the matrix contains the probability of the trajectory: Dk,li = Pr(“ Enter at k and exit at l ”).
Sojourn time distribution is captured in a matrix of sojourn times Ji: For each enter-
ing/exiting points (k, l), the matrix contains the probability distribution of the sojourn time:
Jk,li (∆t) = Pr(“Enter at k and spend ∆t before exiting at l”). Note that a significant amount
of memory is required to store mobility profiles. In the simulation scenario considered here,
mobility profiles require approximately 2 Gigabytes.
Attack
Based on the mobility profiles, the adversary A predicts the most probable assignment of
entering/exiting mobile nodes for each mix zone. To do so, A can model entering/exiting
events with a weighted bipartite graph, as suggested by Beresford in [26]. Each edge is
weighted according to the a priori probability of linking an exiting event at l to an entering
1Code is available at: http://mobivacy.sourceforge.net .
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Figure 3.4: Matching success mi of the 20 potential mix zone locations.
event at k: Dk,li · Jk,li (∆t). Then, the maximum weight matching of the bipartite graph
corresponds to the optimal guess of the adversary. As discussed in [211], a more elaborate
attack consists in computing all perfect matchings of the bipartite graph to weight edges,
according to the a posteriori probability of linking entering/exiting events. However, this
attack has a large complexity, increasing exponentially with the number of entering/exiting
pairs and its scalability remains an open problem.
Metrics
Assume that Zs is the set of mix zones traversed by node s and let Gs ⊆ Zs be the set of
mix zones successfully matched by the adversary. A is successful in tracking the location
of node s in a mix zone if the real trajectory of node s is correctly guessed. For example,
Gs = {3, 5, 10} means that node s was successfully tracked in three mix zones.
For each mix zone i, the mixing effectiveness is mi = uiNi where ui is the number of
successful matches and Ni is the total number of nodes that entered over the course of the
simulation. The tracking success of the adversary is defined as the percentage of nodes that
can be tracked over k consecutive mix zones: ts(k) = Nsuc(k)N(k) , where Nsuc(k) is the number
of nodes successfully tracked over k consecutive mix zones, and N(k) is the total number of
nodes traversing k consecutive mix zones. This metric reflects the distance over which nodes
can be tracked before confusing the adversary.
3.6.2 Results
Mix Zone Performance
Figure 3.4 shows the histogram of mixing effectiveness for 20 potential mix zone locations.
We observe that the mixing effectiveness can vary significantly across mix zones and some
nodes might experience a poor mixing while traversing a given mix zone. This affects optimal
deployment, because mix zones with low mixing effectiveness are sometimes chosen to fulfill
the distance-to-confusion constraint. Other than that, the optimization algorithm will tend
to choose mix zones that offer lowest tracking success. We observe that mix zones 1 and 13
are particularly effective, whereas mix zones 6, 14 and 19 do not provide any mixing.
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# of traversed mix zones 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 avg Tracked (%)
Bad (6 mix zones) 68 20 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0.48 98
Random (10 mix zones) 14 43 24 10 9 0 0 0 0 1.56 78
Optimal (6 mix zones) 14 33 37 16 0 0 0 0 0 1.55 53
Full (20 mix zones) 0 8 24 24 16 14 8 4 2 3.56 48
Table 3.1: Percentage of mobile nodes traversing a certain number of mix zones for various
mix zone deployments. The avg column gives the average number of traversed mix zones.
The last column gives the percentage of nodes that were successfully tracked over all mix
zones in the considered area.
Mix Zone Placement
We consider a total of 20 possible mix zone locations and test 4 deployments of mix zones:
(i) optimal deployment resulting in 6 deployed mix zones, (ii) random deployment of 10
mix zones, (iii) bad deployment of 6 mix zones with poor mixing effectiveness, and (iv) full
deployment where 20 mix zones are in use. We observe in Table 3.1 that in the optimal
deployment, the majority of the nodes traverses at least one mix zone and none exceeds the
tolerable cost of three mix zones. The random and optimal deployment perform relatively
close in terms of the number of traversed mix zones, but with the optimal deployment, fewer
nodes are tracked (53%) approaching the performance of full deployment (48%). As expected,
bad deployment performs the worst.
The average number of traversed mix zones in Table 3.1 also reflects the total cost. We
observe that optimal deployment has a higher cost than bad deployment for the same number
of deployed mix zones. However, compared to full deployment, optimal deployment achieves
tolerable cost and approaches the same mixing effectiveness.
Tracking Success
We compare the tracking success for optimal, random, bad and full deployments. We ob-
serve in Fig. 3.5 (a) that, in general, the probability of success of the adversary decreases
as mobile nodes traverse more mix zones. Optimal deployment of mix zones is more effec-
tive at anonymizing flows than other deployments and complies with the cost constraint. In
particular, optimal deployment is superior to full deployment, since it avoids bad placements.
Note that, in the case of full deployment, traversing more mix zones does not necessarily
increase (and actually decreases) location privacy. The reason is that the majority of the
flows traversing more than five mix zones actually go through a sequence of ineffective mix
zones. Hence, not all flows are equal in terms of the achievable location privacy.
In Fig. 3.5 (b), we observe the effect of an increase in flow intensity λj (leading to a
congested scenario). Optimal deployment is not affected by the change of intensity because
it places mix zones in regions with high traffic density. Random deployment significantly
improves mixing effectiveness and approaches the performance of optimal deployment.
In Fig. 3.5 (c), we observe that as the tracking precision Q of the adversary diminishes,
so does its ability to track nodes. Reduction of tracking precision of the adversary reflects
scenarios where the knowledge of the adversary about mobility profiles is noisy. For example,
the adversary may be unable to obtain precise mobility profiles.
In Fig. 3.5 (d), we observe that increasing mix zone radius R from 50 to 100 does not
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Figure 3.5: Tracking success of adversary ts(k), i.e., the fraction of nodes that can be tracked
over k consecutive mix zones. (a) For various mix zones’ deployments. (b) In a fluid and
congested scenario. (c) With various adversary’s precision. (d) For various sizes of mix zone.
increase the mixing effectiveness, whereas, a small radius R = 20 dramatically reduces the
achieved location privacy. One reason is that changes in speed and direction occur mostly at
the center of mix zones. Another reason is that, with R = 20, the size of mix zones tends to
be smaller than the size of crossroads of the considered map. On one hand, it is important to
choose mix zones that are not too small. On the other hand, large mix zones are inappropriate
because they do not significantly increase location privacy and incur a high cost.
We also vary the parameters of the optimization problem. Cost wi, associated with mix
zones, changes optimal placement of mix zones. As we increase the cost, fewer mix zones are
deployed and achievable location privacy decreases compared to full deployment. Instead,
if the tolerable cost increases, optimal deployment performs closer to full deployment in
terms of achieved location privacy. Finally, if tolerable distance-to-confusion is lowered, the
optimization problem might not have a solution. If there is a solution, it will require more
mix zones and will increase the cost per node.
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Discussion
Our results show some limitations of mix zones and exhibit the importance of optimizing
their placement. An interesting result is that, traversing more mix zones is not necessarily
an advantage. Another interesting observation is the high tracking success of the adversary.
It may be partly due to our application example. First, we consider a worst-case adversary
with global coverage and access to precise mobility profiles (Q = 1). Second, we consider
a relatively small map with a simple road intersection model. From a general perspective,
it is interesting to question our goal of hiding the regular commute of users. After all, this
information is mostly publicly available. Home locations are usually public information and
can be found phone directories. Similarly, work locations are increasingly shared online and
can be found on personal websites. Users also tend to move along the shortest route between
these two locations on a regular basis. In Part I of this dissertation, we even showed that
users’ whereabouts are highly correlated to users’ identities and that little information may
be sufficient to infer most habits of users. In addition to the attack considered in this work,
statistical disclosure attacks [74] could be used to further increase the success of the adversary.
Hence, privacy-preserving mechanisms for location privacy should perhaps aim at protecting
deviant behavior (users not following their typical routine) instead of the routine itself. In
this regard, our results, by indicating the limits of tracking highly correlated information,
show that non-standard behavior may be hard to track for an adversary.
3.7 Summary
We considered the problem of constructing a network of mix zones in a mobile network. We
first showed how to evaluate the mixing effectiveness of mix zones prior to network operation
by using the Jensen-Shannon divergence measure. The proposed metric relies on statistical
information about mobility of nodes in mix zones. Then, we modeled the placement of mix
zones as an optimization problem by taking into account distance-to-confusion and cost in-
curred by mix zones. This approach assumes that users trust the central authority responsible
for the establishment of security and privacy in the system. Our work, by making a possible
algorithm public, contributes to the trustworthiness of the authority as it provides a basis for
comparison.
By means of simulations, we investigated the importance of the mix zone deployment
strategy and observed that the optimal algorithm prevents bad placement of mix zones and
reduces total cost. In addition, we measured the benefit brought by the optimal placement of
mix zones, i.e., a 30% increase of location privacy, compared to a random deployment of mix
zones. We also noticed that the optimal mix zone placement performs comparatively well to
the full deployment scenario, but at a lower cost. As we simulated users’ whereabouts with
mobility flows modeling humans that move according to reproducible patterns, our results
measured the ability of privacy-preserving mechanisms to obfuscate highly correlated spatio-
temporal traces. We observed that a global passive adversary could track a large fraction of
the nodes and thus infer most of the regular commute of users. The mixing provided by mix
zones may thus be insufficient to obfuscate highly correlated location traces. Our results may
appear negative at first; yet, the threat of a global passive adversary is unlikely due to the
high cost to put in place such attack. In practice, an adversary may obtain lower coverage
and noisy mobility profiles. We show that such adversary is considerably less effective at
tracking mobile devices. In addition, if a global passive adversary equipped with precise
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mobility profiles is unable to track mobile devices following highly reproducible patterns, this
indicates that an adversary will not track users deviating from their regular pattern.
Publication: [99]
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4.1 Introduction
Centrally deploying mix zones is not always possible or even sufficient. In some cases, mobility
statistics required to estimate the mixing effectiveness of potential mix zones may not be
readily available or precise enough. In other cases, the central authority responsible for
deployment may not exist or may not be willing to provide such a service. Also, it may be
impractical for users to share in real-time optimal locations of mix zones for different mobile
environments. Finally, our results of Chapter 3 show some limits in the achievable location
privacy of centrally deploying mix zones.
Several researchers advocated the use of a distributed approach [121, 122, 145] whereby
mobile nodes coordinate pseudonym changes to dynamically obtain mix zones. To do this, a
mobile node simply broadcasts a pseudonym change request to its neighbors. Nearby users
independently decide whether to change pseudonyms. The decision depends on the potential
location privacy gain and associated cost.
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, pseudonym changes are costly. Pseudonym can
quickly become a scarce resource if changed frequently. Hence, existing distributed coordi-
nations of pseudonym changes do not align incentives between mobile nodes. Because the
achieved location privacy depends on node density and unpredictability of nodes’ movements,
rational utility-optimizing agents might not change pseudonyms in settings offering low loca-
tion privacy.
In this Chapter, we investigate novel distributed algorithms for deploying mix zones. In
contrast with other distributed approaches, we consider rational mobile devices that locally
decide whether to change their pseudonyms. Although selfish behavior can reduce the cost of
location privacy, it can also jeopardize the welfare achieved with a location privacy scheme.
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We investigate whether the multiple pseudonym approach achieves location privacy in non-
cooperative scenarios. We propose a user-centric location privacy model that captures the
evolution of the location privacy level of mobile users over time and helps them determine
when to change pseudonyms. We then define a game-theoretic model - the pseudonym change
game - that models decisions of mobile nodes in a mix zone.
We first analyze the game with complete information (i.e., every node knows the user-
centric location privacy level of other nodes) and obtain both pure and mixed Nash equi-
libria [162]. We show that nodes should coordinate their strategies. Nodes should either
cooperate when there is a sufficient number of neighbors with low privacy, or defect. Then,
because mobile nodes will, in general, not have good knowledge about payoffs of other nodes,
we study, using a Bayesian approach [112], the incomplete information scenario. We evaluate
(both analytically and numerically) the game model, and derive Bayesian Nash equilibria for
a class of threshold strategies where nodes decide whether to change their pseudonyms based
on a comparison of their privacy level to a threshold value. We find a symmetric equilib-
rium, where all nodes cooperate with the same probability, as determined with respect to a
distribution over privacy levels. We compare our game-theoretic approach with random and
socially-optimal strategies and show that, by using the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, players
can reduce their consumption of pseudonyms. Nevertheless, if uncertainty is high, the achiev-
able location privacy is reduced. We then analyze a dynamic version of the game and show
that it copes better with uncertainty. Finally, based on the results of the games, we design
the PseudoGame protocol that implements the pseudonym change game and evaluate it with
simulations.
4.2 Related Work
Game theory is a fundamental tool for evaluating multiplayers decision making: it captures
the rational considerations of individual parties and predicts the strategies that perform best
under different conditions. As security protocols require the active participation of several
(rational) parties, game theory can help analyze their strategic behavior. A game-theoretic
analysis of security protocols considers the strategies of the parties involved and the nature
of their utility. Based on this, the analysis predicts the resulting strategies of rational utility-
optimizing entities (i.e., Nash equilibra). If the resulting equilibria are not desirable, game
theory can also help us redesign protocols to improve their efficiency.
For these reasons, game theory has been used to evaluate the strategic behavior of mobile
nodes in security protocols [14, 45] such as revocation strategies in ephemeral networks [184].
There is also a recent trend of blending game theory with cryptographic mechanisms when
rational parties are involved [111, 126, 134, 166]. Game theory has also been used to study
privacy. Acquisti [9] explores the reasons why decentralized anonymity infrastructures are
still not in wide use today. Varian [216] depicts the role of privacy in economic transactions,
showing that because of the advantages of price discrimination consumers may be less inclined
to protect their privacy. In this thesis, we study a new aspect of privacy by evaluating how
privacy can be achieved among non-cooperative nodes.
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Figure 4.1: Location privacy loss function βi(t, T `i ). At t1, node i changes pseudonym and
updates its time of last successful pseudonym change: T `i := t1. The function β(t, T
`
i ) in-
creases according to the user sensitivity λ and estimates the time at which mobile i becomes
unsatisfied with its location privacy (T fi ). At t2, node i changes pseudonym again and updates
T `i := t2.
4.3 System Model
As introduced in the system and threat model of Chapter 2, we consider mobile devices
equipped with peer-to-peer wireless interfaces and a global passive adversary. In order to
measure the level of location privacy of every mobile device over time, we introduce a user-
centric model of location privacy.
4.3.1 User-Centric Location Privacy
The entropy metric evaluates the location privacy achieved in mix zones of the network. How-
ever, the location privacy needs of individual users vary depending on time and location. It
is thus desirable to protect the location privacy in a user-centric manner, such that each user
can decide when and where to protect its location privacy. Hence, we consider a user-centric
model of location privacy. User-centric location privacy [118, 120, 145] is a distributed ap-
proach where each mobile node locally monitors its location privacy level over time. The user
centric approach is easily scalable and permits a more fine-grained approach to maintaining
location privacy. Each mobile node can evaluate the distance over which it is potentially
tracked by an adversary (i.e., the distance-to-confusion [118]) and can act upon it by decid-
ing whether and when to change its pseudonym. Whereas, a network wide metric measures
average location privacy and might ignore that some nodes have a low location privacy level
and are traceable for long distances.
With a user-centric model, mobile nodes can request a pseudonym change from other
nodes in proximity when their local location privacy level is lower than a desired level. Nodes
in proximity will then choose to cooperate when their location privacy level is low as well.
The drawback of the user-centric model is that nodes may have misaligned incentives (i.e.,
different privacy levels) and this can lead to failed attempts to achieve location privacy.
In this work, we formalize this problem and introduce a user-centric location privacy
model to capture the evolution of user-centric location privacy level over time. The user-
centric location privacy level of each mobile node i is modeled via a location privacy loss
function βi(t, T `i ) : (R+,R+) → R+ where t is the current time and T `i ≤ t is the time of
the last successful pseudonym change of mobile i. The maximum value of βi(t, T `i ) equals the
level of location privacy achieved at the last pseudonym change. The privacy loss is initially
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zero and increases with time according to a sensitivity parameter, 0 < λi < 1, which models
the belief of node i about the tracking power of the adversary. The higher the value of λi,
the faster the rate of privacy loss increase. For simplicity, we consider that λi = λ, ∀i. For a
given T `i , we write:
βi(t, T `i ) =
{
λ · (t− T `i ) for T `i ≤ t < T fi
Ai(T `i ) for T
f
i ≤ t
(4.1)
where T fi =
Ai(T
`
i )
λ + T
`
i is the time when the function reaches the maximal privacy loss (i.e.,
the user-centric location privacy is null). Figure 4.1 illustrates how the function evolves with
time. Given this location privacy loss function, the user-centric location privacy of node i at
time t is:
Ai(t) = Ai(T `i )− βi(t, T `i ), t ≥ T `i (4.2)
Time T fi is the time at which node i’s location privacy will be zero unless it is successful in
changing its pseudonym at a new confusion point. Based on the time of the last successful
pseudonym change T `i , mobile nodes rationally estimate when next to change pseudonyms.
1
Note that, in practice, nodes cannot compute Ai(T `i ) precisely. Hence, we consider that nodes
use an approximation such as the upperbound log2(n).
In our model, a node’s location privacy does not accumulate over time. Rather, it de-
pends only on the number of nodes that cooperate in the last successful pseudonym change.
Moreover, mobile nodes are given the ability to control the length of path that is revealed to
an adversary before the next pseudonym change. If a mix zone is a strong confusion point
(i.e., Ai(T `i ) is large), then a node can choose to reveal a longer distance before changing
pseudonym again. If a mix zone is a weak confusion point, a node can attempt another pseu-
donym change as soon as possible. In doing so, a node has autonomy to control the period of
time over which its location can be tracked. Because the achievable location privacy defined
by Eq. (2.2) is logarithmic and the location privacy loss function is linear, the user-centric
location privacy level will decrease quickly. In our future work, we plan to analyze the effect
of other loss functions (e.g., super-linear functions).
4.4 Pseudonym Change Games
In this section, we present the game-theoretic aspects of achieving location privacy with
multiple pseudonyms in a selfish environment. We introduce a game-theoretic model that we
refer to as the pseudonym change game G.
A protocol to change pseudonyms is in general composed of two parts [145]: a pseudonym
change initiation phase, in which nodes issue request to others asking for pseudonym changes,
and a pseudonym change decision phase, in which nodes decide upon receiving a request
whether to change pseudonyms or not. Pseudonym change games model the latter with game
theory. The key point of the game-theoretic analysis is to consider costs and the potential
location privacy gain when making a pseudonym change decision.
On one hand, pseudonyms are costly to acquire and use because they are owned in a
limited number and require contacting a central authority for refill. Similarly, routing [198]
1In a user-centric model, users are actually not involved: the devices make decisions on their behalf.
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becomes more difficult and requires frequent updates of routing tables. In addition, while
traversing silent mix zones, mobile nodes cannot communicate and thus momentarily lose
access to services. We take into account the various costs involved in changing pseudonym
in a parameter γ that can be expressed as: γ = γacq + γrte + γsil, where γacq is the cost of
acquiring new pseudonyms, γrte is the cost of updating routing tables, and γsil is the cost
of remaining silent while traversing a mix zone. The cost is expressed in privacy units (e.g.,
bits), causing a decrease in the achieved privacy. Thus, rational mobile nodes might refuse to
change pseudonym in order to reduce their costs. Moreover, selfish behavior might jeopardize
the achievable location privacy.
On the other hand, the available location privacy gain (upperbounded by the density of
nodes and their locations unpredictability) and the user-centric location privacy level might
encourage selfish mobile nodes to change pseudonym and obtain a satisfactory location privacy
level.
Hence, nodes may delay their decision to change pseudonyms in order to try to find
the optimal conditions to maximize the effectiveness of pseudonym changes. Therefore, us-
ing a game-theoretic analysis, we investigate whether location privacy can emerge in a non-
cooperative system despite the cost incurred by a node in changing its pseudonym, differenti-
ated privacy levels, and the need for coordinated pseudonym changes to achieve a confusion
point. We consider rational mobile nodes that maximize their payoff function, which depends
on the current location privacy and the associated pseudonym management cost.
4.4.1 Game Model
Game theory allows for modeling situations of conflict and for predicting the behavior of
participants. In our pseudonym change game G, nodes must decide upon meeting in the
network whether to change pseudonym or not. We model the pseudonym change game both
as a static and dynamic game depending on the constraints on the pseudonym change protocol.
The static version of the game captures protocols in which nodes are unable to sense their
wider environment when deciding whether or not to change its pseudonym, i.e., all nodes
stop/start transmitting at the same time. The dynamic version of the game models protocols
in which nodes do not start/stop transmitting at the same time and may thus observe each
others messages before making their decision.
The game G is defined as a triplet (P,S,U), where P is the set of players, S is the set
of strategies and U is the set of payoff functions. At any time t, several games are played in
parallel (but nodes participate in a single game at a time).
Players
The set of players P = {Pi}n(t)i=1 corresponds to the set of mobile nodes in transmission range
of each other at time t. For a valid game we require n(t) > 1. We assume that each node
knows the number of other nodes in the mix zone. To achieve a consensus on this number,
each node can adopt a neighbor discovery protocol [217].
Strategy
Each player has two moves si: Cooperate (C) or Defect (D). By cooperating, a mobile node
changes its pseudonym. The set of strategies of node i is thus Si = {C,D} and the set of
strategies in the game is S = {Si}n(t)i=1 .
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Figure 4.2: Example of pseudonym change. (a) 7 nodes move on the plane (x, y). (b)
Evolution of the payoff of node 1 over time. At t1 (event E1 in (a)), nodes 2, 3, and 4
meet in a mix zone and cooperate with node 1. Their payoff ui and the time of the last
successful pseudonym change are updated: ui = Ai(T `i )−γ = log2(4)−γ = 1.8, and T `i := t1,
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The payoff of node 1 then decreases according to β1 with slope λ. At t2 (event
E2), node 1 defects. At t3 (event E3), node 1 cooperates with nodes 6 and 7. Consequently,
the 3 nodes update their payoff and the time of the last successful pseudonym change. At t4,
(event E4) node 1 cooperates but node 8 does not. Hence, the payoff of node 1 decreases by
γ. Finally, at T f1 = t5, the payoff of node 1 reaches 0 (event E5).
Payoff Function
We model the payoff function of every node i as ui(t) = bi(t)− ci(t), where the benefit bi(t)
depends on the level of location privacy of node i at time t, whereas the cost ci(t) depends on
the privacy loss function and the cost of changing pseudonym at time t. If at least two nodes
change pseudonyms, then each participating node improves its location privacy for the cost
of a pseudonym change γ. If a node is alone in changing its pseudonym, then it still pays the
cost γ and, in addition, its location privacy continues to decrease according to the location
privacy loss function. If a node defects, its location privacy continues to decrease according
to its location privacy loss function. Formally, we have:
If (si = C) ∧ (nC(s−i) > 0),
T `i := t (4.3)
αi(t, T `i ) := 0 (4.4)
ui(t, T `i , C, si) := max (Ai(T
`
i )− γ, u−i − γ) (4.5)
If (si = C) ∧ (nC(s−i) = 0),
ui(t, T `i , C, si) := max (0, u
−
i − γ) (4.6)
αi(t, T `i ) := αi(t, T
`
i ) + 1 (4.7)
If (si = D),
ui(t, T `i , D, si) := max (0, u
−
i ) (4.8)
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where u−i = Ai(T
`
i ) − γ − βi(t, T `i ) − γαi(t, T `i ) is the payoff function at time t−, which is
the time immediately prior to t. s−i is the strategy of the other players, and nC(s−i) is the
number of cooperating nodes besides i, and αi(t, T `i ) is the number of pseudonyms wasted by
node i since its last successful pseudonym change T `i . (Note that in contrast with the equality
sign =, the sign := refers to the assignment of a new value to a variable.)
Figure 4.2 (a) shows seven users moving in a network and playing a total of four pseudonym
change games. Figure 4.2 (b) illustrates the evolution of the payoff of node 1 playing the four
games. Because we analyze only a single strategic interaction between players, we simplify
notation and write in the following n = n(t), βi = βi(t, T `i ), αi = αi(t, T
`
i ), and ui(si, s−i) =
ui(t, T `i , si, s−i).
Type
Upon meeting other players, the strategy of a player depends on its knowledge of its opponent
payoff function. As both the time of the last pseudonym change and the corresponding location
privacy gain are unknown to other players, each player has incomplete information about its
opponents payoffs. To solve the problem, Harsanyi [102] suggests the introduction of a new
player named Nature that turns an incomplete information game into an imperfect information
game. To do so, Nature assigns a type θi to every player i according to a probability density
function f(θi) known to all players, where θi belongs to space of types Θ. The type of the
players captures the private information of the player, θi = u−i , where u
−
i is the payoff to
player i at time t− just prior to the current opportunity to change pseudonym. Because γ is
common and known to all nodes, this completely defines the payoff of the node.
4.4.2 Equilibrium Concepts
In this section, we introduce the game-theoretic concepts that will help us get an insight into
the strategic behavior of mobile nodes. In a complete information game, a pure-strategy for
player i is si ∈ Si, where Si = {C,D} is the pure-strategy space. A strategy profile s = {si}ni=1
defines the set of strategies of the players. Let us write bri(s−i), the best response of player i
to the opponent’s strategy s−i.
Definition 1. The best response bri(s−i) of player i to the profile of strategies s−i is a strategy
si such that:
bri(s−i) = arg max
si
ui(si, s−i) (4.9)
If two strategies are mutual best responses to each other, then no player has the mo-
tivation to deviate from the given strategy profile. This leads us to the concept of Nash
Equilibrium [162].
Definition 2. A strategy profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if, for each player i:
ui(s∗i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si (4.10)
In other words, in a NE, none of the players can unilaterally change his strategy to increase
his payoff. A player can also play each of his pure strategies with some probability using mixed
strategies. A mixed strategy xi of player i is a probability distribution defined over the pure
strategies si.
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Figure 4.3: Static Pseudonym Change Game. Players 1 and 3 cooperate and remain silent
for some time before transmitting again. Player 2 defects and keeps broadcasting as usual.
In an incomplete information game, a pure-strategy for player i is a function s
¯i
: θi → Si
where Si = {C,D}. The pure-strategy space is denoted SΘi . A strategy profile s¯ = {s¯i}
n
i=1 is
the set of strategies of the players. In incomplete information games, the NE concept does
not apply as such because players are unaware of the payoff of their opponents. Instead, we
adopt the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium [102, 112]. Consider that Nature assigns a
type to every player according to a common probability distribution f(θi). Because the type
of a player determines its payoff, every player computes its best move based on its belief about
the type (and thus the strategy) of its opponents.
Definition 3. A strategy profile s
¯
∗ = {s
¯
∗
i }ni=1 is a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(BNE) if, for each player i:
s
¯
∗
i (θi) ∈ arg max
si∈Si
∑
θ−i
f(θ−i) · ui(si, s¯
∗
−i(θ−i)), ∀θi (4.11)
4.5 Analysis
In this section, we study several types of pseudonym change games with complete or incom-
plete information, and two type of strategies static or dynamic.
4.5.1 Static Game with Complete Information
We begin the analysis with a complete information model called the C-game (C stands for
complete information). We assume that there exists only one time step, which means that the
players have only one move as a strategy. In game-theoretic terms, this is called a single-stage
or static game. This is a realistic assumption because in mix zones, nodes are unable to sense
their environment. Hence, each player with common knowledge about the type of all players
chooses a strategy simultaneously (Fig. 4.3). We compute the NE for the static 2-player game,
and generalize the results for static n-player C-games. We consider that upon a pseudonym
change, every node achieves the same level of privacy and thus we consider the upperbound
Ai = log2(k), where k ≤ n is the number of cooperating nodes.
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2-player C-game
The strategic representation of the two player C-game is shown in Table 4.1. Two players P1
and P2, meeting in a mix zone at time t, take part in a pseudonym change game. Each mobile
node decides independently whether to change its pseudonym without knowing the decision of
its opponent. The game is played once and the two players make their moves simultaneously.
The value in the cells represents the payoff of each player. As usual, the players want to
maximize their payoff. We assume here that u−i > γ for both players, so that u
−
i − γ > 0.
Since u−i is itself bounded from above by log2(2)− γ = 1− γ in a 2-player game, we require
γ < 1/2, so that the cost is bounded.
Table 4.1: 2-player strategic form C-game.
P1\P2 C D
C (1− γ, 1− γ) (u−1 − γ, u−2 )
D (u−1 , u
−
2 − γ) (u−1 , u−2 )
Each player knows u−−i, i.e. the payoff of the other player immediately before the game,
which is sufficient to define its payoff for different strategy profiles because the cost γ is
common knowledge. Theorem 1 identifies the potential equilibrium strategies for the players.
Theorem 1. The 2-player pseudonym change C-game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria
(C,C) and (D,D) and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (x1, x2) where xi = γ1−u−−i
is the
probability of cooperation of Pi.
Proof. We first prove the existence of the pure-strategy NE. (C,C) is a NE since 1− γ > u−i
for i = 1, 2. Similarly (D,D) is a NE because u−i > u
−
i −γ for i = 1, 2. For the mixed strategy
NE, let xi denote the probability of cooperation of ui. The average payoff of player 1 is:
u1(x1, x2) = x1x2(1− γ) + x1(1− x2)(u−1 − γ)
+(1− x1)x2u−1 + (1− x1)(1− x2)u−1
= x1x2(1− u−1 )− γx1 + u−1
The payoff is maximized for:
∂
∂x1
u1(x1, x2) = x2(1− u−1 )− γ = 0
which gives x2 = γ1−u−1
and by symmetry x1 = γ1−u−2
.
We observe that the pseudonym change game is a coordination game [67] because log2(2)−
γ > u−i > u
−
i −γ. Coordination games model situations in which all parties can realize mutual
gains, but only by making mutually consistent decisions. Coordination games always have
three NE as obtained with Theorem 1. (C,C) is the Pareto-optimal strategy and thus the
preferred equilibrium. If the probability of cooperation xi of each player equals 1, then the
mixed equilibrium equals (C,C). Figure 4.4 illustrates the best response correspondence of
the two players. For example, if both players have a low u−i (meaning a high propensity to
cooperate), the mixed-strategy equilibrium approaches (0, 0). In such a scenario, the basin
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Figure 4.4: Best response correspondence for the 2 × 2 pseudonym change C-game. The
best response function of player P1 is represented by the dashed line; that of player P2 is
represented by the solid one. The NE are where the two players’ best responses cross.
of attraction of the (C,C) NE (i.e., the surface of the rectangle between the mixed NE and
the (C,C) NE) is larger than that of the (D,D) NE. In other words, (C,C) would be the
most likely NE in settings where players find their best response with an adaptive behavior.
The complete information pseudonym change game is asymmetric because the payoff of each
player depends on its private type. For example, the mixing probability is different for each
node (i.e., x1 6= x2).
n-player C-game
We extend the 2-player C-game by considering a set of n ≤ N players meeting in a mix zone
at time t. Each player has complete information and knows the payoff function u−i of its n−1
opponents. Let Ck and Dn−k denote the sets of k cooperating players and n − k defecting
players, respectively. Lemma 1 identifies the existence of an All Defection NE.
Lemma 1. The All Defection strategy profile is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the
n-player pseudonym change C-game.
Proof. All Defection is a NE, because if any player Pi unilaterally deviates from D and
cooperates, then its payoff is equal to u−i − γ, which is always smaller than its payoff of
defection u−i .
Lemma 2 identifies the existence of NE with cooperation.
Lemma 2. There is at least one cooperative pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (i.e., at least
two players cooperate) for the n-player pseudonym change C-game if there exists a set of
cooperating nodes Ck
∗
s.t. ∀Pi ∈ Ck∗, log2(|Ck∗ |) − γ > u−i . The strategy profile is then
s∗ = {s∗i |s∗i = C if Pi ∈ Ck
∗
, s∗i = D if Pi ∈ Dn−k
∗}.
Proof. If any Pi ∈ Ck∗ unilaterally deviates from cooperation to defect, then its payoff u−i is
smaller than log2(|Ck∗ |)− γ. Now let Dn−k∗ be the set of all nodes except those in Ck∗ . As
Ck
∗
is the largest group of nodes where log2(|Ck∗ |) − γ > u−i , no mobile node in Dn−k
∗
can
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increase its payoff by joining the set of nodes in Ck
∗
. Hence, none of the nodes can unilaterally
change its strategy to increase its payoff and s∗ is a NE when |Ck∗ | > 1.
Lemma 3. There are at most bn2 c cooperative pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the n-player
pseudonym change C-game.
Proof. Assume that the minimal set of cooperating nodes is Ck
∗
1 s.t. ∀Pi ∈ Ck∗1 , log2(|Ck∗1 |)−
γ > u−i . This is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with the least number of cooperative
players.
We show by contradiction that if another set of cooperating nodes Ck
∗
2 exists, then it
must be a superset of Ck
∗
1 . Consider Ck
∗
1 and Ck
∗
2 such that Ck
∗
1 ∩ Ck∗2 = ∅ and ∀Pi ∈ Ck∗j ,
log2(|Ck
∗
j |)−γ > u−i for j = 1, 2. There always exists a Ck
∗
= Ck
∗
1 ∪Ck∗2 such that ∀Pi ∈ Ck∗ ,
log2(|Ck∗1 |+ |Ck∗2 |)− γ > u−i because log2(|Ck
∗
1 |+ |Ck∗2 |) > log2(|Ck
∗
j |) for j = 1, 2 and users
will merge into the larger group Ck
∗
and create a new cooperative equilibrium. Thus if Ck
∗
2
exists, it must be a superset of Ck
∗
1 .
Another set of cooperating players Ck
∗
2 exists if Ck
∗
1 ⊂ Ck∗2 and ∀Pi ∈ Ck∗2 \ Ck∗1 ,
log2(|Ck∗2 |) − γ > u−i ≥ log2(|Ck
∗
1 |) − γ. Indeed, with such condition, none of the play-
ers in Ck
∗
2 \ Ck∗1 can deviate from cooperation to unilaterally improve its strategy. Thus, a
superset of Ck
∗
1 can be another cooperative NE.
Finally, we observe that |Ck∗2 | − |Ck∗1 | ≥ 2 meaning that at least two players must change
their strategy to obtain a new NE. Otherwise, one player could unilaterally deviate to improve
its strategy. Hence, the maximum number of cooperative NE will depend on the number of
pairs of players that can exist, i.e., bn2 c.
Considering Lemma 1, 2 and 3, and as there are not any NE in which only one player
cooperates, we immediately have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The n-player pseudonym change C-game has at least one and at most bn2 c+ 1
pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
To illustrate the above results, we consider the set of all possible strategy profiles in a
3-player C-game. Assume that N = 10, the payoff of each Pi before playing the game is in
the interval [0, log2(10)−γ], depending on the number of nodes that have cooperated with Pi
in the past (at T `i ) as well as the number of failed attempts and the rate of privacy loss. The
set of all strategy profiles of this 3-player C-game is: s = {(s1, s2, s3)|si ∈ {C,D}}.
Lemma 1 proves that (D,D,D) is always a NE. From Lemma 2, (C,D,D), (D,D,C), and
(D,C,D) are not NE, because |Ck∗ | must be strictly larger than 1 to satisfy log2(|Ck∗ |)−γ >
u−i . Among the remaining strategy profiles, there might be b3/2c = 1 cooperative NE as
defined by Lemma 3. The existence of this equilibrium depends on the payoff of each player.
Assume that P3 cooperated with 6 nodes at T `3 and its payoff is log2(7)− γ − β3 − γα3 that
is bigger than log2(2)− γ before playing the game. Consider that the payoff of P1 and P2 is
less than log2(2)−γ before playing the game. Then, the only cooperative NE strategy profile
is (C,C,D), corresponding to |Ck∗ | = 2.
If multiple NE may exist (including cooperate NE and All Defection NE), players have
to converge to one of these equilibria. In C-games, a simple technique is to start from the
All Cooperation strategy profile and then consider whether certain players have incentive to
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Figure 4.5: Description of the threshold equilibrium in the 2-player I-game. There is a
threshold θ˜i that determines the best response of player i.
defect until a NE is found. This apporach also guarantees that players choose the equilibrium
with the largest number of cooperative players.
In summary, in C-games, each mobile node tries to reduce its consumption of pseudonyms
by changing pseudonyms: (i) only when necessary (i.e., low user-centric location privacy
level) and (ii) when the other encountered nodes are willing to cooperate as well. In the
2-player C-game, we prove the existence of two pure and one mixed NE. The payoff to both
players in (C,C) is higher than in all other outcomes of the game and thus (C,C) is pareto-
optimal. Because the payoffs in the n-player scenario are more asymmetric than those of
the 2-player game (i.e., with a larger difference across players), NE with cooperation do not
always exist. Still, the All Defection equilibrium always exists because one player cannot gain
by cooperating alone. Moreover, we obtain that several NE with cooperation may exist in
some cases.
4.5.2 Static Game with Incomplete Information
In this section, we consider games of incomplete information, which we call I-games (I stands
for incomplete information): the players do not know the payoff type of their opponents. The
incomplete information assumption better models the knowledge of mobile nodes.
Threshold Equilibrium
In an I-game, players decide their move based on their belief about their opponent’s type.
Recall that a player’s type is defined as θi = Ai − βi − γαi − γ; this defines the payoff
immediately before the game. We establish an equilibrium in which each player adopts a
strategy based on a threshold: if the type of a player is above a threshold θ˜i, it defects,
otherwise it cooperates. Hence, the space of types is divided into two regions (Figure 4.5). A
player that has 0 ≤ θi ≤ θ˜i always cooperates, whereas a player with θ˜i < θi ≤ log2(n) − γ
always defects. With this threshold equilibrium, we define the probability of cooperation of
node i as:
F (θ˜i) = Pr(θi ≤ θ˜i) =
∫ θ˜i
0
f(θi)dθi (4.12)
and 1 − F (θ˜i) is the probability of defection. The equilibrium strategy at BNE of player i,
denoted by s
¯
∗ = (θ˜∗1; ...; θ˜∗n), depends only on the thresholds. In the next section, we obtain
the threshold equilibrium for the 2-player I-game.
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Remark: In identifying a symmetric BNE with threshold strategies we do not constrain the
game so that these are the only strategies available. Rather, we show that a node’s best-
response is a threshold strategy across all strategies when every other node plays a threshold
strategy; i.e., it continues to be a best response even if a node can play a non-threshold
strategy, such as playing C for some range of θi, then D, then C, and then D again.
2-player I-Game
Each player predicts the type of its opponent based on the probability distribution f(θi). To
determine the threshold values that define a BNE, fix a threshold strategy s
¯2
associated with
threshold θ˜2 for player 2, and define the average payoff to player 1 for C and D, given type
θ1, as:
E[u1(C, s¯2
)|θ1] = F (θ˜2)(1− γ) + (1− F (θ˜2)) ·
max(0, (θ1 − γ)) (4.13)
E[u1(D, s¯2
)|θ1] = θ1, (4.14)
and similarly for player 2. A necessary condition for a threshold equilibrium is that when a
player’s type is its threshold type it is indifferent between C and D. This is by continuity of
payoffs.
So, we can consider the effect of requiring that E[ui(C, s¯−i
)|θ˜i] = E[ui(D, s¯−i)|θ˜i] for eachplayer i ∈ {1, 2}, directly imposing this condition on the threshold types. This yields a system
of two non-linear equations on the two variables θ˜1 and θ˜2. The following lemma establishes
that this is also sufficient: solving for thresholds with this property defines a BNE for the
2-player I-game.
Lemma 4. The threshold strategy profile s∗ = (θ˜∗1, θ˜∗2) is a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the 2-player, incomplete information pseudonym change I-game if:{
E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1] = E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1]
E[u2(C, s¯
∗
1)|θ˜∗2] = E[u2(D, s¯
∗
1)|θ˜∗2]
(4.15)
Proof. Fix player 2’s strategy to threshold θ˜∗2 and consider player 1 with type θ1 < θ˜∗1. We
have E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1] = E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1]. Now, E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1] − E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ1] = θ˜∗1 − θ1 ≥
(1 − F (θ˜∗2))(θ˜∗1 − θ1) ≥ E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1] − E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ1], where the first inequality follows
because F (θ˜∗2) ≥ 0. Therefore, the drop in payoff from D relative to with type θ˜∗1 is at least
that from C and a best-response for the player is to play C. Now consider player 1 with
type θ1 > θ˜∗1. By a similar argument, we have E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ1] − E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1] = θ1 − θ˜∗1 ≥
(1 − F (θ˜∗2))(θ1 − θ˜∗1) ≥ E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ1] − E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1], and the increase in payoff for D is
greater than the increase in utility for C and the player’s best response is to play D.
Theorem 3 guarantees the existence and symmetry of the 2-player I-game BNE. As before,
we continue to require γ < 1/2 to make the 2 player game interesting (so that a player
retains non-zero privacy value for more than one period after a successful pseudonym change.)
For stating the result we assume continuous type distributions, so that probability density
f(θi) > 0 for all θi ∈ [0, 1− γ].
Theorem 3. The 2-player pseudonym change I-game has All Cooperate and All Defect pure-
strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, and every threshold equilibrium s∗ = (θ˜∗1, θ˜∗2) is symmetric
for continuous type distributions.
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Proof. To see that All Defection is a BNE with thresholds θ˜∗1 = θ˜∗2 = 0, simply note that
E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 = 0] = 0 = E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 = 0] and appeal to Lemma 4. Similarly, to see that
All Cooperation is a BNE consider thresholds θ˜∗1 = θ˜∗2 = 1− γ, for which F (θ˜∗1) = F (θ˜∗2) = 1
since θi ∈ [0, 1 − γ]. With this, we have E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 = 1 − γ] = 1 − γ = E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ˜∗1 =
1− γ].
Second, we prove by contradiction the symmetry of any threshold equilibrium. Assume
without loss of generality that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium s
¯
∗
2 = (θ˜1; θ˜2), such that
θ˜1 = θ˜2 + , where  is a strictly positive number. Adopt short hand F for F (θ˜∗2) and F for
F (θ˜∗2 + ). Then, for this to be a BNE we require by Eq. (4.15) that
F · (1− γ) + (1− F ) max(0, θ˜∗2 + − γ)− θ˜∗2 −  = 0 (4.16)
F · (1− γ) + (1− F) max(0, θ˜∗2 − γ)− θ˜∗2 = 0 (4.17)
Three cases can be identified considering the values of θ˜2, , and γ.
(Case 1) θ˜∗2 ≤ γ − . By equating Eq. (4.16) and (4.17) and simplification, we have
F (1− γ)−  = F · (1− γ) (4.18)
⇒  = F · (1− γ)− F · (1− γ) < 0, (4.19)
since F > F because the type distribution is continuous with f(θi) > 0 everywhere. This is
a contradiction.
(Case 2) γ −  < θ˜∗2 < γ. By equating Eq. (4.16) and (4.17) and simplification, we have
F · (1− θ˜∗2)+θ˜∗2 − γ − F = F · (1− γ) (4.20)
⇒  = F · (1− θ˜
∗
2)− F · (1− γ)− (γ − θ˜∗2)
F
(4.21)
Now, we have F · (1− θ˜∗2)−F · (1− γ) < F · (1− θ˜∗2)−F · (1− γ) = F · (γ − θ˜∗2) < γ − θ˜∗2,
where the first inequality follows because F > F and the second inequality because θ˜∗2 < γ,
by assumption of this case. From this it follows that  < 0 since F > 0, and a contradiction.
(Case 3) γ ≤ θ˜∗2. By equating Eq. (4.16) and (4.17) and simplification, we have
F · (1− θ˜∗2)− F = F · (1− θ˜∗2) (4.22)
⇒  = F · (1− θ˜
∗
2)− F · (1− θ˜∗2)
F
< 0, (4.23)
where the inequality holds because F < F. This is a contradiction.
In simulations we find an intermediate, symmetric threshold equilibrium in almost all
cases, where players don’t simply always cooperate or always defect.2
To illustrate the results of the theorem we consider the following example. Consider
that the distribution on types is uniform, with θi ∼ U(0, 1 − γ), and cumulative probability
function F (θi) = θi/(1 − γ). Looking for an equilibrium with a threshold, θ˜∗i ≥ γ, so that
2Note that previous works [62, 187] obtain similar results showing the existence and symmetry of the BNE
for this type of games (infinite games of incomplete information).
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the max(0, ·) term in defining the payoff of the cooperation action can be dropped, we can
simplify Eq. (4.15) and obtain the system of equations:
θ˜∗i , 1−
γ
F (θ˜∗−i)
, i = 1, 2 (4.24)
Imposing symmetry and solving, we obtain (θ˜∗i )
2 − θ˜∗i + γ(1− γ) = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, which
leads to the following solutions:
θ˜∗i ∈ {γ, 1− γ} (4.25)
Recall that we assume γ < 1/2, so that γ < 1−γ. The solution θ˜∗i = 1−γ corresponds to
an All Cooperation BNE because θi ≤ 1−γ in a two player game. Looking at the intermediate
equilibrium when θ˜∗i = γ, we see that E[u1(C, s¯
∗
2)|θ1] = F (θ˜∗2)(1−γ)+(1−F (θ˜∗2)) ·0 = θ˜∗2 = θ˜∗1
while E[u1(D, s¯
∗
2)|θ1) = θ1, and can confirm that C is the best response for θ1 < θ˜∗1 and D is
the best response for θ1 > θ˜∗1. By further analysis of Eq. (4.15) for the case of θ˜∗i < γ, there
are a multiplicity of symmetric threshold equilibrium in this problem, for any θ˜∗1 = θ˜∗2 < γ,
including (s
¯
∗
1, s¯
∗
2) = (0, 0) which is the All Defection BNE. These results are in line with
Theorem 3.
We numerically solve Eq. (4.15) to find symmetric threshold equilibrium for three different
probability distributions (using fsolve() in Matlab). We consider the beta distribution B(a, b),
a family of continuous probability distributions defined on the interval [0, 1] and parameterized
by two positive shape parameters a and b. If θ ∼ B(2, 5), nodes have a small θ with a high
probability (i.e., long-tail distribution), whereas with θ ∼ B(5, 2), nodes have a large θ with a
high probability. If θ ∼ B(2, 2), θ is symmetric and centralized around 0.5. Figure 4.6 shows
the BNE θ˜∗i and the related probability of cooperation F (θ˜
∗
i ) as a function of the cost γ. For
each distribution of type, we obtain three BNE: θ˜∗i,1 is an All Defection equilibrium, θ˜
∗
i,2 is
an intermediate equilibrium, and θ˜∗i,3 is an All Cooperation equilibrium. With the BNE θ˜
∗
i,1
and θ˜∗i,3, nodes always play the same strategy. With θ˜
∗
i,2, we observe that as γ increases, the
probability of cooperation F (θ˜∗i,2) increases as well, indicating that players should cooperate
more when the cost of changing pseudonyms increases. In other words, with a high γ, users
care more about the coordination success with others. If γ is small, then the cooperation
success becomes less important and nodes become selfish.
The probability of cooperation also depends on the type of Beta distribution. With a
lower type distributions B(2, 5), the probability of cooperation at equilibrium is smaller than
other distribution types. In other words, selfish nodes cooperate less because whenever they
must change pseudonym, they know that the majority of their neighbors also needs to change
pseudonym. On the contrary, for B(5, 2), selfish nodes cooperate more to maintain high
privacy.
In considering the welfare achieved in the pseudonym change game, we focus on the
performance under the intermediate BNE θ˜∗i,2. This is more interesting to study than the
All Cooperation or All Defection equilibrium. We simulate the 2-player I-game in Matlab.
The results are averaged over 1000 simulations. We consider three metrics: (i) the welfare
of the system defined as the average achieved utility, E[ui] of the nodes; (ii) the fraction
of interactions in which a pseudonym is changed FC; and (iii) the fraction of successful
coordination between nodes, CS (i.e., nodes play the same action). We compare the BNE
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Figure 4.6: Probability distribution of user types f(θ), threshold θ˜∗i , and probability of coop-
eration F (θ˜∗i ) at the equilibrium as a function of γ for different distributions of type: β(2, 5),
β(2, 2), and β(5, 2). For each type distribution, there are three BNE: θ˜∗i,1 corresponds to All
Defection, θ˜∗i,3 to All Cooperation, and θ˜
∗
i,2 is an intermediate equilibrium. As the cost γ of
changing pseudonyms increases, θ˜∗2 approaches θ˜∗1, meaning that the probability of cooperation
increases.
performance with a random strategy, in which all nodes choose their threshold randomly, and
to the socially-optimal strategy, which is All Cooperation.
We observe that the welfare achieved in the BNE is less than with the socially-optimal
strategy and in general similar to that of the random strategy. The difference with the
random strategy is particularly large for B(5, 2) because the probability of cooperation is
then larger than that of the random strategy. It is informative to consider the ratio of welfare
in the BNE with that at the socially-optimal, by analogy to the price of anarchy (which
considers the performance of the worst-case NE [137]). This ratio provides a measure of the
cost of non-cooperative behavior. For example in Table 4.2 for B(5, 2) and γ = 0.3, we have
0.56/0.70 = 0.80 meaning that the system performance is degraded by 20%. We notice that
the system performance is only degraded by 7% in the case of γ = 0.7, showing that nodes
are less selfish when the cost of a pseudonym change is large. The cost FC in Table 4.2 shows
the fraction of interactions in which a pseudonym is changed. We observe that in general less
pseudonyms are changed with θ˜∗i,2 (20% decrease with respect to the random strategy when
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Table 4.2: Welfare of system E[ui], fraction of interactions in which a pseudonym is changed
(FC), and fraction of successful coordinations (CS).
Strategy E[ui] | FC | CSB(2, 5) B(2, 2) B(5, 2)
θ˜∗i,2, γ = 0.3 0.20|0.08|0.84 0.39|0.44|0.50 0.56|0.70|0.58
θ˜∗i,2, γ = 0.5 0.15|0.09|0.85 0.29|0.49|0.50 0.46|0.91|0.85
θ˜∗i,2, γ = 0.7 0.09|0.08|0.85 0.17|0.49|0.49 0.28|0.91|0.85
Random (1− γ)/2 | 0.5 | 0.5
Socially Opt. 1− γ | 1 | 1
γ = 0.3) showing that less pseudonyms are needed.
n-player I-Game
Assume n ≤ N players meet at time t and take part in a pseudonym change I-game. Let
Pr(K = k) be the probability that k nodes cooperate. We can again obtain the thresholds
that define a BNE in the n-player game by comparing the average payoff of cooperation with
that of defection, now defined as:
E[ui(C, s¯−i
)] =
n−1∑
k=0
Pr(K = k)ui(C, s¯−i
)
E[ui(D, s¯−i
)] = u−i
By a similar argument to that for the 2-player I-game (Lemma 4), a BNE s
¯
∗ =
(θ˜∗1; · · · ; θ˜∗n) can be obtained as the solution to the following system of n non-linear equations
for the n variables θ˜i:
n−1∑
k=0
Pr(K = k)ui(C, s¯−i
) = u−i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n (4.26)
We denote the probability of cooperation qi = F (θ˜i). Assume that the thresholds θ˜∗i
are all equal: We obtain qi = q and thus have a symmetric equilibrium. Consequently, the
probability that k nodes cooperate is Pr(K = k) =
(
n
k
)
qk(1 − q)n−k. For example, consider
the limit values of q:
• If q → 0, then θ˜∗i = 0, Pr(K > 0) = 0 and Pr(K = 0) = 1. Thus, the All Defection
equilibrium exists.
• If q → 1, then θ˜∗i = 1, Pr(K < n − 1) = 0 and Pr(K = n − 1) = 1. Thus, the All
Cooperation equilibrium occurs when log2(n)− γ > u−i for all nodes i.
For intermediate values of q, we numerically derive the thresholds θ˜∗i by solving Eq. (4.26)
with Matlab (Figure 4.7). For γ = 0.3, we observe that with a higher density of nodes n,
θ˜∗i,2 decreases, which means that players cooperate with a lower probability. Similarly, θ˜
∗
i,3
disappears for large values of n, which means that Always Cooperation is not a BNE anymore.
Yet in the case of β(5, 2), the All Cooperation equilibrium θ˜∗i,4 persists. The reason is that with
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Figure 4.7: Threshold θ˜∗i at the equilibrium as a function of n for different values of γ and
distributions of type: β(2, 5), β(2, 2), and β(5, 2). For each type distribution, the number of
BNE changes depending on the cost γ.
such a distribution of types, selfish nodes need to cooperate more. For a larger value γ = 0.7,
we observe a similar behavior. Note that with β(5, 2) an additional threshold equilibrium,
denoted by θ˜∗i,3, appears in which nodes cooperate more when n increases. Moreover, All
Cooperation equilibrium survives longer when γ increases.
In summary, we first analytically prove the existence and symmetry of BNE in 2-player
games and then obtain numerically three BNE for each possible distribution of users’ types.
We observe that the intermediate BNE θ˜∗i,2 reduces the number of pseudonyms used (FC in
Table 4.2) and achieves a high level of privacy. However, non-cooperative behavior affects the
achievable location privacy. In particular, we notice that, a larger n encourages selfish nodes
to not cooperate (Figure 4.7). In contrast, in the 2-player game, when the cost γ of changing
pseudonym is high, we observe that selfish nodes cooperate more, which means that a high
cost of pseudonyms provides an incentive to cooperate. In summary, even with incomplete
information, it is possible to find an equilibrium that achieves high location privacy, and
reduces the number of used pseudonyms.
4.5.3 Dynamic Game with Complete Information
Until now, we assumed that the players made their moves simultaneously in mix zones without
knowing what the other players do. This is a reasonable assumption because in mix zones,
nodes are unable to sense their environment. Yet, nodes could exchange messages in mix
zones to advertise their decision. In this case, players have several moves as a strategy and
can have sequential interactions: the move of one player can be conditioned by the move
of other players (i.e., the second player knows the move of the first player before making his
decision). These games are called dynamic games, and we refer to dynamic pseudonym change
games with complete information as dynamic C-games. We can represent dynamic games by
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Figure 4.8: Extensive form of the Pseudonym Change Game. The game is represented by a
tree and node 1 plays the first action. The game has three stages corresponding to the moves
of the three players. The actions (cooperate C and defect D) are represented on each branch
of the tree. The leaves of the tree represent the payoff of the game for all players.
their extensive form (Fig. 4.8), similar to a tree where branches represent the strategies for a
given player. Each level of the tree represents a stage of the game.
For such dynamic scenarios to exist, nodes must be able to observe the action of other
nodes. There are several solutions to do so in practice. A simple solution is that players
broadcast their decision to cooperate in a sequential manner [145]. Nonetheless, this in-
creases the communication overhead. Another solution is that players observe the messages
of other nodes exiting a mix zone. For example, if a node decides to defect, then it continues
broadcasting messages that can be observed by other nodes in the mix zone. In other words,
nodes participating in a mix zone can use defection as a signal. Any of these solutions can be
used, but we consider the latter because it requires less network resources (Fig. 4.9).
Backward Induction
To predict the outcome of the extensive-form games, one can use the well-known concept of
Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, the Nash equilibrium concept sometimes predicts outcomes
that are not credible for some players (i.e., these outcomes are unreachable because the
players will not play, out of self-interest, according to the incredible Nash equilibrium path).
Hence, we use the stronger concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium. The strategy profile s is
a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a finite extensive-form game G if it is a Nash equilibrium of
any subgame G′ of the original game G [102].
One can check the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria by applying the one-deviation
property. This property requires that there exists no single stage in the game, in which a player
i can gain by deviating from her subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy while conforming to it
in other stages. Hence, we can state that strategy profile s is a subgame-perfect equilibrium
of a finite extensive-form game G if the one-deviation property holds. We will check for the
existence of subgame-perfect equilibria by backward induction [102].
Backward induction works by eliminating sub-optimal actions, beginning at the leaves of
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Figure 4.9: Dynamic Pseudonym Change Game. Player 2 defects and keeps broadcasting as
usual. Players 1 and 3 notice player 2 defection, but decide to cooperate and remain silent
for some time before sending new messages.
the extensive-form tree. The obtained path (sequence of actions) in the game tree defines the
backward induction solution and any strategy profile that realizes this solution is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium.
n-player Dynamic C-Game
In the complete information scenario, each player can predict deterministically the decisions of
other nodes, and its own best response. Hence, for any order of players, the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium can be derived by all nodes with the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let Ck
∗
be a maximal set of cooperating nodes s.t. ∀Pi ∈ Ck∗ , log2(|Ck∗ |)−γ >
u−i . If there exist such a C
k∗, then in the n-player dynamic pseudonym change C-game, there
is a strategy that results in a single subgame-perfect equilibrium:
s∗i =
{
C if Pi ∈ Ck∗
D else
(4.27)
If there does not exist such a Ck
∗
, then the subgame perfect equilibrium is all defection.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, no player Pi ∈ Ck∗ has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from cooperation to defection as its payoff u−i would be smaller than log2(|Ck
∗ |)− γ.
The same is true for players that defect, i.e., that are not in Ck
∗
. Hence, none of the nodes can
unilaterally change its strategy to increase its payoff and s∗ is an subgame-perfect equilibrium
when |Ck∗ | > 1. If Ck∗ is empty, then the subgame-perfect equilibrium corresponds to an All
Defection strategy. Because the actions of the players are dynamic, a single subgame-perfect
equilibrium will be selected.
We observe that the All Defection equilibrium does not systematically exist anymore as
there is only one subgame-perfect equilibrium. Indeed, one advantage of the dynamic moves
is that the All Defection equilibrium will often be an incredible threat. Similarly, among
possible cooperative equilibria, the equilibrium with the largest number of cooperating devices
is selected. In other words, coordination is simpler in dynamic games than in static games.
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4.5.4 Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information
In this section, we consider dynamic games of incomplete information, which we call dynamic
I-games. The concept of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium introduced in the previous section
cannot be used to solve games of incomplete information. Even if players observe one another’s
actions, the problem is that players do not know the others’ types and cannot predict each
others’ strategy.
Dynamic games of incomplete information can be solved using the concept of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This solution concept results from the idea of combining sub-
game perfection, Bayesian equilibrium and Bayesian inference. Strategies are required to yield
a Bayesian equilibrium in every subgame given the a posteriori beliefs of the players about
each others’ types. To do so, players update their beliefs about their opponents’ types based
on others’ actions using Bayes’ rule. The resulting game is called a dynamic Bayesian game
where “dynamic” means that the game is sequential and “Bayesian” refers to the probabilistic
nature of the game. For further details, we refer the interested reader to [102].
n-player Dynamic I-Game
Consider that a pseudonym change game starts at time t0. Every player can decide to coop-
erate or defect at each stage of the game. Hence, players can delay their decision and enter
the game at any time t ≥ t0. The actions of players at time t is denoted at = (at1, ..., atn) and
can be cooperate C, defect D or wait. The history of actions of the game is ht = (a0, ..., at−1).
The following theorem provides a strategy that leads to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Theorem 5. In the n-player dynamic pseudonym change I-game, the following strategy re-
sults in a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
s
¯
∗
i =
{
C if (nD(t) = 0) ∧ (u−i < log2(nr))
D else
(4.28)
where nr < n is the number of nodes remaining in the game (i.e., that did not defect) and
nD(t) is the number of nodes that defect at time t.
Proof. The strategy of players depends on their belief about other players’ types. We define
µi
(
θj |ht
)
as the belief of a player i about the type of another player j given a history of
actions ht. In order to obtain a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Bayes’ rule is used to update
beliefs from µi
(
θj |ht
)
to µi
(
θj |ht+1
)
. Formally, for all i, j, ht and aj , we have:
µi
(
θj |
(
ht, at
))
=
µi
(
θj |ht
)
σj
(
atj |ht, θj
)
∑
θ˜j
µi
(
θ˜j |ht
)
σj
(
atj |ht, θ˜j
) (4.29)
where σj is the probability that a user j plays a certain action aj . Assume that the number
of remaining nodes in the game is nr (i.e., the number of nodes that did not defect) and that
the initial belief function is: µi(θj) = f(θj). If at time t1 > t player j defects, it indicates
that the type of player j is above the current threshold θ˜ = log2(nr). Hence, the behavior
strategy σj(at1j |ht1 , θj) returns 0 if θj ≤ θ˜ and 1 otherwise. The denominator computes the
belief about all possible types of player j and thus normalizes µi(θj |ht1) according the current
threshold θ˜. Other players that observe the action of player j can thus update their belief
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Figure 4.10: Average number of nodes that cooperate in a game with respect to the num-
ber of nodes participating in the game for different values of γ and distributions of types:
β (2, 5) , β (2, 2) , β (5, 2).
about the type of player j and obtain: µi(θj > θ˜|ht1 , at1) = 1, i.e., they know that player j
had a type above the current threshold. If at some time t2 > t1 no nodes defect (nD(t2) = 0),
it indicates that with probability one all remaining players have types below the current
threshold: µi(θj ≤ θ˜|ht2 , at2) = 1. Hence, all these players will cooperate and θ˜∗ = log2(nr).
Compared to the static game, the threshold computation is much simpler as it only de-
pends on the number of nodes remaining in the game.
We numerically evaluate the perfect Bayesian equilibrium using Matlab (Fig. 4.10). We
compute the average number of nodes that cooperate in dynamic games of incomplete infor-
mation given distributions of type and cost.
We observe that when the cost of cooperation γ increases, the number of nodes that
cooperate decreases. The reason is that, in dynamic games, nodes have more information
to optimize their decision and will thus avoid cooperating unless there is a large number of
nodes in a game. The distribution of types also affects the number of cooperating nodes. We
observe that a large population of nodes with high privacy (β(5, 2)) cooperate less: nodes
cooperate only if the privacy gain is large. We also observe that a larger number of nodes
in a game, increases the probability of cooperation. In summary, the dynamic version of the
game copes well with uncertainty by relying on the action of defecting nodes to improve the
estimation of the potential privacy gain.
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4.6 Protocols
In this section, we formally describe location privacy protocols, including PseudoGame proto-
cols and evaluate them using simulations. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, pseudonym change
games are usually composed of two parts: an initiation phase and a decision phase.
4.6.1 Initiation Protocols
The initiation phase aims at finding appropriate contexts to request pseudonym changes
from nearby nodes. A context provides high location privacy if there is high node density
and mobility unpredictability. The number of contexts providing high location privacy thus
depends on the mobility of the nodes.
NaiveInitiation Protocol
A simple solution consists in issuing a pseudonym change request at every time step t when
there is at least another node nearby. The sender can choose a silent period in the range
[spmin, spmax] that it attaches to the initiation message. We call this protocol the NaiveIniti-
ation protocol (Protocol 1).
Protocol 1 NaiveInitiation.
1: if (At least one neighbor) and (not in silent period) then
2: Broadcast initiation message to change pseudonym.
3: end if
GainInitiation Protocol
In the GainInitiation protocol (Protocol 2), any node can initiate a pseudonym change by
broadcasting an update message if a node has at least one neighbor and if its current location
privacy is lower than the potential privacy gain. The sender can choose a silent period in the
range [spmin, spmax] that it attaches to the initiation message. This is a protocol similar to
that in [145].
Protocol 2 GainInitiation.
1: maxGain = log2(number of neighbors)
2: if (At least one neighbor) and (current location privacy < maxGain) and (not in silent period)
then
3: Broadcast initiation message to change pseudonym.
4: end if
4.6.2 Decision Protocols
Mobile nodes receiving the initiation message must decide whether to stop communicating
for a silent period, defined in the initiation message, and change pseudonyms. The decision
phase aims at making the best pseudonym change decision to maximize the level of privacy at
a minimum cost. Below we describe several decision protocols including protocols proposed
in previous work and protocols resulting from the aforementioned game-theoretic analysis.
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Swing Protocol
Protocol 3 Swing.
Require: The current location privacy of node i is u−i
1: if (Receive Initiation message) or (Initiated change) then
2: if u−i < θ˜i then
3: Change pseudonym and comply with silent period spmax
4: else
5: Quit
6: end if
7: else
8: Keep pseudonym
9: end if
In the Swing protocol (Protocol 3) [145], the decision of mobile nodes to cooperate - or
not - exclusively depends on their user-centric level of location privacy compared to a fixed
threshold θ˜. The cost of changing pseudonyms and the probability of cooperation of the
neighbors are not considered in the computation of the threshold. Hence, this is a reactive
model: users change pseudonyms only if their user-centric level of location privacy goes below
the threshold.
Static PseudoGame Protocol
Protocol 4 Static PseudoGame.
Require: Node i knows the probability distribution f(θ)
Require: The current location privacy of node i is u−i
1: if (Receive Initiation message) or (Initiated change) then
2: n⇐ estimate(n) //Number of neighbors
3: Calculate θ˜∗i as solution of
∑n−1
k=0 Pr(K = k)ui(C, s¯−i
)− u−i = 0 wrt θ˜i,
where Pr(K = k)⇐ (nk)qk(1− q)n−k and q ⇐ ∫ θ˜i0 f(θi)dθi
4: if u−i ≤ θ˜∗i then
5: Play C
6: Comply with silent period spmax
7: else
8: Play D
9: end if
10: else
11: Keep pseudonym
12: end if
Our game-theoretic evaluation allows us to design PseudoGame protocols that extend the
Swing protocol to consider optimal strategies of mobile nodes in a non-cooperative environ-
ment. The static PseudoGame protocol is based on our results for static n-player I-games.
All nodes receiving the initiation message use the PseudoGame protocol to decide whether
to change pseudonyms based on the number of neighbors and the probability of their coop-
eration (related to the distribution of user types f(θi)). As described in Protocol 4 for any
node i, the PseudoGame protocol assists mobile nodes in selecting the BNE strategy. Hence,
after receiving the initiation message, the nodes calculate the equilibrium thresholds using
4.6. Protocols 81
their location privacy level, the estimated number of neighbors, and their belief f(θi). The
PseudoGame protocol extends the Swing protocol by computing the optimal threshold in a
rational environment to determine when to change pseudonym.
Dynamic PseudoGame Protocol
Protocol 5 Dynamic PseudoGame.
Require: Node i knows the probability distribution f(θ)
Require: The current location privacy of node i is u−i
1: if (Receive Initiation message) or (Initiated change) then
2: n⇐ estimate(n) //Number of neighbors
3: lastN = n
4: for t = 0 to spmax do
5: if u−i ≥ log2(n) then
6: Play D
7: Quit
8: end if
n = number of remaining nodes
9: if n = lastN then
10: Play C
11: Comply with silent period spmax
12: end if
lastN = n
13: end for
14: else
15: Keep pseudonym
16: end if
The dynamic version of the PseudoGame protocol (Protocol 5) makes use of the action of
other nodes as a signal to improve the decision making algorithm. It assists mobile nodes in
selecting the PBE strategy.
All Cooperation Protocol
Protocol 6 AllCooperation.
1: if (Receive Initiation message) or (Initiated change) then
2: Change pseudonym and comply with silent period spmax
3: else
4: Keep pseudonym
5: end if
The AllCooperation protocol (Protocol 6) is a straightforward solution in which players
always cooperate when asked to change pseudonyms.
Random Decision Protocol
The Random protocol (Protocol 7) is a straightforward solution in which players decide
randomly whether to cooperate or not.
82 Chapter 4. Distributed Coordination of Pseudonym Changes
Protocol 7 Random.
1: if (Receive Initiation message) or (Initiated change) then
2: Throw a coin
3: if Heads then
4: Change pseudonym and comply with silent period spmax
5: end if
6: else
7: Keep pseudonym
8: end if
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Figure 4.11: Average number of pseudonym change initiations for each initiation protocols
using the dynamic PseudoGame.
Evaluation
To evaluate the ability of these protocols to mix pseudonyms, we simulate them in a mobile
network by using the simulator3 presented in Chapter 3. We consider the same simulation
setup, i.e., mobility traces generated with Sumo [5] over a cropped map [6] of Manhattan of
6 km2. We consider an initial distribution of user types β(2, 5), λ = 0.0005 and a cost of
pseudonym change γ = 0.3. The results are averaged across 5 simulations.
Figure 4.11 shows the total number of games initiated by each initiation protocol. We
observe that the NaiveInitiation protocol generates a larger number of games compared to the
GainInitiation protocol. A large number of games will induce networking costs because of all
the initiation messages but will also provide more opportunities to change pseudonyms. Yet,
the quality of the contexts of the initiated games may be lower. For this reason, we evaluate
below the achievable utility for both initiation protocols.
Figure 4.12 shows the average utility obtained with the different initiation and decision
protocols. We observe that the initiation protocols do not affect the achievable utility of
PseudoGame protocols. Intuitively, the reason is that PseudoGame protocols avoid inefficient
pseudonym changes and thus adapt better to different contexts. In constrast, the NaiveIni-
tiation protocol decreases the achievable utility of the AllCooperation, Swing and Random
protocols because it increases the number of inefficient pseudonym changes.
In Figure 4.12, we also observe the achievable privacy obtained with different decision
protocols. The dynamic PseudoGame achieves the highest level of location privacy among all
3The code is available at: http://mobivacy.sourceforge.net .
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Figure 4.12: Average utility with each decision and initiation protocols. Swing 3 means the
Swing protocol with a threshold θ˜ = 3.
protocols, showing that even in the presence of rational behavior high coordination is possible.
We observe that in the case of the Swing protocol, a large threshold means that nodes will
participate in many inefficient mix zones, whereas a small threshold means that nodes will
have to wait too long before changing pseudonyms again. In this regard, θ˜ = 3 appears as
an efficient static threshold. Finally, the static PseudoGame performs slightly worse than the
Swing protocol, showing that rational behavior negatively affects the achievable privacy in this
case. This can be notably observed in Fig. 4.13 that shows the average cost associated with
the different protocols. Most of the time, the cost is larger with the NaiveInitiation protocol.
Comparing decision protocols, we observe that the dynamic PseudoGame protocol dramat-
ically reduces the cost compared to other protocols, whereas for the Swing protocol, the cost
increases with the threshold. The dynamic PseudoGame protocol provides the best trade-off
between privacy and cost, showing that it efficiently deals with the uncertainty of incomplete
information. In contrast, the static PseudoGame protocol performs poorly showing that, in the
presence of uncertainty caused by static strategies, rationality may not reduce cost compared
to Swing, but performs better than AllCooperation and Random.
4.7 Summary
We have considered the problem of rationality in location privacy schemes based on pseudo-
nym changes. We introduced a user-centric model of location privacy to measure the evolution
of location privacy over time. To evaluate the strategic behavior of mobile nodes, we pro-
posed a game-theoretic model, the pseudonym change game. We first analyzed the n-player
scenario with complete information and obtained NE strategy profiles. Then, using Bayesian
game theory, we investigated the equilibria in the incomplete information game and derive the
equilibrium strategies for each node for both static and dynamic strategies. In other words,
we derive equilibria that predict the strategy of rational mobile nodes in order to achieve
location privacy in a non-cooperative environment. This analysis results in the design of new
protocols, the PseudoGame protocols, that can be used in practice to coordinate pseudonym
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Figure 4.13: Average Cost with each decision and initiation protocols.
changes in distributed environments.
We numerically obtain a particularly interesting result: when uncertainty about others’
strategies is high (i.e., static games), rational nodes care more about the successful unfolding
of the game if the cost of pseudonyms is also high. This result indicates that cost, a parameter
usually having negative consequences, can also have positive consequences: it considerably
increases the success of pseudonym change coordination. We also showed that dynamic games,
unlike static games, can take advantage of situations with a large number of players to achieve
a large level of privacy. By means of simulations, we finally showed that dynamic games
(relying on small signaling information from other nodes, i.e., defection), dramatically increase
the coordination success of pseudonym changes. The dynamic PseudoGame protocol notably
performs better than other protocols for the coordination of pseudonym changes and obtains
an efficient trade-off between privacy and cost.
Publication: [95]
Chapter 5
Measuring Location Privacy: A
Mean-Field Approach
He who makes a beast of himself gets
rid of the pain of being a man.
Samuel Johnson
5.1 Introduction
The degree of location privacy provided by mix zones can be evaluated by measuring the
entropy of mix zones and the tracking success of the adversary. Each mix zone acts as a
confusion point for the adversary and makes tracking of mobile devices difficult. As observed
in [120], the degree of location privacy also depends on how long an adversary can successfully
track mobile nodes between confusion points. A longer tracking period may increase the
likelihood that the adversary identifies nodes (i.e., the distance to confusion [118]). The age
of a pseudonym refers to the lifetime of a given pseudonym.
Privacy is higher if the pseudonyms are short-lived. However, pseudonyms are costly as
described in Chapter 2. Consequently, in many cases a node might consider that its level of
privacy is still high enough and might prefer to not change its pseudonym, even if it is located
in a mix zone.
Protocols that coordinate pseudonym changes usually limit the maximum age of pseudo-
nyms. With centralized mix zone deployments, the maximum age of pseudonyms is upper
bounded in the optimization algorithm. In distributed pseudonym change coordination, the
user-centric location privacy model relates the maximum age of a pseudonym to the amount
of entropy derived from the last successful pseudonym change. In both cases, we use simula-
tions or empirical mobility data to evaluate the degree of privacy provided by location privacy
protocols, in particular, to evaluate the achieved age of pseudonyms.
In this Chapter, we further analyze the distributed coordination of pseudonym changes
and provide a framework for analytically evaluating privacy obtained with mix zones. This
framework captures nodes mobility and evolution of age of pseudonyms over time. We model
system dynamics and consequently provide critical conditions for the success of the multiple
pseudonym approach. We validate our analytical results with simulations.
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5.2 Related Work
Several metrics are proposed in the literature to quantify the level of location privacy [78,
88, 107, 117, 118, 120, 199, 202] based on concepts such as: entropy, probability of error or
k-anonymity. Ideally, a location privacy metric should be able to measure the inability of a
given adversary in accurately tracking the mobile users over space and time. There is ongoing
research to identify a satisfactory metric [202]. In this Chapter, we do not attempt to derive
another location privacy metric. Instead, we focus on analytically measuring an important
aspect of location privacy protocols (related to the degree of privacy).
In wired mix networks, several metrics are proposed to measure anonymity [78, 199] based
on the concept of entropy. Recent results have shown how traffic analysis attacks can be used
to compute this entropy [212]. Age of pseudonyms is a problem specific to location privacy
because the time period over which a given pseudonym is used can help identify the mobile
devices (unlike mix networks where packets can be routed in many ways).
5.3 System Model
As introduced in the system and threat model of Chapter 2, we consider a global passive
adversary and mobile devices equipped with peer-to-peer wireless interfaces. We consider a
generic mobility model that captures all existing mobility models and define the notion of age
of pseudonyms.
5.3.1 Mobility Model
We consider a random-trip mobility model characterized by the rate of encounters η, and
the average number of nodes met in an encounter N¯ . The rate η determines the number of
encounters with nearby nodes that occur on average. The average N¯ is the average number
of nodes that participate in each encounter. The meeting rate η and the average N¯ depend
on nodes’ speeds and the topology of the underlying road network.
5.3.2 Location Privacy Model
There are several techniques to mitigate tracking. We consider the use of multiple pseudonyms:
mobile nodes change their pseudonyms over time to reduce their long-term linkability.
Distance to Confusion or the Age of Pseudonyms
As observed in [120], the degree of location privacy not only depends on the location pri-
vacy achieved in mix zones by the nodes traversing it, but also on how long an adversary
can successfully track mobile nodes between mix zones. A longer tracking period increases
the likelihood that the adversary identifies the mobile nodes. Hence, mobile nodes should
evaluate the distance over which they can be tracked by an adversary (i.e., the distance to
confusion [118]) and act by deciding to change pseudonyms accordingly. To capture the no-
tion of distance to confusion, we define the age of a pseudonym as the time period over which
a given pseudonym is used.
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Figure 5.1: Example of evolution of age of pseudonyms. At t1, node ui successfully changes
pseudonym with another node and the age of its pseudonym drops to zero. The age of
pseudonym of node ui then increases with rate λ. At t2, pseudonym change fails and node ui
pays the cost γ of changing a pseudonym. At t3, the node refuses to change its pseudonym.
In this work, we model the evolution of the age of pseudonyms over time Zi(t) for each
mobile node ui as a linearly increasing function of time with an aging rate λi:
Zi(t) = λi · (t− T `i ) (5.1)
where t is the current time and T `i ≤ t is the time of the last successful pseudonym change of
mobile ui. The value Zi(t) captures the age of the current pseudonym of user i at time t (Fig.
5.1). The aging rate λi mainly depends on the belief of node ui with respect to the tracking
power of the adversary and on the beaconing rate/range of node ui. The higher the value of
λi is, the faster the pseudonyms age. For simplicity, we consider that λi = λ, ∀i. Note that
the function Zi(t) that models the age of pseudonym corresponds to the privacy loss function
β(t, T `i ) of Chapter 4.
Strategies
With this location privacy model, mobile nodes request a pseudonym change when the age
of their pseudonym is considered large and if there are other nodes in proximity. Nodes in
proximity choose to cooperate (C) or defect (D) if their pseudonym age is large as well.
Hence, the success of a pseudonym change depends on the state of the neighboring nodes.
Asynchronous requests to change pseudonyms might cause failed attempts to achieve location
privacy. Assume that nc is the number of nodes that cooperate (change pseudonyms) in a
meeting besides ui and that Zi(t−) is the age of ui just before making its decision. Considering
an encounter in a mix zone at time t, we write for node ui:
If C ∧ (nc > 0),
T `i = t (5.2)
Zi(t) = 0 (5.3)
If C ∧ (nc = 0),
Zi(t) = Zi(t−) + γ (5.4)
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If D,
Zi(t) = Zi(t−) (5.5)
In other words, Zi(t) is reset to 0 when a pseudonym change is successful. If a node is alone
in changing its pseudonym, then it pays the cost of changing pseudonym γ and the age of its
pseudonym keeps increasing. The cost γ can be expressed as: γ = γacq + γrte + γsil, where
γacq is the cost of acquiring new pseudonyms, γrte is the cost of updating routing tables, and
γsil is the cost of remaining silent while traversing the mix zone. The cost γ is expressed
in age units (i.e., time), causing an increase in the age of pseudonyms. The cost γ captures
the failed opportunity of a pseudonym change and is thus an incentive to carefully manage
pseudonyms. Finally, if a node defects, its pseudonym age is unchanged. Figure 5.1 illustrates
how the age of pseudonyms evolves with time in the case of meetings between several nodes.
With this model, nodes control the distance over which they can be tracked.
Nodes decide when to change pseudonyms next based on the time of their last successful
pseudonym change T `i . The probability distribution over the age ci(z) gives the probability
of cooperation of each node ui. For simplicity, we assume that the distribution is the same
for all nodes and we write ci(z) = c(z). When several nodes meet, each decides whether to
change its pseudonym with probability c(z).
5.3.3 Metric
We are interested in measuring the success of the multiple pseudonym approach. A pseudonym
change is successful only if it is coordinated with other nodes nearby. In order to evaluate
the ability of nodes to synchronize, we measure the distribution of the age of pseudonyms
in the network. We define Z(t) ∼ f(z, t) as a random variable that describes the density of
probability for any age z. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (z, t) =
∫
z f(x, t)dx
gives the fraction of nodes ui at time t whose age of pseudonym is Zi(t) ≤ z.
5.4 Analytical Evaluation
In this section, we analytically derive the probability distribution of the age of pseudonyms,
F (z, t). To do so, we calculate the fraction of users whose age of pseudonyms is lower than z,
i.e. Pr{Z 6 z}. We show that the evolution of the age of pseudonyms can be approximated
by a dynamical system composed of a simple differential equation when the number of nodes
N gets large.
5.4.1 Dynamical System
As discussed above, the random variable Z(t) models the distribution of the age of pseudonyms
at time t. The evolution of this random variable over time can be captured by a dynamical
system composed of drift and jump processes. The goal of the drift and jump processes
is to capture the dynamics of the age of pseudonyms by modeling possible variations of a
pseudonym age. The drift models an increase in the age of the pseudonyms, and a jump
models sudden changes in the age of the pseudonyms (e.g., upon using a new pseudonym).
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the drift (∆) and jump (Γ1 and Γ2) processes. We observe the
three scenarios causing a change in the distribution F (z, t).
Drift Process ∆
The drift process models the aging of pseudonyms over time as shown in Fig. 5.2. At each
time step, the age of the pseudonym of every node is incremented with rate λ. Hence, for
any fixed value z, the age of the pseudonyms of a fraction of nodes will pass above z and
decrease F (z, t). The drift directly depends on the aging rate λ and the density of the age of
the pseudonyms:
∆ = λ
∂F
∂z
(5.6)
Jump Process Γ
The jump process captures the sudden variations in the age of pseudonyms. There are two
possible scenarios, Γ1 and Γ2, that correspond to successful and failed attempts to change
pseudonyms, respectively (Fig. 5.2). In the first type of jump Γ1, a node uj with a pseudonym
age greater than z successfully changes its pseudonym with other nodes in proximity. Hence,
the age of its pseudonym drops to 0. This happens with rate:
Γ1 = η
∫ ∞
0
c(x)q(t)(1− 1{x≤z})
∂F
∂x
(x, t)dx (5.7)
where q(t) is the probability that at least one of the encountered nodes changes pseudonym;
c(z) is the probability of cooperation of user uj given that its age of pseudonym is z, and
η is the rate of meetings scaled by the number of nodes. Intuitively, Γ1 (the rate at which
any node uj successfully changes pseudonym) depends on: (1) the rate of encounter between
nodes η, (2) on the probability that uj cooperates c(z), (3) on the probability of meeting a
nodes that cooperates q(t), and (4) on the probability of having a pseudonym age larger than
z. The integral captures the probability that a node uj has a pseudonym age larger than z,
cooperates, and meets at least one cooperative node, thus causing an increase in F (z).
In the second type of jump process Γ2, a user uk with a pseudonym age between z − γ
and z changes pseudonym in an encounter with other nodes. However, none of the nodes in
proximity cooperate, and the pseudonym change is a failure. Hence a pseudonym is wasted
and user uk suffers a cost γ: Zk(t) = Z−k + γ causing an increase in the number of users with
90 Chapter 5. Measuring Location Privacy: A Mean-Field Approach
an age of pseudonym larger than z. This occurs with rate:
Γ2 = η
∫ z
z−γ
c(x)(1− q(t))∂F
∂x
(x, t)dx (5.8)
Intuitively, Γ2 (i.e., the rate at which uk fails to change pseudonyms) depends on the rate
of encounter η, on the probability that uk cooperates, on the probability of meeting nodes
that all defect (1− q(t)), and on the probability that uk has a pseudonym age in the interval
[z − γ, z]. The integral captures the probability that a node uk has a pseudonym age in the
interval [z − γ, z], cooperates, and meets nodes that all defect, thus causing a decrease in
F (z).
5.4.2 Differential Equation
Taking into account the drift and jump processes, we obtain a dynamical system defined by a
single differential equation. The cumulative distribution function F (z, t), giving the fraction
of nodes with an age of pseudonym smaller than z, is the unique solution of the following
differential equation:
∂F
∂t
= −∆ + Γ1 − Γ2 (5.9)
with boundary conditions: F (∞, t) = 1,∀t. Intuitively, on one hand, the drift ∆ and the jump
Γ2 cause nodes to have an age larger than z, hence decreasing the fraction of nodes F (z).
For this reason, they are subtracted from ∂F∂t . On the other hand, the jump Γ1 increases the
number of nodes on the left size of z, hence increasing F (z). For this reason, it is added to
∂F
∂t .
As defined above, q(t) is the probability that at least one of the encountered nodes co-
operates. It can be calculated by considering the probability of meeting n nodes and the
probability that at least one node cooperates:
q(t) = 1−
∑
n≥0
hn(1− c¯(t))n = 1−H(1− c¯(t)) (5.10)
where hn is the probability of meeting n nodes (a meeting involves n + 1 nodes: the node
itself with the n encountered nodes), H(z) =
∑
n>0 z
nhn is the Z-transform of hn, and c¯(t)
is the probability that an encountered node cooperates:
c¯(t) =
∫ ∞
0
c(z)f(z, t)dz (5.11)
Intuition of the equation above: The main idea is to replace all interactions between
nodes with an average interaction. This can be done by using the principles of Mean Field
theory. To do so, we consider the probability that each node has a certain age in the system
(e.g., f(z)). Previous work [25, 56] has shown that such probability distribution function
converges to a deterministic limit (mean field convergence) when N goes to infinity. The
probability distribution function is known to satisfy an ordinary differential equation formed
by drift and jump processes that capture possible transitions in the age of pseudonyms. In
summary, by considering possible scenarios that affect the age of pseudonyms, we derive above
differential equation characterizing the distribution of the age of pseudonyms.
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5.5 Analytical Results
In this section, we solve the differential equation (5.9) characterizing the age of pseudonyms.
We consider the system in the stationary regime (i.e., as t goes to infinity, we have ∂F∂t = 0)
and evaluate how system parameters such as η, λ, θ, and c(z) affect the distribution of the
age of pseudonyms F (z, t).
We assume that a node cooperates according to a simple threshold function. This means
that if its age of pseudonym is smaller than a given threshold θ, it decides not to cooperate,
whereas it cooperates with probability c0 if its age of pseudonym is larger than θ:
c(z) =
{
0 z 6 θ
c0 z > θ
(5.12)
Intuitively, a node will tend not to cooperate as long as it estimates that the age of its
pseudonym (or its distance to confusion) is sufficient. With this model, the threshold θ and
the probability c0 determine the inclination of each node to cooperate. For example, a low
θ and a high c0 mean that the nodes will often change their pseudonyms. These parameters
directly affect the probability distribution of the age of pseudonyms. Consequently, we can
fine tune the achievable level of privacy in the system.
As mentioned, we have ∂F∂t = 0 in the stationary regime. For simplicity, we derive Equa-
tion (5.9) with respect to z and as ∂F∂z (z, t) = f(z, t), we obtain: λ
∂f
∂z + ηc(z)f(z)− η(1− q)c(z − γ)f(z − γ) = 0∫∞
0 f(z)dz = 1
(5.13)
Considering the probability of cooperation c(z) defined by Equation (5.12), the above differ-
ential equation must be solved in three intervals:
1. z < θ: The probability of cooperation c(z) is equal to 0 in this interval (i.e., nodes never
cooperate). Hence the differential equation (5.13) becomes ∂f∂z = 0. The solution is then
f(z) = f(0).
2. θ 6 z < θ+ γ: The probability of cooperation c(z− γ) is equal to 0 in this interval and
the differential equation is: λ∂f∂z + ηc0f(z) = 0. Considering the boundary condition
f(z = θ), the solution in this interval is: f(z) = f(0)e
−ηc0
λ
(z−θ).
3. θ + γ 6 z: For these values of z, the differential equation (5.13) is a non-autonomous
differential equation. We iteratively solve this differential equation by solving a series
of autonomous differential equations in the interval [0, γ]. As illustrated in Fig. 5.3, we
define m functions fm, m = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,∞, over the interval [0, γ]. For each interval, we
obtain an autonomous differential equation as follows:
∂fm(x)
∂x +
ηc0
λ fm(x)− ηc0(1−q)λ fm−1(x) = 0
fm(0) = fm−1(γ) m = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,∞
(5.14)
In order to ensure the continuity of f(z), we need to take into account the solution of
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Figure 5.3: The definition of fm over [θ +mγ, θ + (m+ 1)γ] intervals.
f(z) in the interval [θ, θ+γ]. Hence, we know that f0(γ) must be equal to f(0)e
−ηc0
λ
(γ).
For m = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,∞, the solution of the above system of iterative equations is:
fm(x) = e
−ηc0x
λ
„
fm−1(γ) +
ηc0(1− q)
λ
Z x
0
e
ηc0y
λ fm−1(y)dy
«
(5.15)
Finally, we obtain the values of f(z) by calculating fm(z− (θ+mγ)) for every interval
[θ +mγ, θ + (m+ 1)γ].
Let us define α = ηc0/λ for simplicity. After some simplifications on Equation (5.15), we
obtain:
f(z) =

f(0) z < θ
f(0)e−α(z−θ) θ 6 z < θ + γ
f(0)e−α(z−θ)g(z) θ + γ 6 z
(5.16)
where g(z) is a polynomial function as follows:
g(z) =
m∑
k=0
αk
k!
ekαγ(1− q)k(z − kγ − θ)k (5.17)
for θ + mγ ≤ z < θ + (m + 1)γ. Recall that f(0) can be calculated using the boundary
condition presented in Equation (5.13). After some simplification, we obtain:
f(0) =
1
θ + 1−e−αγα + I
(5.18)
where I =
∑∞
m=1
∑m
k=0 e
α(θ+kγ) (1−q)kαk
k!
∫ θ+(m+1)γ
θ+mγ
e−αz(z − θ − kγ)kdz.
From the above equation, we observe that we need to calculate probability q (at least one
node cooperates at the meeting point) in order to obtain f(z). To do so, we must compute
probability hn of meeting n nodes and the probability of cooperation of a node c¯ as shown in
Equation (5.10).
5.5.1 Derivation of Probability q
Assume that the average number of nodes in a meeting point is N¯ . Usually, the probability of
having n nodes in a meeting point follows a long tail distribution. We consider a Geometric
distribution with parameter w for the probability of meeting n nodes. By definition of a
Geometric distribution, the average number of nodes at a meeting point is N¯ = w1−w . The
probability of meeting n nodes is then:
hn = wn(1− w) (5.19)
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Hence, the Z-transform of hn is:
H(z) =
∑
n>0
znwn(1− w) = z(1− w)
1− zw (5.20)
We also need to compute the average probability of cooperation c¯. Using Equation (5.11),
we obtain:
c¯ = f(0)c0
(
1− e−αγ
α
+
∫ ∞
θ+γ
e−α(z−θ)g(y)dy
)
= f(0)c0
(
1− e−αγ
α
+ I
)
(5.21)
Finally, q is obtained by computing H(1 − c¯), which is the value between 0 and 1 that
satisfies the following equation:
c0
q
=
1
w
− (1− c0) + θ(1− w)
w(1−e−αγα + I)
(5.22)
Our results in Equation (5.16) show that the probability density function f(z) will first be
uniform in the interval [0, θ]. Then, on the small interval [θ, θ + γ], it will decrease exponen-
tially. For the other values of z, the probability f(z) decreases according to an exponential
distribution multiplied by a polynomial g(z). Intuitively, it means that nodes will be evenly
distributed below the threshold θ and for the other values of z > θ will have a long tail
distribution.
With respect to probability q, we observe that it not only depends on cooperation param-
eters such as c0 and θ, but also depends on the rate of encounters η, the average number of
nodes in an encounter N¯ , and on the cost of changing pseudonym γ.
Example with γ = 0 and c0 = 1
Assume that the cost of changing pseudonym γ = 0 and that c0 = 1. The probability
distribution function f(z) can be rewritten as
f(z) =

f(0) z < θ
f(0)e
−ηq
λ
(z−θ) θ 6 z
(5.23)
where f(0) = 1
θ+ λ
ηq
. We compute q by using Equation (5.10). Considering our threshold
cooperation function c(z), c¯(t) is:
c¯ =
∫ ∞
θ
f(0)e−
ηq
λ
(z−θ)dz =
λ
λ+ ηqθ
(5.24)
Finally q can be calculated by replacing c¯ in Equation (5.10):
q =
λ−√λ(4ηθw(1− w) + λ)
2(−1 + w)ηθ (5.25)
We observe that in this simple example, the probability density function f(z) is first uniform
for z < θ and then decreases according to an exponential distribution.
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Figure 5.4: Probability distribution function f(z) for different values of γ.
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Figure 5.5: Probability distribution function f(z) for different values of θ.
5.5.2 Numerical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate numerically the analytical results of the previous section. In
particular, we study how the system parameters affect the distribution of the age of pseudo-
nyms, f(z). Unless otherwise stated, we use the following values for the system parameters:
N¯ = 0.5, θ = 5, γ = 1, λ = 1, η = 0.75, and c0 = 1.
As shown in Equation (5.16), the probability density function f(z) has three different
behaviors: it is first constant with value f(0), then decreases exponentially with parameter
−α and finally decreases according to an exponential multiplied by a polynomial which is
different for every interval of size γ. We observe in Fig. 5.4 the three behaviors of f(z) for
different values of γ. For example, with γ = 4, we have f(z) = f(0) = 0.09 over the interval
[0, θ]. Then, f(z) exponentially decreases until θ + γ = 9. Finally, we observe that f(z)
oscillates because of the polynomial function (5.17) which is different for every interval of
size γ. As z increases, the oscillation is attenuated because the exponential term dominates
the polynomial function. Intuitively, the oscillation is caused by the jump process Γ2: nodes
with age of pseudonym belonging to [z − γ, z] fail to coordinate and their age of pseudonym
is thus increased by γ. In Fig. 5.4, we also observe the effect of different values of γ on the
distribution f(z). As γ decreases, the oscillations become less noticeable because the jump
process Γ2 affects fewer nodes (since the interval [z−γ, z] becomes smaller). Moreover, in the
case of γ = 0, we notice that there is no oscillation because Γ2 does not affect any node. Note
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Figure 5.6: Probability distribution function f(z) for different values of N¯ .
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Figure 5.7: Probability distribution function f(z) for different values of λ.
that when γ decreases, more nodes have an age of pseudonym smaller than the threshold θ.
Figure 5.5 shows the effect of different θ on f(z). We observe that with larger values of
θ, the number of nodes with age of pseudonym below θ increases. A system designer can
thus fine tune θ to vary the population of nodes with age of pseudonym smaller than θ. As
θ increases, we notice that the average value of z increases as well, meaning that more nodes
have a high age of pseudonym because nodes are less cooperative.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the effect of the average number of nodes N¯ in meetings on f(z).
When N¯ increases, the probability q to find a cooperative node increases and consequently
the number of nodes with age of pseudonym below the threshold θ increases as well, meaning
that in average the age of pseudonym is smaller.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the effect of the aging rate λ on f(z). We observe that with a high
λ (i.e., pseudonyms age faster), fewer nodes have an age of pseudonym below θ compared to
lower values of λ.
Finally, we evaluate the influence of the rate of meetings η on f(z) in Fig. 5.8. First, we
focus on the probability q of encountering at least one cooperative node in Fig. 5.8 (a). As
λ increases, nodes age faster and we observe that their probability of cooperation increases
logarithmically. When the rate η increases, we observe that the probability of cooperation q
decreases for any value of λ: the reason is that for larger values of η, both jump processes Γ1
and Γ2 occur more frequently. Because Γ1 dominates Γ2 (as it affects more nodes), a larger
fraction of nodes will have an age of pseudonym below θ (Fig. 5.8 (b)). For this reason, for a
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Figure 5.8: Influence of the rate of meetings η: (a) Probability q that at least one node in a
meeting cooperates. (b) Probability distribution function f(z).
high η, fewer nodes cooperate, and q decreases.
The above results can help a system designer find the conditions for the emergence of
location privacy. More specifically, the system designer can fine tune parameters such as θ, γ
and λ in order to control the number of nodes with large age of pseudonym.
5.5.3 Validation with Simulations
In order to verify the relevance of our model, we compare our numerical evaluations with
simulation results.
Simulation Setup
We consider a set of N = 1000 mobile nodes moving according to a random walk model [54].
The plane is composed of a grid of 10km×10km, where each step is of one meter. At every
intersection, mobile nodes move from their current location to a new location by randomly
choosing a direction. We consider that mobile nodes move with a constant speed. Directions
are chosen out of [0, 2pi] with granularity pi/2.
We consider that nodes are neighbors (i.e., in communication range) if they are within a
fixed perimeter. We consider a communication range of 100m. Whenever a node has at least
one neighbor, it must decide whether to cooperate or defect based on its value Zi(t) and the
threshold cooperation function c(z). After each iteration of the simulation, we compare the
average of the current probability density function f(z) to the average of f(z) obtained in
the 50 previous iterations. The simulation stops if the difference is smaller than 0.005, and
otherwise runs at least for 200 iterations.
Simulation Results
Figure 5.9 compares f(z) obtained with the numerical evaluation to the one obtained by
simulation with two different values of γ = 0 and γ = 4. We consider the same value of η and
N¯ for the analytical and simulation results. The distribution of age obtained from the model
shows a pretty good match with the distribution obtained with simulations. This means that
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Figure 5.9: Validation of numerical results: (a) γ = 0. (b) γ = 4.
our modeling assumptions succeeded in capturing the collective behavior of nodes changing
their pseudonyms in mobile networks.
5.6 Summary
We developed a framework to analytically evaluate the age of pseudonyms. Our framework
captures the mobility and interactions between nodes. With this model, we obtained critical
conditions for the emergence of location privacy. In particular, we evaluated the importance
of the probability of cooperation of the nodes (θ and c0), their mobility (η and N¯), the cost
of pseudonyms γ, and the aging rate λ.
Some results are intuitive: the number of nodes with age of pseudonyms lower than
the cooperation threshold increases with a large number of devices in meetings N¯ , with a
large rate of encounters η, with a small cooperation threshold θ or with small aging rate
λ. A less intuitive result is the influence of the cost γ on the distribution of the age of
pseudonyms. We observe that a large cost γ creates oscillations in the distribution of the
age of pseudonyms, indicating that it becomes harder to bound the age of pseudonyms.
It is particularly interesting to note that our results enable to analytically relate different
cooperation thresholds θ achieved in practice and the age of pseudonyms, e.g., the threshold
at Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative environments (Chapter 4). The results of the model
match well with simulations, meaning that our modeling assumptions succeeded in capturing
the collective behavior of nodes changing their pseudonyms in mobile networks.
Publication: [94]
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Chapter 6
Privacy of Communities
Ce devant quoi une socie´te´ se prosterne
nous dit ce qu’elle est.
Philipe Murray
6.1 Introduction
In addition to wireless interfaces that communicate with the infrastructure (e.g., cellular or
WLAN), mobile devices are increasingly equipped with ad hoc communications capabilities
(e.g., WiFi in ad hoc mode or Bluetooth). These wireless interfaces enable peer-to-peer
interactions with nearby users and may fuel the development of context-aware applications:
mobile devices can sense their environment and share data with other nearby devices.
Such peer-to-peer communications offer new ways to enhance social interactions between
humans [15]. Wireless communications inherently depend on the geographic proximity of mo-
bile devices and thus provide a geographic extension of online social networks. Both industry
and academia are pushing towards the development of such context-aware applications. For
example, new applications enable users to share information in real-time for local-area so-
cial networking [3, 4, 10, 176, 32], dating [1, 2, 135], gaming [156], or personal safety [177].
In most applications, users enter personal information in their smart phones, which is then
shared with other phones nearby.
In real-life social interactions, humans naturally form groups called communities based
on interests, proximity, or social relations [169]. Some communities are created dynamically
for short periods of time, whereas other are persistent. In this work, we consider that users
of mobile devices are grouped into user-defined communities based on user interests, social
relation, or proximity. Such communities can be created dynamically when users are in
proximity, or on online social platforms (e.g., groups in Facebook).
We study a communication primitive that enables users to share information with specific
communities using ad hoc wireless communications. Users can subscribe to communities of
interest to automatically receive messages sent to their community by other members. Friends
or strangers can thus dynamically exchange relevant information when they are in proximity.
For privacy concerns, some users of online web services have an aversion towards sharing
their contextual information with infrastructure-based services. Sharing personal information
locally in a peer-to-peer fashion mitigates this problem, yet leaks personal information to
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eavesdroppers. In particular, as the content of wireless communications can be eavesdropped,
data privacy is at risk. Similarly, wireless broadcasting of messages leaks location information
meaning that location privacy is in jeopardy [26]. In addition, the use of communities brings
forth a new set of community privacy threats. Users from the same community could be
linked, thus exposing their social relations [83]. Similarly, users’ memberships in communities
reveals their interests. Community privacy also affects location and data privacy as it might
be easier to track an individual or to breach data privacy if it is known to belong to a specific
community.
The upcoming generation of mobile computing requires mechanisms to identify groups of
users while protecting their privacy. To do so, existing works suggest to anonymously au-
thenticate other community members, thus protecting location and community privacy, and
then derive a secret to protect data privacy. Several anonymous authentication techniques
could be used, such as anonymous credentials [47, 48], group/ring signatures [35, 60, 188],
private set intersections [91], affiliation-hiding envelopes [130] and secret handshakes [21, 127].
These methods thwart many privacy threats, but, besides secret handshakes, none of them
achieves the desired privacy protection. In some cases, community membership is not hid-
den [47, 48, 35, 60, 188], others do not provide a suitable solution to our problem [91], and yet
in others, anyone can communicate with community members [130]. Secret handshakes [129]
appear to be the best solution to anonymously authenticate community members.
In this work, we tackle the main drawback of secret handshakes: cost. Secret handshakes
are interactive protocols that require exchange of several messages and execution of several
cryptographic operations to authenticate other group members. Although secret handshake
schemes work well for Internet-based scenarios, in pervasive social networks, users will en-
counter a large number of other devices for a short period of time, e.g., dozens of encounters
per minute in a city center, thus frequently invoking group-identification mechanisms. In par-
ticular, as interactions are short-lived, these group-identification mechanisms have to operate
fast. In addition, battery constraints of mobile devices hinder the use of computation and
communication intensive operations.
Most secret handshake schemes are linkable: users use persistent pseudonyms to initiate
a secret handshake. Previous work on secret handshakes suggested the use of one-time pseu-
donyms to obtain unlinkability. However, such single-use pseudonyms may require too much
storage. Some solutions provide cryptographic unlinkability using zero-knowledge proofs [129],
or Key-Private Group Key Management Schemes [128]. However, such approaches entail a
high cost. Other solutions include heuristic unlinkability approaches where users achieve un-
linkability by rotating through a small set of pseudonyms, by setting strict time limits on the
use of each pseudonym, by using k-anonymous techniques [224], or by associating different
pseudonyms with different locations or aspects of a user’s activity [127]. In this work, we
consider these heuristic solutions as a starting point. Yet, the achievable privacy is unclear
and other schemes could be derived.
In view of these observations, our contributions are:
1. We define the notion of community privacy that captures the privacy threat induced
by communities. We provide a framework based on challenge-response protocols to
formally evaluate the interactions between mobile users using community pseudonyms
and an adversary aiming at breaking community privacy.
2. We propose new schemes to efficiently identify communities of users in a privacy-
preserving fashion. These schemes complement existing schemes used in secret hand-
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shakes by focusing on the specific requirements of mobile wireless networks, i.e., low cost
and unlinkability. These schemes provide unlinkability by using short-term community
pseudonyms and authentication based on symmetric cryptography. We show how asym-
metric cryptography can be used only for specific operations in order to reduce cost.
3. We evaluate the privacy and cost of proposed and existing schemes by using the com-
munity privacy formalization. Our results shed light on the unlinkability achieved with
short-term pseudonyms and the consequences on the privacy provided by secret hand-
shakes.
6.2 Related Work
We discuss the properties of cryptographic techniques that could protect the privacy of com-
munities.
Anonymous Authentication As previously discussed in Chapter 2, there are several
mechanisms for anonymously authenticating users such as anonymous credentials [48], group
signatures [35, 60], and ring signatures [188]. Although these techniques protect the authen-
ticator’s privacy, they expose group membership and hence leak community membership to
any eavesdropper.
Private Broadcast Encryption and Affiliation-Hiding Envelopes There are several
mechanisms for privately sharing information with members of a group. Key-private encryp-
tion (also called private broadcast encryption) [23] allows users to send encrypted messages to
any member of a group such that the ciphertext hides the identity of the intended recipients
from anyone except authorized recipients. Affiliation-hiding envelopes [130] address the same
issue but with regards to interactive protocols: a receiver can read a message only if it sat-
isfies the policy of the sender. Hidden credentials [38] are a special form of affiliation-hiding
envelope schemes that also hide receivers’ affiliations from all parties (including senders), and
hide senders’ policies from non-authorized receivers. Similar to affiliation-hiding envelopes,
oblivious signature-based envelopes (OSBEs) [146] enable a sender to send an encrypted mes-
sage to a receiver such that the receiver can open the message only if it is authorized and also
guarantees that the sender cannot tell whether the receiver read the message.
Although such schemes could be used to privately share information with other community
members, anyone (not even owning any credentials) can send messages to a given group. This
property is undesirable in our setting as it makes it difficult to prevent spam. Only members
of a community should be authorized to communicate with other members.
Private Set Intersection Private set intersection (PSI) protocols [68, 91] allow users to
discover the intersection of two input sets without disclosing any information about further
elements. PSI protocols could be used to detect other group members in proximity: two
parties input their community membership as a list of community identifiers, execute the
PSI interactive protocol and obtain the communities in common. One problem with PSI
protocols is that memberships are not certified, so users can include identifiers of communities
they do not belong to. Authorized PSI protocols [52] solve this problem by strengthening
the requirements: the computed intersection of inputs must contain certified elements only.
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Another problem with PSI protocols appears when multiple parties are involved: PSI protocols
compute the intersection of the input sets of all parties. In order to obtain pairwise community
discovery, PSI protocols thus require an exponential number of operations. For these reasons,
PSI protocols are not suitable to solving the problem considered in this Chapter.
Nearby Friend Algorithms Previous work investigated algorithms to alert users of nearby
friends [12]. Mobile devices determine their position and share it with friends using ad hoc or
centralized communications. One disadvantage of this approach is that friends always learn
each other’s location, regardless whether they are actually nearby. To solve this issue, Zhong
et al. propose a privacy-preserving buddy-tracking application where users can learn their
friends’ locations only if their friends are actually nearby [227].
These protocols assume that users know their friends and regularly communicate in or-
der to compare their locations privately. Such technique would not scale to the setting of
community detection because communities are composed of numerous users that would have
to regularly communicate with each other. In this work, we investigate a related problem in
which users can discover others that share common interests in a spontaneous fashion (i.e.,
when in vicinity). The nearby friend problem could actually be solved using communities:
users could create a community of friends, and could detect them by checking for the proximity
of members of that community.
Secret Handshakes and Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Key Exchange
Affiliation-hiding authentication schemes were introduced as secret handshakes [21]: they
allow two members of the same group to authenticate each other in a way that hides their
affiliation from all others. Such property can be used to anonymously authenticate mem-
bers of communities. As secret handshake schemes are only entity authentication schemes,
new schemes were proposed to provide Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Key Exchange (AH-
AKE) [127]. These schemes have the advantage of providing higher security guarantees as
they output an authenticated session key after the handshake. The state-of-the-art AH-AKE
scheme [127] guarantees perfect forward secrecy, robustness against man-in-the-middle at-
tacks and was recently extended to support linear complexity for the discovery of multiple
communities [154]. It achieves minimal costs of 3 communication rounds and two (multi)
exponentiations per party and community. There is still no solution for group (multi-party)
secret handshakes in this setting.
We argue that the main cost factor in secret handshakes schemes is due to asymmetric
cryptography. One way to reduce cost is to rely instead on symmetric cryptography. Schemes
based on symmetric cryptography make it more difficult to support revocation and could be
linkable [213]. Hence, in order to provide revocation support, we restrict the use of asymmetric
cryptography to certain situations. In order to achieve unlinkability, we rely on techniques
similar to those proposed in the unlinkable secret handshakes schemes.
6.3 System Model
We introduce the assumptions made throughout the Chapter.
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6.3.1 Network Model
Like in previous Chapters, we consider a network composed of personal mobile devices
equipped with wireless interfaces that can communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer
fashion upon coming in radio range (e.g., WiFi in ad hoc mode or Bluetooth). These peer-
to-peer wireless communications complement communications with an infrastructure such as
cellular or WLAN. We define U = {U1, ..., Un} as the set of users in the network, where n is
the total number of users. For simplicity, we consider that each user owns a single commu-
nication device. We study a discrete time system with initial time t = 0 and consider the
location of users at each discrete time instant t.
Mobile devices can identify each other with their link-layer identifier (i.e., MAC address),
network-layer identifier (i.e., IP address) or application-layer identifiers (i.e., usernames or
cookies). Let IDk(t) refer to all identifiers of user Uk at time t; we call IDk(t) a user
pseudonym. As commonly assumed, user pseudonyms may change over time [26, 108].
We assume the presence of a trusted central authority (CA) run by an independent third
party. Among other things, the CA loads authentication material in mobile devices and re-
vokes misbehaving users. Users are preloaded by the CA with authentication credentials (i.e.,
asymmetric keys) and can encrypt or sign their messages by using asymmetric cryptography.
The CA may not always be available to mobile users because of communication costs, limited
network coverage or scalability issues. In practice, the CA can be a generic online platform
(e.g., Verisign, Facebook) or a cellular operator.
6.3.2 Community Model
We consider that users can form communities [169, 177] structured around groups of people
sharing common interests, such as professions, locations and social relations. Users can be
represented as nodes in a graph connected by edges capturing shared interests. A community
can then be defined as the union of several complete subgraphs that share many of their
nodes [169]. Communities can be centrally formed, for example, online in the CA like groups
on online social networks, or created in a distributed fashion by users in the network. Note
that users can belong to several communities.
Let us define C = {C1, C2, ..., Cm} as the set of communities where m is the number of
communities in the network. Each Ci is composed of a set of users Ci = {Uk} and has private
credentials SKi (i.e., a secret) known to all community members. At time t, a community
is identified by one or multiple community pseudonyms PCi(t) = {pi,j} where j is the jth
pseudonym. Unless otherwise stated, we focus for simplicity on a time period during which
community pseudonyms do not change and write PCi(t) = PCi . The set of all community
pseudonyms in the system is then P = ⋃i PCi . Community pseudonyms are generated using
a community pseudonym scheme. In Section 6.6, we discuss various techniques to generate
community pseudonyms based on the community secret.
We consider that communities have different profiles depending on the common interests
characterizing members, their mobility profiles and communication rate. For example, a com-
munity profile may be characterized by a set of points of interest (POIs), e.g., restaurants for
a fine food community. We consider that each user belongs to a fixed number of communities
nc. In summary, a community is established by defining its members, its name, its secret and
its pseudonym scheme.
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6.3.3 Communication Model
In order to automatically detect the presence of other users, mobile devices periodically broad-
cast proximity beacons containing the users’ identities and time:
Uk → ∗ : IDk(t) | t (6.1)
where IDk(t) is the user pseudonym of Uk at time t. We consider a contention-based beaconing
mode similar to Ad Hoc mode of IEEE 802.11. When Uk receives a beacon from Uj , Uk can
start interacting with Uj .
In addition to standard unicast interactions, we consider that mobile users can exchange
information with groups of users (communities). When another user is in proximity, users
broadcast messages to all communities they belong to. Nearby users can then automati-
cally detect messages sent to communities they subscribed to. To do so, community packets
broadcasted by user Uk to community Ci at time t have the following format:
Uk → Ci : IDk(t) | pi,j | msg (6.2)
where pi,j is the j-th community pseudonym of Ci at time t (i.e., the destination of the
packet) and msg is the message that may be encrypted. Community pseudonyms pi,j are
used by receivers to detect whether a message is sent to a community they belong to and
decide whether to read/decrypt the message. If a user wants to reply to a community packet,
it can use standard unicast communications:
Uj → Uk : IDj(t) | IDk(t) | msg (6.3)
We consider that communications are multi-hop to a certain maximum hop-count de-
fined by the system. Hence, traditional routing algorithms can be used [42] and community
members located multiple hops away from the sender can receive messages.
The battery of mobile devices is affected by the number of communications and the com-
putation overhead. Hence, energy efficiency is crucial in the design of algorithms used in
the scope of pervasive social networks. In the following, we will aim at designing community
pseudonym schemes that rely on as few operations and messages as possible.
6.3.4 Application Example
Numerous applications could take advantage of community information and real-time localized
messages to enhance their context awareness. Consider the following example of a privacy-
conscious geo-social network application. A group of users interested in technology create a
community on their preferred online social network. Each member of the community receives
keying material that is uploaded on their mobile device. Mobile devices broadcast community
pseudonyms so that members of the same community can automatically detect their proximity.
The notion of community enables to easily identify messages of other friends.
Upon detecting the proximity of another community member, mobile devices can take dif-
ferent actions depending on user preferences. Typically, mobile devices log received messages
and decide whether to interrupt users’ current activities. They can also perform pre-defined
actions such as automatically share articles about technology users recently read. Later, users
can check their logs to learn articles that others liked. Unlike other sources of information
online (such as an RSS feed), this system is influenced by the geographic proximity of users
and thus provides novel insights.
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6.4 Threat Model
Based on the broadcasted packets, an adversaryA could jeopardize user privacy. In particular,
A may detect the members of communities, obtain users’ locations and extract the content
of messages. In this Chapter, we address these threats and focus on designing mechanisms to
protect the privacy of communities.
We consider both a passive and an active adversary. A passive adversary collects from
the network the messages broadcasted by the devices and obtains communication traces. At
best, the passive adversary is global : it has complete coverage and tracks users throughout
the entire network. So far in the thesis, we exclusively considered passive adversaries. In this
Chapter, we extend our threat model to active adversaries because mobile devices contain
keying information that may affect the privacy of other nodes as well. An active adversary can
compromise mobile devices in order to extract their secrets. An adversary has thus incentive
to actively compromise nodes to improve its tracking ability. In addition to compromising
devices, A may also be a legitimate member of the network and know a priori the secret of
several communities. We assume that A knowns C and define PACi the set of pseudonyms of
Ci known by A: for all communities Ci the adversary belongs to, we have PACi = PCi .
We use the concept of oracles to abstract possible actions of the adversary and its strength.
Based on collected mobility traces, the passive adversary A can attempt to break user privacy
using traffic analysis attacks. A tracks users’ locations and packets over time and tries to infer
the relation between community pseudonyms and communities. For example, locations visited
by a user or a group of users that are in proximity may leak their community membership
to the adversary. We call s the number of packets collected by the passive adversary. Let
OP =TrafficAnalysis(s) be a passive oracle that captures the traffic analysis attack of a passive
adversary. The adversary inputs the s collected messages to OP that outputs a mapping
between community pseudonyms and specific communities.
In addition to the capabilities of a passive adversary, we consider an active adversary
that can compromise devices using various means. Active attacks enable the adversary to run
selective surveillance strategies in order to ascertain community membership information. We
consider four oracles to model the attacks of an active adversary interacting with a mobile
device D.
• Query(D, C): A sends packets to D about communities C by forging or replaying over-
heard packets. A unicast reply from D reveals the membership of the device to a
community in C.
• Reveal(D, C): A tries to obtain private credentials of all communities C of D by hacking
into the hardware (e.g., reading the memory of D).
• Join(D, C): A tries to join communities C of D to obtain their private credentials, e.g.,
using social engineering attacks.
• Create(D, C): A creates several communities C and invites D to join them. With
this knowledge of community membership of D, A may identify pseudonyms of other
communities D belongs to.
We simulate the set of oracles to which the active adversary has access by considering an
active Oracle OA ⊂ {Q,R, J,C}, where Q, R, J and C represent respectively the oracles Query,
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Reveal, Join and Create. The adversary inputs devices D to OA that then outputs a map-
ping between community pseudonyms and specific communities. A thus learns community
memberships of input devices D and obtain all the corresponding community pseudonyms.
6.5 Protecting Privacy
In this section, we discuss different privacy-preserving mechanisms proposed to protect privacy
of users of pervasive social networks. Recall that packets exchanged between users contain
three parts: a user pseudonym IDk(t), a community pseudonym pi,j and a message msg. We
first discuss how to provide unlinkability of user pseudonyms, how to protect data privacy of
messages and, finally, address the unlinkability of community pseudonyms.
6.5.1 Location Privacy
In order to avoid traceability, users can change their pseudonyms IDk(t) over time [26, 108].
As a pseudonym changed by an isolated node can be trivially guessed by an external
party, pseudonym changes should be coordinated among mobile nodes in regions called mix
zones [26]. To protect against the spatial correlation of location traces, mix zones can also
conceal the trajectory of mobile nodes to the external adversary by using silent/encrypted
periods [122, 145], or (iii) regions where the adversary has no coverage [43].
The effectiveness of a mix zone, in terms of the location privacy it provides, depends on
the adversary’s ability to relate mobile nodes that enter and exit the mix zone [26]. Previous
works show that mix zones are more effective when used by a large number of devices that
have unpredictable mobility [28, 122]. The main drawback of mix zones is that they induce
a cost for mobile users in terms of quality-of-service: for example, in a silent mix zone [123],
mobile nodes cannot communicate and access services.
In this work, we consider that mobile users coordinate their pseudonym changes as defined
in the dynamic game of Chapter 4 and thus effectively protect their location privacy at a low
cost.
6.5.2 Data Privacy
In some cases, users may broadcast private messages to other members of the same commu-
nity, and in others they may share their messages with everyone. Without lack of generality,
we consider two types of communities: public and private communities. In public commu-
nities, any user can join the community and send messages to all members. Such messages
can thus be read by anyone. In contrast, only members of a private community can read the
content of packets sent to that community. Hence, users must be authorized to join a private
community. Upon authorization, each private community member receives appropriate cre-
dentials to protect data privacy. In the following, we focus on private communities as they
can be generalized to public communities by revealing private credentials.
Several mechanisms can be used to encrypt communications. A simple solution is to
rely on the central authority to set up shared secrets: upon registration in the network,
every user is given by the central authority a symmetric key SKi for each community Ci
it belongs to. As the secret key is common to every user in a community, users can use
it to encrypt their packets and rely on community pseudonyms to detect messages sent to
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of result of attack by passive and active adversaries. (a) Weighted
bipartite graph G. (b) Weighted bipartite graph G′ resulting from the combination of G
and GA. The edge between p1 and C1 (in bold) belongs to GA and is obtained from an
interaction with Oracle OA. Assuming that each community uses a single pseudonym, the
adversary can rely on GA to update the weights of other edges in G. In this example, the
adversary learns all mappings between community pseudonyms and communities.
a community they belong to. Another approach consists in deriving shared secrets in a
distributed fashion [17, 39, 61, 87, 165, 208].
In this work, we consider that mobile users obtain certificates from the central authority
and can derive shared secrets in a distributed or centralized fashion. Users also receive a
symmetric key for each community they belong to.
6.5.3 Community Privacy
In this section, we discuss the properties that community pseudonyms should satisfy in order
to preserve community privacy while enabling users to verify whether a message is destined
for a community they belong to. To do so, we formalize the study of community privacy,
define requirements for achieving community privacy and propose a framework to study the
effect of various pseudonym schemes on community privacy.
Security proofs usually formalize the actions of the adversary and then derive security
properties to protect against such an adversary [20]. In this Chapter, we follow a similar
methodology to establish whether a community pseudonym scheme is resistant to passive
and active attacks. We make use of a challenge-response methodology to evaluate the ability
of the adversary to break privacy properties. A challenger provides the adversary with a
privacy challenge. The adversary then attempts to solve the challenge by using oracles as a
source of information and then inferring the link between pseudonyms and communities. If
the adversary succeeds, it breaks the privacy of the scheme.
Description of Passive Attacker
A passive adversary collects s packets and infers the relation between sniffed community
pseudonyms and communities by using the oracle OP . This relation depends on the way
community pseudonyms are used (i.e., the community pseudonym scheme) by mobile devices.
The number of collected messages s is a system parameter indicating the strength of the
passive adversary. The application of oracle OP to s messages results in a weighted bipartite
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graph G (Fig. 6.1 (a)) representing a partial mapping between community pseudonyms P
and communities C, i.e., the vertices are divided into the set of pseudonyms P and the
set of communities C. Every edge connects a vertex in P to one in C and is weighted by
the probability (estimated by the adversary) of linking a specific pseudonym to a specific
community. There are multiple ways to obtain such graphs and we discuss them in Section 6.7.
Description of Active Attacker
An active adversary can extract information about communities by interacting with the oracle
OA. We call W (D) the result of the application of the oracle OA to device D. W (D) is a
mapping between communities and community pseudonyms (similar to G). An active attack
is a set of calls to OA by A: {W1(D1), ...,W`(D`)} where ` is the number of interactions
and a system parameter indicating the strength of A. Information obtained from an active
attack can be represented with a weighted bipartite graph GA similar to G. If there is an
edge between a vertex in P to one in C in the graph GA, then its weight is either 1 or 0 as
the information learned from an active attack is absolute. At each interaction, the adversary
changes the device that is input to the Oracle. Note that two interactions Wi(D1),Wj(D2), i 6=
j may produce identical mappings. Similarly, an interaction may be unsuccessful and output
an empty result, Wi(D) = ∅.
The set of community pseudonyms of Ci known to A PACi increases depending on the
number of interactions of A with OA. In general, the outcome of the active attack GA is
directly related to the number of different devices D input to the Oracle (i.e., the number of
devices under attack). In other words, the larger the graph GA is, the more successful is the
active attack.
An active adversary can combine information from G and GA into a more accurate graph
G′. Based on information in GA, the adversary can update the probability (i.e., weight) of
the edges from P to C. This is illustrated in Fig 6.1 (b) in case a single pseudonym is assigned
to each community.
We derive two properties that community pseudonym schemes must satisfy to provide
community privacy: community anonymity (CAN) and community unlinkability (CUN).
Community Anonymity
Definition 4. For any community Ci, there is community anonymity at time t if and only
if for all pseudonyms pi,j of Ci, only members of Ci are able to deterministically verify that
pi,j is a valid pseudonym of Ci.
Community anonymity (CAN) guarantees that users cannot be linked by third parties to
the communities they belong to, i.e., community pseudonyms do not affect the anonymity of
the community members.
To formalize community anonymity, we define a challenge-response game between the
adversary and the challenger.
1. A collects s messages, interacts with OP and obtains G.
2. A interacts ` times with oracle OA and obtains GA.
3. A queries challenger one community C0 /∈ GA (i.e., for which the adversary does not
have a mapping with probability 1).
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4. Challenger selects at random b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0, it sends p ∈ C0 to A, else it sends
p /∈ C0.
5. A decides whether p belongs to C0 and outputs b′.
Step 2 is not executed by a passive adversary. We define the advantage of the adversary
for community anonymity as:
AdvCANs,` (A) = Pr(A is correct)−
1
2
(6.4)
where ` is the length of the interaction of the adversary with oracle OA, and s is the number
of messages collected by the adversary. The advantage measures the relation between the
number of interactions `, the number of messages collected s, and the probability of success
of the adversary. If the adversary guesses uniformly at random (Pr(A is correct) = 1/2),
then the advantage is AdvCANs,` = 0. Similarly, if the adversary surely knows the answer
(Pr(A is correct) = 1), then the advantage is AdvCANs,` = 1/2. Thus, the advantage belongs
to the interval [0, 1/2]. When there is no advantage provided by the community pseudo-
nym scheme (AdvCANs,` = 0), the adversary’s best decision is to guess uniformly at random.
For any advantage greater than 0 and smaller than one half, the adversary wins the game
probabilistically.
Community Unlinkability
Definition 5. For any community Ci, there is community unlinkability at time t if and only
if for any two pseudonyms pi,j and pi,k of Ci, only members of Ci are able to deterministically
verify that pi,j and pi,k belong to the same community.
Community unlinkability (CUN) guarantees that users of the same community cannot be
linked to each other or tracked by third parties, i.e., community pseudonyms do not affect
traceability of community members.
We use again a challenge-response game.
1. A collects s messages, interacts with OP and obtains G.
2. A interacts ` times with oracle OA and obtains GA.
3. A queries challenger one community C0 /∈ GA.
4. Challenger computes C1 = C \ {C0 ∪GA}. Then, it selects at random b ∈ {0, 1} and
d ∈ {0, 1} and sends p ∈ Cb and p′ ∈ Cd to A.
5. A decides whether p and p′ belong to the same community and outputs yes/no.
Step 2 is not executed by a passive adversary. We define the advantage of the adversary for
community unlinkability as:
AdvCUNs,` (A) = Pr(A is correct)−
1
2
(6.5)
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Implications
Based on the definitions of CAN and CUN, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 6. Community unlinkability implies community anonymity, but community anony-
mity does not imply community unlinkability.
Proof. We prove Theorem 1 by contradiction. Assume first that unlinkability does not imply
anonymity: CUN 9 CAN . This implies that there are probabilistic algorithms that do not
breach community unlinkability but that do breach community anonymity. In other words,
there are probabilistic algorithms that cannot decide better than a random guess whether any
two pseudonyms belong to the same community, but that can decide better than a random
guess their respective communities.
Let one such algorithm for breaching community anonymity be ACAN (pj , Ci) that outputs
yes if pj ∈ Ci and no if pj 6∈ Ci. We have for some communities Ci:
σ = Pr(ACAN (pj , Ci) is correct) >
1
2
Given ACAN , we can construct a probabilistic algorithm, ACUN (pj , pk), for deciding whether
any two community pseudonyms belong to the same community or not. We define
ACUN (pj , pk, Ci) as an algorithm that decides whether pj and pk belong to community Ci.
We have:
Pr(ACUN (pj , pk) is correct) =
m∑
i
Pr(Ci) · Pr(ACUN (pj , pk, Ci) is correct)
where Pr(Ci) is the probability that the challenger chooses a target community Ci and m is
the number of communities. Note that
∑m
i=1 Pr(Ci) = 1.
Consider that ACUN (pj , pk, Ci) is the following algorithm:
1. Given community pseudonyms pj and pk.
2. Call ACAN (pj , Ci) and guess if pj ∈ Ci.
3. Call ACAN (pk, Ci) and guess if pk ∈ Ci.
4. Output yes if the two guesses say yes, else output no.
The probability of success of ACUN (pj , pk, Ci) is:
µ = Pr(pj , pk ∈ Ci)Pr(ACUN (pj , pk, Ci) is correct|pj , pk ∈ Ci)
+ Pr(pj /∈ Ci, pk ∈ Ci)Pr(ACUN (pj , pk, Ci) is correct|pj /∈ Ci, pk ∈ Ci)
+ Pr(pj ∈ Ci, pk /∈ Ci)Pr(ACUN (pj , pk, Ci) is correct|pj ∈ Ci, pk /∈ Ci)
+ Pr(pj , pk /∈ Ci)Pr(ACUN (pj , pk, Ci) is correct|pj , pk /∈ Ci)
=
1
4
(σ2) +
1
4
(σ2 + (1− σ)2) + 1
4
(σ2 + (1− σ)2)) + 1
4
(σ2 + 2σ(1− σ))
= σ2 +
(1− σ)2
2
+
σ(1− σ)
2
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where σ2 means ACAN guesses pj , pk correctly, (1− σ)2/2 models the two cases where ACAN
does not guess pj , pk correctly but ACUN is correct and σ(1−σ)/2 models the two cases where
ACAN guesses one of pj , pk correctly and ACUN is correct.
We observe that when σ = 0.5, we have µ = 0.5, when σ > 0.5, we have µ > 0.5 and when
σ = 1, we have µ = 1. Hence, for any distribution Pr(Ci), we obtain that ACUN succeeeds
with probability greater than a random guess. This contradicts our initial hypothesis that
the community identifier scheme is CUN . Thus, there can be no such algorithm and CUN
→ CAN .
Second, assume that community anonymity implies community unlinkability: CAN →
CUN . If there are no probabilistic algorithms that can decide the respective community of
a community pseudonym better than a random guess, then this implies that there are no
probabilistic algorithms that can decide whether any two community pseudonyms belong to
the same community better than a random guess. Formally, as we have CAN , there exists
no algorithm ACAN (pi, Cj) that is correct with a probability greater than 1/2 for all pi not
known to the adversary, and for all communities Cj .
Assume that there exists a set of parameters xj ∈ X that uniquely identifies the community
Cj and there is a mapping R : X → C from X to the set of all communities C. Let A′(pi, xj)
be the algorithm that decides if the pseudonym pi belongs to a community with parameters
xj . Let A′′(xj , Ck) be the algorithm that links a parameter xj with a community Ck. If
A′′(xj , Ck) success with probability no greater than a random guess, then even if A′(pi, xj)
succeeds with probability greater than a random guess, it does not break CAN. But A′(pi, xj)
actually breaks CUN. This contradicts our initial assumption that CAN → CUN , and thus,
CAN 9 CUN .
This theorem establishes the relation between CAN and CUN. It is consistent with existing
results in the literature and validates our modeling assumptions. It shows that unlinkability is
a stronger notion of community privacy in community identification protocols. Equivalently,
applying the contrapositive property, Theorem 6 can be restated as: if CAN does not hold
(i.e., there is an algorithm to break CAN), then CUN does not hold (i.e., there is also an
algorithm to break CUN).
6.6 Community Pseudonym Schemes
In order to provide cost-efficient and private identification of user communities, we propose
schemes of cryptographically generated community identifiers. The way these community
pseudonyms are generated affects the verification cost and provided privacy.
In this section, we describe four classes of community pseudonym mechanisms and propose
approaches to derive them. Then, we compare them with each other by evaluating their cost
and security properties. We express the communication and computation cost needed to
generate, store and transmit community pseudonyms with respect to the number of users in
proximity and the number of communities per user. We consider that pseudonyms are defined
over B bits. Thus, the space of possible pseudonyms has size M = 2B.
We assume that a secret SKi is shared among community members for all communities
Ci and that when community pseudonyms change, the user pseudonym IDk(t) changes as
well, and vice versa.
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Figure 6.2: Community pse donym schemes with multiple pseudonyms per community (as-
suming only two communities for illustration purposes). (a) Multiple pseudonyms over the
entire domain. (b) Multiple pseudonyms over a shrunk domain. (c) Overlapping multiple
pseudonyms, i.e., hints.
6.6.1 Single Pseudonym Schemes
In single pseudonym schemes, users use one constant pseudonym per community: PCi = pi
where pi is chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1}M and |PCi | = 1. We consider two possible
techniques to instantiate single pseudonym schemes.
• Each user uses a single pseudonym per community different from that of other users
from the same community (similar to linkable secret handshake schemes).
• The same pseudonym is used by all users per community (similar to group signatures).
In practice, such schemes can be realized by using, for example, Hash functions. The pseudo-
nym identifying a community can be the Hash of the secret of the community: pi = H(SKi),
where H(.) is a Hash function such as SHA-2.
Such schemes have a low computation and communication overhead at the sender: the
sender of a message has to select one pseudonym per community, i.e., O(m) lookups where m
is the number of communities, and send one message per community it belongs to, i.e., O(m)
communications. The receiver has to do more operations: for all community pseudonyms
received from one neighbor, a receiver has to compare these community pseudonyms to all
community pseudonyms of communities the receiver belongs to. The complexity of such
lookups depends on the data structure used to store community pseudonyms (e.g., hashmaps
or trees). The cost of lookups typically depends on memory requirements. As all messages are
broadcasted, lookup operations are done for each device in communication range. Assuming
hashmaps, the total number of lookups at the receiver is then: O(nem), where ne is the
number of nearby nodes (e stands for encounter).
One extension of single pseudonym schemes consists in relying on the concept of k-
anonymity in order to achieve some unlinkability [224]. For each community pseudonyms
of communities users belong to, users select k − 1 other community pseudonyms that they
send together with their messages. This technique increases the cost of the receiver as it
increases the number of lookups to do. We obtain O(nekm) lookups. The higher the k, the
higher the cost.
6.6.2 Multiple Pseudonym Schemes over the Entire Domain
With this class of schemes, each community Ci is identified by a set of pseudonyms known
to all community members PCi = {pi,j} where j is the jth pseudonym of community Ci.
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To send a packet to a community Ci, a user randomly selects a pseudonym from the set
of pseudonyms PCi . Users receiving the packet determine whether the packet is sent by
a member of their community by searching their local pseudonym repository for received
community pseudonyms. If the receiver finds a match, it detects a message of interest and
reads it. In practice, users must know all community pseudonyms of all communities they
belong to.
The first type of multiple pseudonym scheme is defined over the entire domain of pseu-
donyms, i.e., over the M possible pseudonyms. It separates all possible pseudonyms across
communities. In theory, we thus have: |PCi | = M/m and PCi
⋂
PCj = ∅,∀i 6= j. In practice,
several mechanisms can be used to generate multiple pseudonyms over the entire domain.
• Pre-Computed Schemes: The CA randomly splits the set of all pseudonyms across com-
munities as follows: every community Ci is assigned bM/mc community pseudonyms.
• Self-Generated Schemes: Every user generates community pseudonyms on the fly. For
each message sent to Ci, users choose a random number RND and using a Hash function
compute a message authentication code: pi,j = RND || HMACSKi(RND). For every
message, a receiver verifies the HMAC with the key of all communities it belongs to. If
the receiver can verify the hash, it knows that the message is sent to a specific community
it belongs to.
Pre-computed schemes incur storage costs. For example, if pseudonyms are B = 48
bits and there are at most m = 100000 communities, every user must store MB/8m ≈ 16
gigabytes per community it belongs to. The sender has to do O(m) lookups and broadcast
O(m) messages. The advantage of pre-computed schemes is that the sender and receiver do
not perform any computations. For every received community pseudonym, the receiver must
do O(m) lookups. The large memory requirements (O(M)) increases the cost of each lookup.
Given ne nearby nodes, the total number of lookups at the receiver is then: O(nem).
In self-generated schemes, the sender has computation costs, i.e., O(m) hashes and O(m)
messages. The receiver also has a computation cost: users must hash all received messages
with the secret key of all communities they belong to, i.e., O(nem2) Hash operations. Then,
each Hash result is compared to the received Hashes. The self-generated scheme thus intro-
duces online computation costs.
A possible improvement that decreases overhead involves the use of Hash bins. Users
can process their membership information before broadcasting it as follows: each user uses
a Hash function H to map their memberships to an output into one of B bins. When two
parties meet, the protocol must be run only between the membership credentials that were
mapped by both parties to the same bin. Indeed, for every community Ci for which both
users have membership credentials, both parties map these credentials to the same bin. As
described in [154], this technique reduces the computation overhead to O(nem logm), again
at the expense of O(m) Hash operations at the sender.
A further improvement involves the use of Index-Hiding Message Encoding vectors
(IHME) [154]. This technique uses polynomial interpolation to hide community membership
in order to decrease the computation overhead to O(nem). Any of these two optimization
mechanisms could be used to further reduce the cost of secret handshakes based on symmetric
secrets.
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6.6.3 Multiple Pseudonym Schemes over a Shrunk Domain
The next type of multiple pseudonym scheme shrinks the size of sets of community pseu-
donyms according to a shrink factor h ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, fewer community pseudonyms are
assigned to each community (i.e., some pseudonyms are not assigned at all). The idea of
shrinking pseudonym sets is to reduce costs and to make it more difficult for an adversary to
relate community pseudonyms to communities (as some pseudonyms are not assigned at all).
Formally, we have: |PCi | = (M/m) · h and PCi
⋂
PCj = ∅,∀i 6= j. The smaller h is, the fewer
community pseudonyms are used. Users then rotate in those sets to choose their community
pseudonyms.
Two mechanisms can be used to generate multiple pseudonyms over a shrunk domain.
• Pre-Computed Schemes: The CA separates the set of pseudonyms across communities
but only assigns a subset: every community Ci receives bh ·M/mc community pseudo-
nyms.
• Self-Generated Schemes: One technique is as follows: all users belonging to the same
community generate a Hash chain in a synchronized fashion: pi,1 = H(SKi), pi,j+1 =
H(pi,j) for 1 < j < len where len is the length of the Hash chain.
In terms of the storage cost of a pre-computed scheme, it can be significantly lower com-
pared to the scheme based on the entire domain. For example, users must now store only 160
megabytes of data if h = 0.01, B = 48 and m = 100000. The receiver cost is again O(nem)
lookups.
With self-generated schemes, users can verify if a message is destined to them by checking
whether the received community pseudonym belongs to one of the Hash chains they know.
Hence, self-generated schemes enable verification by doing O(nem) lookups without online
Hash operations.
6.6.4 Hints: Overlapping Multiple Pseudonyms
The third multiple pseudonym scheme relies on a method that we call hints. This method
allows for an overlap in the set of pseudonyms used for each community. In other words,
community pseudonyms can be used by more than one community. The idea of overlapping
pseudonym sets is to create confusion for the adversary. We define the overlap factor o ∈ [0, 1]
as the fraction of community pseudonyms that may be shared by different communities. We
use the term “hint” because a community pseudonym does not uniquely identify a community
anymore but works rather as a hint to help receivers determine whether a messages is destined
to them. We have: PCi
⋂
PCj 6= 0 for some i 6= j.
• Pre-Computed Schemes: The CA splits the set of all pseudonyms across communities
but assigns some pseudonyms to multiple communities.
• Self-Generated Schemes: Hints can be implemented using the Hash method of self-
generated schemes. In order to obtain some overlap, the output of the Hash is truncated
to a smaller number of bits. As a consequence, several RND values will have the same
Hash, thus creating collisions. The larger the truncation of the Hash is, the larger the
overlap will be.
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In addition to the cost of self-generated schemes over the entire domain, users will get
some messages that are not destined to them because of the Hash collisions (i.e., false
positives). If these messages are encrypted using the community secret, then users will have
to unsuccessfully attempt decryption. The number of unsuccessful decryptions depends on
the number of collisions and can be computed using the Birthday paradox. Hence, the larger
the overlap is, the larger the cost of verification will be.
Table 6.1 summarizes the cost of the different schemes. Note that computations in our
setting correspond to Hash operations, which is significantly lower than the cost of asymmetric
cryptography operations. Similarly, lookup operations have a considerably lower cost than
Hash operations.
We observe that it is possible to derive schemes that avoid online computations, such as sin-
gle pseudonym schemes and pre-computed multiple pseudonym schemes. But, these schemes
may suffer from drawbacks of trivial linkability or large storage costs. Other schemes, such as
self-generated schemes, Hash bins and IHME overcome the problem of high storage costs by
introducing online computations. Although Hash bins provide logarithmic complexity, they
are communication-wise inefficient. The reason is that all bins must be transmitted even if
users belong to only a few communities. IHME schemes are the most efficient but they are
linkable because of the polynomial’s uniqueness. Shrunk schemes reduce cost by decreasing
the space of community pseudonyms. Hints attempt to provide confusion by overlapping
community pseudonyms, but may be computation-wise inefficient because of the number of
failed verifications.
Table 6.1: Cost of several community pseudonym schemes with m communities per partici-
pants, and ne participants.
Technique
Sender Receiver
Lookups Computation Communication Lookups Computation Memory
Single pseudonym O(m) ∅ O(m) O(nem) ∅ O(m)
k-anonymity O(km) ∅ O(km) O(nekm) ∅ O(km)
Pre-computed entire O(m) ∅ O(m) O(nem) ∅ O(M)
Self-generated entire O(m) O(m) O(m) ∅ O(nem2) O(m)
Hash bins O(m) O(m) O(m) ∅ O(nem log(m)) O(m)
IHME O(1) ∅ O(m) ∅ O(nem) O(m)
Pre-computed shrunk O(m) ∅ O(m) O(nem) ∅ O(hM)
Self-generated shrunk O(m) ∅ O(m) O(nem) ∅ O(len ·m)
Hints O(m) O(m) O(m) ∅ O(nem2) O(m)
6.6.5 Security Analysis
We study the security properties of schemes based on symmetric cryptography and show how
asymmetric cryptography can be used in local regions to thwart misbehavior.
Forward Secrecy
The symmetric key shared by community members can be used as a digital credential to
authenticate other community members and encrypt communications. However, such a widely
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shared secret could leak if one community member is compromised or malicious. Hence,
pseudonym schemes using symmetric cryptography do not provide forward secrecy : if the
secret key of a community is leaked, then all community pseudonyms, even the ones generated
before the leak [223], are no longer trustworthy. In addition, an adversary that obtains a
community secret can break community privacy by observing the messages broadcasted by
other users.
In order to protect forward secrecy, community pseudonym schemes based on symmetric
key cryptography can be modified to change over time the shared secret of communities.
As investigated in [223], symmetric key updates should be generated in mobile devices in a
distributed fashion, e.g., relying on pseudo-random functions. The symmetric key rekeying
can also be done relying on the asymmetric credentials of users as described in [175]. Such
rekeying operations are also needed when new members join a community or existing members
leave the community.
These rekeying operations require coordination among all community members. We ar-
gue that the cost of coordinating key updates is lower than the cost of relying on asymmetric
cryptography to obtain similar properties. In the case of pervasive social networks, the sym-
metric keys of the communities could be changed at regular interval as suggested in [200] to
minimize costs. In addition, mobile devices can communicate with the CA in order to check
whether they are using the right current secret.
Revocation
The detection of misbehaving community members is hard if symmetric cryptography is used.
For example, any community member can broadcast spam messages to other community
members, and as the sender is not uniquely authenticated, he may be difficult to identify.
This problem can be overcome with the use of digital signatures within the secure channel
established with the symmetric key of the community. In the event of a spamming attack,
community members can require other members to use their PKI credentials in their mes-
sages [213]. This will induce a larger cost on all community members in the region of the
network where the spamming attack is taking place. Users now authenticated with their
personal credentials can be reported to a central server and revoked by using traditional
revocation algorithms [226]. Such mechanism could also detect the presence of Sybil attacks.
6.7 Evaluation of Community Privacy
We evaluate privacy (in terms of CAN and CUN) provided by the different community pseu-
donym schemes with respect to passive and active adversaries. As previously described, an
adversary collects information from the network and obtains G from the passive oracle, GA
from the active oracle and G′ from the combination of the above two graphs.
6.7.1 Community Anonymity Analysis
Let us define ρ = “A solves the CAN challenge”. The probability that an adversary success-
fully answers a CAN challenge depends on the information the adversary might have about
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the community pseudonym. Formally, we can write Pr(ρ) as follows:
σ = Pr(ρ) = Pr(ρ|pb ∈ Gw)Pr(pb ∈ Gw) (6.6)
+ Pr(ρ|pb ∈ Gf )Pr(pb ∈ Gf )
where Gf is the subgraph of G containing all edges with weight equal to 0 or 1, Gw is the
subgraph of G containing all edges with weight in (0, 1) and pb is the community pseudonym
send to adversary by the challenger. More specifically,
Pr(ρ) =
∑
Ci /∈GA
Pr(“A picks Ci”)Pr(ρi) (6.7)
where Pr(ρi) is Pr(“A solves the CAN challenge for Ci”).
In other words, the adversary may know the community of pb (Gf ) or have statistical
information (Gw) about the community of pb. The probabilities Pr(pb ∈ Gx) depend on the
type of adversary (i.e., passive or active), its strength (s and `) as well as on the community
pseudonym scheme.
Passive Adversary
Given Eq. (6.4) and (6.6), the advantage in the CAN challenge-response game for the passive
adversary can be computed as follows:
AdvCANs = Pr(ρ|pb ∈ Gw)−
1
2
(6.8)
Indeed, in the passive case, the graph Gf is empty, as the adversary cannot be sure with
probability 1 of the relation between community pseudonyms and communities. Hence, we
have Pr(pb ∈ Gf ) = 0, or equivalently, Pr(pb ∈ Gw) = 1.
Equation (6.8) shows that community anonymity exclusively depends on the information
contained in Gw, i.e., the ability of the adversary to exploit the collected messages s in order
to profile communities and link community pseudonyms to communities.
Active Adversary
An active adversary can interact with the oracle OA to discover the relation between some
community pseudonyms and communities with probability 1. We compute the advantage of
the adversary as follows:
AdvCANs,` =
{
(Pr(ρ|pb ∈ G′w)α′ + (1− α′))− 12 if |v′f | < |P| − 1
1
2 else
(6.9)
with
α′ =
1
2
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
|evw|
|ev| +
1
2
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
|ew| − |evw|
|e| − |ev| (6.10)
where G′w is the subgraph of G′ containing all edges with weight in (0, 1), G′f is the subgraph
of G′ containing all edges with weight equal to 0 or 1, V is the set of nodes in the communities
of G′, v′f are the nodes in V with an edge with weight 1, ew are the edges in G
′
w, e
v are
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the edges connected to a node v, evw are the edges in G
′
w connected to a node v, P is the
set of all community pseudonyms, α′ is the probability that a pseudonym belongs to G′w and
1−α′ is the probability that a pseudonym belongs to G′f . Equation (6.9) indicates that with
probability 1 − α′ the adversary knows the challenge and is always successful, whereas with
probability α′, the adversary must guess based on the information in G′w. The probability
α′ is composed of two parts. First, it depends on the probability that the challenger selects
the community Ci queried by the adversary (1/2) and on the proportion of edges that belong
to G′w in Ci. Second, it depends on the probability that the challenger does not select the
community Ci queried by the adversary (1/2) and on the proportion of edges that belong to
G′w in C − Ci.
If α′ = 0, meaning that community pseudonyms exclusively belong to G′f (i.e., the number
of interactions ` is large), then the advantage is AdvCANs,` = 1/2 indicating that the adversary
can always successfully guess. If α′ = 1, meaning that community pseudonyms exclusively
belong to G′w, then the advantage is AdvCANs,` = Pr(ρ|pb ∈ G′w) − 1/2, the same as for the
passive adversary.
6.7.2 Community Unlinkability Analysis
Let us define υ = “A solves the CUN challenge”. As before, we can write:
µ = Pr(υ) = Pr(υ|pb, pd ∈ Gf )Pr(pb, pd ∈ Gf ) (6.11)
+ Pr(υ|pb, pd ∈ Gw)Pr(pb, pd ∈ Gw)
+ Pr(υ|pb ∈ Gf , pd ∈ Gw)Pr(pb ∈ Gf , pd ∈ Gw)
+ Pr(υ|pb ∈ Gw, pd ∈ Gf )Pr(pb ∈ Gw, pd ∈ Gf )
In other words, the probability of success of the adversary depends on the type of information
it has on the challenges.
Passive Adversary
Given Eq. (6.5) and (6.11), the advantage in the CAN challenge-response game for the passive
adversary can be computed as follows:
AdvCUNs = Pr(υ|pb, pd ∈ Gw)−
1
2
(6.12)
Theorem 6 shows that if the adversary is able to break the CAN challenge successfully, i.e.,
σ ∈ (0.5, 1], then the adversary can also break CUN. Hence, the probability of breaking the
CUN challenge in the passive case η is:
η = Pr(υ|pb, pd ∈ Gw) = σ2 + (1− σ)
2
2
+
σ(1− σ)
2
(6.13)
The advantage is obtained as follows: as with CAN, in the passive case, Gf is empty.
Hence, we have Pr(pb, pd ∈ Gf ) = Pr(pb ∈ Gw, pd ∈ Gf ) = Pr(pb ∈ Gf , pd ∈ Gw) = 0
and Pr(pb, pd ∈ Gw) = 1. We can relate the probability of success υ to the probability
of success σ in the CAN case. Indeed, the adversary can run the CAN challenge response
protocol for both communities, and its success rate for those CAN challenges will determine its
success rate for the CUN challenge. We obtain that η depends on the following probabilities:
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the adversary can guess both CAN challenges correctly (σ2); the adversary cannot guess
both CAN challenges correctly but answers the CUN challenge correctly ((1 − σ)2/2); or
the adversary can guess one of the CAN challenges correctly and CUN correctly (σ(1 −
σ)/2). Note that Theorem 6 identifies the general relation between CUN and CAN, whereas
Equation (6.13) considers the particular case in which an adversary breaks CUN using the
solution for CAN. More details about this expression can be found in the proof of Thm 6.
We observe that if σ = 0 (meaning that the adversary does not break community anony-
mity), then η = 1/2 and the advantage is minimum. Instead, if σ = 1, then the probability
of success η = 1, indicating that the adversary has maximum advantage.
Active Adversary
If A is an active adversary, it discovers the relation between some community pseudonyms
and communities. Using (6.6) and (6.11), we compute the advantage of the adversary as
follows:
AdvCUNs,` = (1− α′)2 + ηα′2 + 2σ′α′(1− α′)−
1
2
(6.14)
We obtain the above formula by again relating the CUN advantage to the probability of success
in the CAN challenge response game. With probability (1− α′)2, the adversary is given two
pseudonyms that it knows (in G′f ) and can always guess the CUN challenge correctly. With
probability α′2, the adversary does not know any of the pseudonyms and must guess with
success η (like a passive adversary). Finally, with probability α′(1−α′), the adversary knows
one of the two pseudonyms in the CUN challenge and has to guess the other pseudonym using
the CAN probability of success σ′.
If σ′ = 1/2 (meaning that the CAN algorithm does not help), then the advantage is
1 − α′ + α′2/2, and depends exclusively on α′. If α′ = 0, then the advantage is maximal
(0.5). Instead, if α′ = 1, then the advantage is minimal (0). If σ = 1′, then the advantage is
maximum (0.5) for any value of α′. This indicates that if the adversary can solve the CAN
challenge, it can also solve the CUN challenge.
6.7.3 Evaluation
In this section, we compute the CAN and CUN advantages for different community pseudonym
schemes and adversaries based on numerical evaluations and simulations.
Numerical Evaluation
The CAN and CUN advantages depend on the CAN probability of success σ and the proba-
bility α′. In Fig. 6.3, we numerically evaluate the evolution of the CAN and CUN advantages
with respect to those parameters. We observe in Fig. 6.3 (a) that the CAN advantage in
the passive case increases linearly with σ. In practice, σ is an increasing function of s that
depends on the attack of the adversary and on the community pseudonym scheme. In general,
the higher the number of collected messages s is, the higher the advantage of the adversary
is. In contrast, the CUN advantage (Fig. 6.3 (c)) increases non-linearly in the passive case as
indicated in Eq. (6.13). Note that α′ has no influence because the attack is passive.
In Fig. 6.3 (b) & (d), we plot the CAN and CUN advantages of an active adversary and
observe that as α′ decreases, the success of the adversary dramatically increases. This means
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Figure 6.3: Numerical evaluation of the advantage of a passive and an active adversary. (a)
AdvCANs , (b) Adv
CAN
s,` , (c) Adv
CUN
s and (d) Adv
CUN
s,`
that compromising devices considerably helps the adversary. These plots give an interesting
insight on how breaking CAN affects the success probability of CUN (assuming that the
adversary breaks CUN using an algorithm to break CAN). These results provide a baseline to
estimate the possible values of the advantage in different scenarios. Yet, the relation between
σ and s is missing, as it depends on the attack and the community pseudonym scheme. In
the following section, we investigate the relation between σ and s by simulating attacks on
community pseudonym schemes and computing the advantage of the adversary for different
values of s.
Simulation Setup
We simulate a pervasive social network composed of wireless mobile devices. The simulator
models the mobility of users, the aforementioned community pseudonym schemes and an
attack on community privacy by passive and active adversaries. We model n = 50 users
moving on a grid of 1km × 1km where each step is one meter according to state-of-the-art
random walk mobility model [218]. We consider that mobile nodes move with a constant
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speed. Directions are chosen out of [0, 2pi] with granularity pi/2. We leave it for future work
to consider other mobility models. Two nodes are assumed to be in communication range if
they are within a 100 meters. Mobile devices rely on the communication protocol described
in Section 6.3 to interact. We consider that there are m = 20 communities, that each user
belongs to 6 communities and that there are M = 100000 possible community pseudonyms.
We consider that the adversary collects all messages broadcasted in a time slot t and that
at every time slot all devices broadcast a message to all communities they belong to and if
possible change community pseudonyms. We have s = t · n · nc where nc is the number of
communities per user.
Attack Description
The goal of the adversary is to obtain the graph G of the relation between community pseu-
donyms and communities. We consider a global passive adversary that collects community
messages from the entire network. The attack consists of two parts: traffic analysis and
community detection.
In the traffic analysis part, the adversary aims at obtaining a graph Ge where community
pseudonyms are the nodes, and weighted edges indicate the possibility that community pseu-
donyms belong to the same community. To do so, the adversary links community pseudonyms
based on the wireless communication patterns between nodes. For example, when two nodes
A and B are in proximity and exchange their community pseudonyms, if the adversary ob-
serves a unicast communication occurring after the initial handshake, it can conclude that the
two devices have at least one community in common. It can thus link all community pseudo-
nyms broadcasted by device A to those of device B. A link with weight 1 indicates that two
community pseudonyms may belong to the same community. Similarly, an adversary can link
with weight 0 all community pseudonyms used by a given device, because such community
pseudonyms must belong to different communities.
In this work, we assume that the adversary attempts to group community pseudonyms
into communities using the community detection algorithm of [33] on graph Ge. The prob-
lem of community detection in social graphs has been considerably investigated in previous
works [33]: the challenge consists in efficiently detecting communities in large graphs that
describe the relation between several entities. In some cases, community detection is dif-
ficult because the relation between entities in the graph is hidden. The so-called problem
of adversarial community detection consists in detecting communities of privacy-conscious
users [160].
If several community pseudonyms are linked to each other with weight 1, they are in-
terpreted as a community by the community detection algorithm. The adversary can thus
cluster community pseudonyms and obtains inferred communities. Yet, it still does not know
the correspondence between real communities and inferred communities. An adversary must
guess the relation between inferred communities and real communities. It can do so based on
the profile of communities (e.g., some communities may frequently visit specific locations). In
this work, we consider a very strong adversary that can correctly map inferred communities
to the corresponding real communities. In reality, this is non-trivial, but we leave the study of
such attacks for future work. In this setting, we compute the probability of success of the ad-
versary by considering the amount of overlap between each inferred and real community and
also considering the auxiliary information the adversary has about the relation of community
pseudonyms and communities: for example, the adversary may know that several community
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Figure 6.4: CAN and CUN Advantages obtained in simulations of a passive and active adver-
sary for different community pseudonym schemes. (a) AdvCANs with respect to the number
of collected messages s and (b) AdvCANs,l with respect to the fraction of compromised devices
`/n. (c) AdvCUNs with respect to the number of collected messages s and (d) Adv
CUN
s,l with
respect to the fraction of compromised devices `/n.
pseudonyms do not belong to the same community or belong to another community. This
attack converts the graph Ge into G.
In the case of an active attack, the attacker selects at random ` devices that it can
compromise. For each of these devices, it discovers the entire relation between community
pseudonyms and communities. We do not argue that the described attack is the best attack
an adversary can perform. Still, we believe that the strong adversary model considered
in this work (i.e., a global adversary that links inferred communities to real communities)
provides insight into the ability to protect community privacy by comparing the performance
of community pseudonym schemes.
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Simulation Results
In Fig. 6.4 (a) and (c), we show the CAN and CUN advantages in the case of a passive
adversary. We observe that for most schemes, the advantage increases with the number of
collected messages s. The fixed single pseudonym scheme (Single Pseudonym Fixed) does not
provide any community anonymity because, with such a scheme, it is trivial for the adversary
to link all community pseudonyms together. In contrast, the single pseudonym scheme similar
to linkable secret handshakes (Single Pseudonym SH ) results in a low advantage. This is
because the set of community pseudonyms broadcasted by mobile devices is static for a given
user (i.e., always the same), but different from other users. Hence, linkable secret handshakes
schemes effectively protect community privacy. Nevertheless, with such schemes, an adversary
can trivially track users’ whereabouts, thus jeopardizing location privacy.
The scheme resulting in the lowest advantage is the multiple pseudonym scheme over the
entire domain (Multiple Pseudonym Entire). The reason is that the probability of reusing
a community pseudonym tends to be very small as the domain of community pseudonyms
of size M is large. This scheme also provides location privacy as it is not possible to link
community pseudonyms to track users’ whereabouts. As soon as M is decreased (Multi-
ple Pseudonym Shrunk with h = 0.01), the advantage increases considerably. This shows
that reusing community pseudonyms significantly reduces community privacy, as it makes it
possible for an adversary to correlate different messages. Note that as the CAN and CUN
advantage increase, its ability to track mobile devices also improves.
The negative effect of shrinking the community pseudonym set can be attenuated by using
Hints. We implement Hints by considering the shrunk scheme with h = 0.01 and by select-
ing community pseudonyms for each community from the set of hM community pseudonyms
without removing selected elements (i.e., with repetitions). Hints reduce the advantage com-
pared to the shrunk scheme by introducing confusion in the set of community pseudonyms
assigned to communities: community pseudonyms can be reused for different purposes. This
technique provides community privacy by exploiting the limitations of community detection
algorithms: these algorithms assume that each node in the graph belongs to a single commu-
nity. Hence, Hints extend the lifetime of shrunk community pseudonym sets by reducing the
advantage of the adversary.
The k-anonymous scheme complements the single pseudonym SH scheme by selecting
k − 1 other community pseudonyms [224]. We consider that extra community pseudonyms
are chosen from communities the sender does not belong to (e.g., pseudonyms eavesdropped in
previous interactions). We observe that the k-anonymous scheme with k = 3 performs worse
than the single pseudonym SH scheme. The graph Ge of the adversary (Fig. 6.5) shows
that it can quickly distinguish communities. The reason is that adding k − 1 community
pseudonyms to each message leaks additional information: the adversary learns that these
groups of pseudonyms do not belong to the same community. With a k-anonymous scheme,
the advantage increases even faster than the shrunk domain approach. Even if the k − 1
other community pseudonyms were chosen at random, the adversary could still statistically
recognize the community pseudonyms of mobile devices out of the random values and k-
anonymous schemes would at best achieve the same level of privacy than the raw single
pseudonym SH scheme. In summary, k-anonymous schemes do not provide community privacy
and can even be detrimental to privacy.
In Figures 6.4 (b) and (d), we show the advantage of the active adversary with respect to
the fraction of compromised devices `/n averaged across all values of s. We observe that the
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Figure 6.5: Graph Ge resulting from an attack on a k-anonymous scheme with n = 50,
m = 10 and nc = 3. The color of a node indicates the community it belongs to. (a) t = 1,
(b) t = 2000, (c) t = 5000 and (d) t = 10000.
adversary can rely on the information actively learned to infer the relation between community
pseudonyms and communities. The increase is non-linear: even if devices are compromised at
random, it is sufficient to compromise a fraction of those devices to have a significant impact
on community privacy. In practice, an adversary may target devices that belong to a large
number of communities in order to improve its effectiveness.
The advantages obtained through simulations of the attack with respect to community
pseudonym schemes can be mapped to our numerical results in Fig. 6.3. Our numerical model
allows us to evaluate the performance of the attack and the community pseudonym scheme.
For example, in the case of an active attack, we know from our numerical results the minimum
and maximum advantage the adversary could obtain for different values of α′. We can map
the advantage obtained from simulations with a certain value of s and a certain number of
compromised devices l to a point in Fig. 6.3 in order to evaluate the performance of the attack.
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6.8 Conclusion
We have considered the problem of privacy in pervasive social networks exhibiting potential
threats on location, data and community privacy. We considered that people may share infor-
mation with other users based on a social graph and evaluated the privacy risks introduced by
such social network information used atop peer-to-peer wireless networks. We identified the
need to protect community privacy and proposed a framework based on challenge-response
games to study it. An interesting outcome of the framework is the analytical relation ob-
tained between community anonymity and community unlinkability. Although the relation
between these two properties was previously studied [178], to the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to analytically relate these two properties. We also showed how to use asymmetric
cryptography in local areas in order to reduce cost and provide resilience to attacks.
By means of simulations, we evaluated the privacy provided by different privacy-preserving
schemes. We obtained that shrinking the number of possible community pseudonyms signifi-
cantly reduces the achievable privacy. This result outlines the delicate trade-off between the
achievable community privacy and cost of community pseudonym schemes. Our analysis en-
ables system designers to tune their shrunk scheme to a desired privacy level, by for example
regularly changing the set of community pseudonyms in order to bound the adversarial ad-
vantage. We also showed how a technique called Hints can increase community privacy. We
argued that reusing pseudonyms across communities can provide a good cost/privacy trade-
off. We also demonstrated that k-anonymous schemes are detrimental to community privacy.
In the future, we intend to investigate other communication models and study with practical
implementations the cost introduced by community pseudonym schemes.
Publication: [93]

Conclusion
Malo periculosam libertatem quam
quietum servitium.a
aI prefer liberty with danger to peace
with slavery.
Latin Proverb
Modern communication technologies increasingly rely on contextual information in order
to, notably, offer customized services. For example, when mobile users query search engines,
search results can be customized to users’ locations. Most mobile handsets are now equipped
with localization technology and are thus compatible with such location-based services. In the
future, one of the major shifts in communication technologies will be the adoption of ad hoc
wireless communications complementing infrastructure-based communications. Such peer-
to-peer wireless communications will further improve the environment awareness of mobile
devices and enable a new breed of context-based services.
In this work, we study privacy issues that appear with the sharing of location information.
We argue that location information indirectly reveals a large amount of personal data. In
particular, third parties can learn users’ whereabouts and jeopardize users’ location privacy.
New communication technologies require novel mechanisms for the protection of personal
information. We observe that the increased pervasiveness of communication technologies
may force such mechanisms to become increasingly distributed and complex. In such setting,
mobile devices will tend to behave rationally in order to optimize their cost-privacy trade-off,
thus jeopardizing most privacy-preserving protocols. In view of these observations, the novel
contributions of this thesis are as follows.
In Part I, we push further the understanding of location privacy threats. In Chapter 1,
we study the ability of third parties to de-anonymize location traces given a certain quantity
of location information and given how location information is collected. In particular we con-
sider the threat induced by location-based services: we show that operators of location-based
services frequently find the identity and points of interest of their users based on a small
number of location samples taken from users’ everyday lives. We observe that the type of lo-
cation information shared by users determines the privacy risks: if users access location-based
services from personal locations (such as home or work places), they dramatically increase the
risk to be identified. These results exhibit a peculiar property of location information, namely
that the spatio-temporal correlation of location traces tends to be unique to individuals, and
question the ability of privacy-preserving mechanisms to obfuscate highly correlated location
traces. These results increase the awareness of location privacy threats and can thus help us
design better privacy-preserving mechanisms.
In Part II, we study the privacy architecture of distributed wireless networks and present
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solutions to preserve location privacy in this setting. In Chapter 2, we describe the multiple
pseudonym approach and the mix zone concept used to protect location privacy. We explain
how mobile devices should change their pseudonyms in a coordinated manner in order to
successfully confuse an adversary tracking their whereabouts. We illustrate the approach by
providing an example of pseudonym change for vehicular networks. As pseudonym changes
introduce a cost to mobile devices and to network operators, we show that pseudonym change
strategies should aim at achieving an efficient trade-off between privacy and cost.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we set up centralized and distributed approaches for pseudonym
changes in order to study the achievable trade-off in different contexts, thus far a research
area that has received little attention. Our centralized approach (Chapter 3) is modeled
as an optimization problem taking into account the mixing effectiveness of mix zones, the
distance between mix zones and their cost. By means of simulations, we show an increase in
location privacy brought by the optimal placement of mix zones. Yet, we also observe that
a global passive adversary can track a large fraction of the nodes. Even if this result may
appear negative at first, the threat of a global passive adversary is unlikely due to the high
cost to put in place such attack. In practice, an adversary would obtain lower coverage and
noisy information about users’ mobility. We show that such an adversary is considerably less
effective at tracking mobile devices. A centralized approach assumes that users trust a central
authority responsible for the establishment of security and privacy in the system. Our work,
by making a possible algorithm public, contributes to the trustworthiness of the authority as
it provides a basis for comparison.
In our distributed schemes (Chapter 4), we introduce a user-centric model of location
privacy to measure the evolution of location privacy over time. This model is used to evalu-
ate the strategy of mobile devices individually optimizing their trade-off between privacy and
cost. We develop the pseudoGame protocol to model the behavior of rational nodes partici-
pating in pseudonym changes. Our game-theoretic analysis shows that rational behavior in
the presence of uncertainty tends to decrease the achievable level of location privacy: rational
nodes participate less in pseudonym changes because it is more difficult for them to predict
the success of pseudonym changes. Using this insight, we develop a dynamic version of the
pseudoGame protocol that relies on signaling information from other nodes to dramatically
increase the achievable location privacy. By means of simulations, we show that the dynamic
pseudoGame protocol outperforms any existing protocols at a much lower cost. These results
shed light on the potential application of game-theory to privacy problems in distributed en-
vironments and indicate fundamental benefits and limits of the multiple pseudonym approach
in mobile networks.
In Chapter 5, we further push the analysis of the distributed approach by providing a
framework to analytically evaluate the privacy obtained with mix zones. Using mean-field
approximation techniques, we show that it is possible to measure for different pseudonym
change strategies the distribution of the time period over which a pseudonym is used, i.e.,
the distribution of the age of pseudonyms. With this result, we show that we can design
pseudonym change protocols that bound the maximum age of pseudonyms of mobile devices
in distributed networks. If the cost of pseudonym changes is high, then we note that it becomes
more difficult to bound the distribution of the age of pseudonyms. These results encourage
further application of approximation methods to analytically evaluate the achievable privacy
in complex systems such as distributed wireless networks.
In Part III, we explore how peer-to-peer wireless communications could enhance social
interactions between humans. In Chapter 6, we study the mechanisms required by so-called
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pervasive social networks in order to anonymously identify communities of users. We propose
new schemes that complement existing secret handshake schemes proposed in the research
literature: we focus on the specific requirements of mobile wireless networks, i.e., low cost
and unlinkability. These schemes provide authentication based on symmetric cryptography
and unlinkability by using short-term community pseudonyms. We show how the use of
asymmetric cryptography can be limited to local regions in order to reduce cost and still be
resilient to attacks. We identify the problem of community privacy and provide a framework
based on challenge-response protocols to formally evaluate the interactions between mobile
users that use community pseudonyms and an adversary. With our framework, we analytically
related the notion of community anonymity and unlinkability. We also consider an active
adversary that can compromise mobile devices in order to obtain their private credentials.
Our results indicate that an adversary may, based on observations from pervasive social
networks, break the protection provided by several community pseudonym schemes. We also
show that some schemes can efficiently protect community privacy.
Future Research Directions
The results of this thesis, with both their limitations and their promises, indicate that it is
possible to design communication technologies that effectively protect privacy. By consider-
ing various fundamental approaches, we hope to have cleared the way for designing privacy
solutions for emerging wireless networks and to inspire future work on the preservation of
privacy. Many research directions can be pursued:
• The understanding of privacy threats heavily depends on the information available to
an adversary. Hence, an interesting extension of the first part of the thesis would be to
further study the influence of the background information of an adversary on its ability
to infer information about users. In particular, analytical models capturing the strategy
of the adversary, as well as the cost to implement attacks, would definitely improve the
understanding of location privacy threats and have an impact on our experimental
results.
• In the same vein, the models we developed in the second part of the thesis can be
extended in various ways. Mobile devices protecting their privacy in a distributed
fashion could rely on information about network conditions to further optimize their
strategy. For example, the a priori knowledge of good mixing locations may influence
the decision to change pseudonyms of rational devices. Such information could be
captured by introducing fictitious strategies in our game model.
• We evaluated the pseudonym change approach based on simulations and numerical
evaluations, as we could not evaluate them on real systems. The feedback from a real
test bed of devices implementing the protocols suggested in this thesis would provide
considerable insight on our theoretical and simulation results. Such a test bed could
also be used to evaluate the coexistence of infrastructure-based communications and
ad hoc communications. In particular, in the last part of the thesis, we suggested to
combine asymmetric and symmetric cryptography to prevent misbehavior and this could
be tested in real systems.
132 Conclusion
• We discussed how privacy threats depend on the context of mobile devices and the
information shared by mobile devices. In order to take this into account in the design
of privacy-preserving mechanisms, we used tools from other disciplines to better model
different contexts. Our results show that such an approach can positively affect the
design of privacy protocols. This is still a relatively untouched, yet burgeoning area of
research that could be further explored.
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